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Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania in Cross-Border Area

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Abstract. The Republic of Moldova, after proclaiming its independence and being recognized by the international community, has made considerable efforts to establish partnership and cooperation relations with the most important bodies and international political and economic organizations, including by signing bilateral agreements with different countries. Being a country with limited natural resources, in the author's opinion, the Republic of Moldova cannot develop its economy and guarantee welfare and stability for its citizens, rather than by being integrated into European and world economic structures. The economic, cultural or social projects carried out between the Republic of Moldova and Romania (funded by the European Union) deal with a wide range of areas within the framework of cross-border cooperation: environmental conservation and amenity areas; popularizing destinations and capitalizing on tourism potential; discovery and exploitation of alternative energy sources; economic development and business people training; capitalizing on the academic and scientific potential of the two countries; and also the preservation of the identity of communities, folk traditions, traditional products, etc. In conclusion, the author highlights the relevance of the cross-border cooperation of the Republic of Moldova with Romania as an imperative factor of the regional development policy; which can only be achieved by defining and identifying present and potential political and economic opportunities and challenges, creating a zone of stability and security at the eastern border of the European Union – a decisive option for its future in the great European family.

Keywords: Republic of Moldova, Romania, cross-border cooperation, regional development, bilateral relations.

Introduction

Après la proclamation de l'indépendance et de la reconnaissance par la communauté internationale, la République de Moldova, pays à ressources

naturelles limitées, incapable de développer son économie et garantir la bonté et la stabilité à ses citoyens, que par le fait d'être intégrée dans les structures économiques européennes et mondiales, a fait des efforts considérables pour établir des relations de partenariat et de coopération avec les plus importantes organismes et organisations politiques et économiques internationales, notamment en signant des accords bilatéraux avec différents pays.

La Roumanie a été le premier État, qui a reconnu l'indépendance de la République de Moldova, proclamée le 27 août 1991. Les relations diplomatiques au niveau des ambassades ont été établies sur le 29 août 1991: Ambassade de Roumanie - la première représentation diplomatique ouverte par un Etat dans la capitale de la République de Moldova.

Depuis la reconnaissance de l'indépendance, au fil des années, la République de Moldova et la Roumanie ont mis en place des mécanismes de dialogue pour soutenir une large gamme de domaines. Ils étaient fondés sur des dimensions majeures telles que: le renforcement du statut spécial des relations de nos états, confirmés par des traditions communes, de la langue, de l'histoire et de la culture unique; la dispersion commune des valeurs européennes - la Roumanie en tant que membre de l'UE et de l'OTAN, en tant que partenaire stratégique pour soutenir le vecteur européen de notre pays, mais aussi pour l'intérêt commun d'assurer la sécurité et la stabilité dans la région de l'Est de l'Europe.

Les Projets Bilatéraux, la République de Moldavie-Roumanie

La République de Moldova se confronte avec des multiples problèmes politiques, économiques et socioculturels et, dans ce sens, l'intention de s'intégrer dans la communauté internationale a été promue au niveau central et régional, en renforçant la coopération des communautés régionales avec des structures similaires dans les pays voisins, y compris la Roumanie. La dimension européenne des relations bilatérales entre notre pays et la Roumanie, a été renforcée par la «Déclaration sur l'établissement d'un partenariat stratégique entre la Roumanie et la

République de Moldova pour l'intégration européenne» (signée à Bucarest le 27 avril 2010), respectivement à l'aide d'un «Plan d'action entre le gouvernement de la Roumanie et le gouvernement de la République de Moldova pour l'application de la Déclaration Commune» (signé à Iasi, le 3 mars 2012).

Bien que la coopération transfrontalière entre la République de Moldova et la Roumanie soit codifiée par des traités, des accords et des accords politico-juridiques, elle a une certaine continuité et il n'y a que 3 Eurorégions au long de la frontière avec la Roumanie: Le Danube inférieur, *Figure 1* (districts de Cahul et Cantemir en République de Moldova; les départements Galați, Tulcea et Brăila en Roumanie et Odessa en Ukraine), le Prut, *Figure 2* (Edineț, Briceni, Ocnița, Dondușeni, Râșcani, Glodeni, Făleşti, Sângerei et Bălți en République de Moldova; les départements Suceava, Botoșani en Roumanie, et Tchernivtsi en Ukraine) ainsi que Siret-Prut-Nistre, *Figure 3* (Anenii Noi, Basarabeasca, Călărași, Cimișlia, Criuleni, Dubăsari, Florești, Hâncești, Ialoveni, Leova, Nisporeni, Orhei, Rezina, Soroca, Strășeni, Șoldănești, Telenești, Ungheni de la République de Moldova et les départements Iași et Vâslui en Roumanie), les relations transfrontalières ne progressent pas trop sur ce segment. Étant superficiels et sporadiques, elles n'ont pas contribué à une amélioration significative des secteurs ciblés en collaboration: projets économiques, culturels, sociaux ou environnementaux communs, etc. Les problèmes politiques qui ont surgi au cours des années entre la Roumanie et la République de Moldova n'ont pas permis (et ne permettent même jusqu'aujourd'hui) la signature d'accords entre les états sur l'expansion substantielle des compétences des autorités locales en ce qui concerne l'activité dans le domaine des Eurorégions. Le régime des mouvements de biens, de capitaux et de la main-d'œuvre dans les Eurorégions ne diffère pas, à quelques petites exceptions, du cadre général existant. En outre, les actions des autorités publiques locales pour la promotion d'intérêts à l'étranger ne sont pas réglementées par des dispositions légales. Il manque des mécanismes pour coordonner la coopération entre les gouvernements locaux, ainsi que des règles

harmonisées pour l'administration, le financement et la surveillance des projets de coopération transfrontalière, ainsi que des ressources financières insuffisantes des budgets locaux pour financer les activités de coopération.



Figure 1: Carte d'Euroregion Le Danube inférieur, avec rouge (les districts de la République de Moldova), avec violet (les départements de Roumanie), au vert (la région d'Odessa en Ukraine)

Source: <https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldova#/media/File:Lower-Danube-Euroregion.jpg>, consulté le 25.05.2017.




Figure 2: La carte de l'Eurorégion du Prut (Prutul de Sus): les structures administratives constitutives sont marquées en rouge (les districts de la République de Moldova), jaune (les départements de Roumanie) et en bleu (les régions de l'Ukraine).

Source:

https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euroregiunea_Fichier:Euroregiunea_PRUTUL_DE_SUS.jpg, consulté le 25.05.2017.




Figure 3: Carte de l'Eurorégion Siret-Prut-Nistre (jaune)

Source: <https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldova#/media/File:EuR-SiPruNis.png>, consulté le 25.05.2017.

Les eurorégions sont un modèle efficace pour aborder les problèmes de développement socio-économique et politique des régions frontalières des pays voisins. La coopération transfrontalière favorise la croissance économique et du niveau de la vie dans la zone frontalière. Elle stimule le libre échange, le partage des investissements, facilite l'intégration de la région dans le réseau de communication européen. La coopération transfrontalière est considérée comme une condition préalable à l'intégration européenne et à l'établissement de meilleures relations entre pays voisins, ainsi qu'un mécanisme d'harmonisation des priorités politiques internes avec les normes de sécurité internationales et régionales. À cet égard, l'UE soutient la coopération eurorégionale comme un exercice de préparation pour l'adhésion des pays participants, comme un microexperiment pour la mise en œuvre et le développement de relations spécifiques au sein d'un espace communautaire et entre les régions des pays candidats.

Les projets initiés par les représentants de l'Eurorégion sont cofinancés par des Fonds structurels de l'UE (Fonds européen de développement régional(FEDER), Fonds social européen(FSE), Fonds de cohésion(FC)) et par divers programmes (par exemple, INTERREG - soutien à la coopération transfrontalière, transnationale, interrégionale et au développement de solutions communes dans les domaines du développement économique et de la gestion de l'environnement; par les fonds publics des communautés locales et des fonds privés (fondations, ONG, entreprises etc.). Les projets, dans lesquels les pays candidats à l'UE participent aussi, sont également financés par le programme PHARE-CBC (programme d'aide communautaire aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale), Instrument d'aide de préadhésion (IAP) ou L'instrument européen de voisinage et de partenariat (IEVP).¹

À partir des fonds alloués par l'Union européenne, pour la coopération transfrontalière entre la République de Moldova et la

¹ Cooperarea transfrontalieră sub forma euroregiunilor. Ministerul Afacerilor Externe. <https://www.mae.ro/node/1513?page=2>, consulté le 25.05.2017.

Roumanie ont été financé divers domaines, tels que: la conservation de l'environnement et l'aménagement des zones menacés; popularisation des destinations et la valorisation du potentiel touristique; le développement et l'exploitation de sources d'énergie alternatives; le développement des projets économiques communs et la préparation des gens d'affaires; la valorisation du potentiel académique et scientifique des deux pays; mais aussi la conservation de l'identité des communautés, des traditions folkloriques, des produits traditionnels etc.

Le principal instrument financier pour soutenir la mise en œuvre de la Politique européenne de voisinage pour la période 2014-2020 est l'Instrument Européen de Voisinage.

Au cours de l'exercice précédent (2007-2013), au niveau de la coopération transfrontalière, la Roumanie et la République de Moldova ont participé à deux programmes avec un financement européen: le Programme opérationnel commun 2007-2013, Roumanie-Ukraine-République de Moldova et le Programme de coopération dans le bassin de la mer Noire.

Le Programme opérationnel commun 2007-2013, Roumanie-Ukraine-République de Moldova, avait comme objectif la création d'un pont entre les trois pays partenaires afin de soutenir les communautés situées dans les zones frontalières, pour trouver des solutions communes aux problèmes similaires auxquels ils sont confrontés. Les autorités locales et d'autres organisations dans les zones frontalières sont encouragées à travailler ensemble pour développer l'économie locale, aborder certaines questions en ce qui concerne l'environnement et pour renforcer la préparation aux situations d'urgence. Le programme a également créé une meilleure interaction entre les communautés dans les zones frontalières. À cet égard, pour ce projet 126 711 067 millions d'euros ont été alloués.²

Au cours de l'exercice financier actuel, les formats de coopération transfrontalière concernée pour la République de Moldova sont le

² Programul Operațional Comun România-Ucraina-Moldova 2007-2013. http://www.fonduri-structurale.ro/Document_Files/transfrontaliera/00000041/yujkx_POC_Ro-Ua-Md_feb_ro_mana.pdf, consulté le 25.05.2017.

Programme opérationnel commun Roumanie – République de Moldova 2014-2020 et le Programme opérationnel commun du bassin de la mer Noire 2014-2020. L'autorité de gestion de ces programmes est le ministère du Développement régional et de l'Administration publique de Roumanie.

L'objectif général du Programme opérationnel commun Roumanie – République de Moldova 2014-2020 est d'accroître le développement économique et d'améliorer la qualité de la vie des gens qui habitent dans la région visée par le program, grâce à des investissements communs dans l'éducation, la recherche, le développement technologique et l'innovation, le développement économique, la promotion culturelle de la culture locale et la conservation du patrimoine historique, l'infrastructure et la santé, assurant la sécurité des citoyens des deux pays, avec 81 millions d'euros alloués. Le programme vise la zone frontalière entre la Roumanie et la République de Moldova et contribuera à l'objectif général de l'instrument européen de voisinage: l'évolution envers une région de prospérité et de bon voisinage, réalisé par des actions de coopération transfrontalière au profit des États membres et des pays voisins non-membres de L'UE.³

Un autre projet financé par l'UE ayant un fort impact, correspondant aux idées promues dans le cadre du Programme opérationnel commun Roumanie - Ukraine - République de Moldova 2007-2013: «Frontières communes - Solutions communes» est le projet d'«Infrastructure Transfrontalière». La mise en œuvre de ce projet a été réalisée jusqu'en décembre 2016, l'objectif étant d'accroître la capacité de coopération entre les autorités publiques en Roumanie et la République de Moldova dans la zone transfrontalière; le développement d'une infrastructure de télécommunications commune entre la Roumanie et la République de Moldova et la création d'un système intégré d'une nouvelle génération pour l'entier secteur public et pour le trafic ferroviaire dans les deux pays. Dans le cas du secteur public, l'interaction opérationnelle entre les chaînes modernes, entre les autorités publiques et locales dans la zone éligible de la

³ România-Republica Moldova. Programul Operațional Comun România-Republica Moldova. <http://www.ro-ua-md.net/romania-republica-moldova-3/>, consulté le 26.05.2017.

République de Moldova et de Roumanie est importante, ainsi que l'augmentation de la fluence du trafic ferroviaire, en respectant toutes les conditions de sécurité. À la suite de ce projet, un flux de données de 1 Gb / s a été installé et utilisé entre Iași et Chișinău et un réseau radio d'une capacité de transmission de 155 Mb / s a été implémenté sur le territoire de la République de Moldova. Ainsi, en Roumanie, le réseau de communication existant a été modernisé, et un nouveau réseau a été développé en Moldavie, interconnecté sur deux relations entre Iași-Chișinău et Galați-Giurgulești. Les emplacements fixés pour les lignes de communication utilisées pour la diffusion des informations, sont situés à Chișinău et dans le sud de la République de Moldavie. Dans ce contexte, l'installation de l'équipement nécessaire a été réalisée dans 36 localités des deux pays, les principaux en République de Moldova étant: le poste de douane «Giurgulești», IP Cahul, IP Taraclia, IP Comrat, IP Cimișlia, IP Hâncești, IP Ialoveni, siège central de MAI, IP Căușeni, IP Ștefan-Vodă, Station douanière, «Palanca». L'équipement au sein de la voie de communication radioélectrique est équipé d'après les modernisations récentes, tant dans le domaine de l'équipement radio que dans le domaine des équipements de télécommunication et de transmission de données. Les avantages des nouveaux systèmes sont à la disposition des services d'urgence, de la police, des autorités publiques locales, des gares ferroviaires et d'autres institutions et entités de l'État, qui en optimisant le temps de réaction, apporteront indirectement un bénéfice à la population. À l'aide de ce projet, le système de gestion du trafic ferroviaire sur le système Galați-Larga-Giurgulești a été modernisé en passant à l'équipement moderne d'expédition du trafic ferroviaire, ce qui réduit le risque de mauvaise interprétation des messages ferroviaires et permet un échange d'informations opérationnel et sécurisé maximal. La valeur totale du projet «L'infrastructure Transfrontalière» est de 5 225 000 euros, dont 4 700 000 euros représentent le financement de l'Union européenne, dont l'équivalent est 100 875 630 MDL.⁴

⁴ Proiectul „Infrastructura transfrontalieră”: rezultatele implementării și noile oportunități pentru Republica Moldova și România, 12/20/2016, <http://www.mai.gov.md/ro/content/>

En outre, ayant à la base l'accord de coopération entre le Ministère du développement régional et de la construction de la République de Moldova et le Ministère du développement régional et du Tourisme de Roumanie, signé le 3 mars 2012 à Iași, la coopération interministérielle moldave-roumaine s'est poursuivie et ils ont élaboré un programme de coopération interministérielle entre MDRC et MDRAP pour la période 2016-2017. A partir de l'accord de coopération interministérielle, suite aux consultations avec la partie roumaine, les projets suivants ont été proposés par MDRC:

- Mise en œuvre du programme pilote pour 20 localités en République de Moldova pour le développement de l'infrastructure rurale, d'une valeur de 1 million d'euros;
- Mise en œuvre du Projet pour l'élaboration de la documentation urbanistique, des plans urbains généraux dans ces 20 localités, d'une valeur de 1 million d'euros.

Le parti roumain a accepté comme programme de coopération pour 2016 entre le gouvernement de la République de Moldova et le gouvernement de la Roumanie:

- 3 millions d'euros pour les jardinettes (GD n 1120 du 07.10.16);
- La contribution de 100 minibus comme transport scolaire pour toutes les régions du pays (en plus des 100 minibus offerts en 2014);
- 2 projets dans le domaine d'énergie gérés par le ministère de l'Économie (le gazoduc Iași-Chișinău):
- 550 000 euros pour l'élaboration du projet technique nécessaire à la construction du gazoduc Ungheni-Chișinău (GD n 1178 du 26.10.16);

- 350 000 euros pour la construction et la mise en service du Centre d'automatisation et de contrôle sur le territoire de la République de Moldova pour le gazoduc Iasi-Ungheni (GD n 1348 du 14.12.16).⁵

Dans le même contexte, je mentionne l'importance culturelle des deux projets transfrontaliers:

- La valorisation et l'amélioration de la gestion des petits centres historiques qui se trouvent dans la région du partenariat oriental (VIVA-EAST), coordonné par l'Association pour la transition urbaine - Roumanie, mis en œuvre en partenariat avec l'Association arménienne d'écotourisme et l'Agence pour la coopération transfrontalière européenne et l'intégration européenne en Moldavie, et avec l'aide du partenaire scientifique le Département de génie civil et d'architecture de la polytechnique de Bari, en Italie. Il vise à revaloriser le patrimoine culturel et écologique en engageant les acteurs locaux impliqués et directement intéressés par les activités culturelles et touristiques dans trois régions pilotes: Roumanie - Microrégion de la vallée de Hârtibaciu, Arménie - Région de Tavush et République de Moldova - District de Cahul;
- Projet «Bijoux Médiévaux: Les cités: Khotin, Soroca, Suceava, réalisé dans le cadre du Programme opérationnel commun Roumanie-Ukraine-République de Moldova. Le but du projet: l'extension de la compétitivité économique et attrayante des régions de Soroca-Suceava-Hotin grâce à la mise en œuvre d'activités de partenariat transfrontalier, liées à l'enrichissement du potentiel touristique et à la promotion de valeurs culturelles et historiques communes. Le chef de ce projet est le conseil de district Soroca et en tant que partenaires - la mairie de la ville Soroca, la mairie de Suceava en Roumanie et la Réserve architecturale historique et nationale "Forteresse de Khotin", région de Chernivtsi, en Ukraine. La valeur totale du projet: plus de trois millions d'euros, l'argent

⁵ Raport de activitate al Direcției Relații Internaționale și Atragerea Investițiilor pentru anul 2016, 8, consulté le 28.05.2017.

partagé entre les demandeurs de projets. La République de Moldova possède la plus grande partie-plus d'un million et demi d'euros.⁶

Les projets développés au cours des dernières années en collaboration avec des partenaires de la République de Moldova et de la Roumanie, en utilisant les fonds fournis par l'Union européenne, abordent une large gamme de domaines. Une catégorie importante est représentée par des actions pour la préservation de l'environnement et des zones menacées (Projet de la collaboration transfrontalière pour la gestion de la rivière Prut, 2004; Le management bilatéral Roumanie- Moldova pour la conservation de la biodiversité dans la zone frontalière entre les deux pays, 2007). La promotion du tourisme, la popularisation des destinations et la valorisation du potentiel touristique sont également une préoccupation particulière des acteurs concernés (Eco-Rural Tourism à Codrii Lăpușnei, 2006; Développement des capacités d'investissement dans la zone touristique Hâncești-Leușeni, 2009; Itinéraires culturels et religieux: Vaslui – Hâncești - Leova, 2004-2006; Développement du tourisme transfrontalier dans la forêt Gârboavele, 2007), la découverte et l'exploitation de sources d'énergie alternatives (L'utilisation démonstrative de sources d'énergie alternatives en Moldavie par la culture expérimentale de la récolte - ALTER ENERGY, 2006-2007), le développement économique et la formation des hommes d'affaires (l'Amélioration de l'entrepreneuriat des femmes d'affaires - création d'un réseau transfrontalier, 2008-2009; la création du Centre économique transfrontalier, 2006), la valorification du potentiel agricole des deux pays (Development and implementation of good practices in bull genetic improvement in the cross-border region, 2005-2006; La marque de produit - mode de promotion de la région transfrontalière, 2009). Dans le domaine de la culture, les activités communes pour les jeunes et les enfants sont très répandus (TinArt, 2009, «Caravana Veselă»- le terrain de jeu sans frontières, un projet financé par l'Union européenne dans le cadre du Programme de voisinage Roumanie-Moldavie 2004-2006,

⁶ Ministerul Educației, Culturii și Cercetării al RM, Proiecte internaționale. <http://www.mc.gov.md/ro/content/proiecte-internationale>, consulté le 30.05.2017.

Priorité 2, Actions "People to People", Phare CBC 2005, RO 2005 / 017-537.01.02.21), mais aussi la préservation de l'identité des communautés, des traditions populaires, des produits traditionnels (la création du Centre de l'Art et de l'artisanat traditionnel, 2008) etc.⁷

Dans l'ensemble, selon les données de la Chambre d'enregistrement d'état, le 01.07.2017, sur le territoire de la République de Moldova, 1693 entreprises fonctionnent avec un capital roumain. Les investissements dans le capital social se sont élevés à 842,53 millions de MDL et augmentent.

Selon les données du Bureau national des statistiques de la République de Moldova, le volume du commerce extérieur (sans tenir compte de l'activité commerciale des agents économiques des districts de l'Est) de la République de Moldova avec la Roumanie en 2016 s'élève à 1 064 562 millions USD, même les exportations ont constitué 513.063 millions USD (+ 14,9% par rapport à l'année précédente), importations - 551.498 millions USD (-0.66% par rapport à 2015). Après la valeur du volume commercial, enregistré au cours de la période analysée, la Roumanie occupe le 1er rang parmi les partenaires avec lesquels la République de Moldova entretient des relations commerciales.

Le commerce extérieur entre la République de Moldova et la Roumanie s'élève à 267,4 millions USD, dans la période janvier-mars 2017. La Roumanie a reconfirmé sa position de principal partenaire commercial de notre pays et occupe la I place dans les exportations, avec un poids de 24,3% (128,3 millions USD), du total des exportations moldaves et sur la II place selon l'importation, avec un poids de 13,5% (139,1 millions USD) des importations totales moldaves. On a gardé la tendance de la croissance de 23,14% du volume commercial entre la Moldavie et la Roumanie, pendant la période janvier-mai 2017, qui a gagné 455,02 millions USD et s'est classé sur

⁷ Cooperare România – Republica Moldova în derularea proiectelor transfrontaliere. <http://europamoldovaromania.blogspot.md/>, consulté le 30.05.2017.

la 1 place parmi les partenaires commerciaux étrangers à la fois pour l'exportation et pour l'importation).⁸

En outre, selon le Bureau national des statistiques, entre janvier et juin 2017, sur un total de 1,7 million de personnes traversant la frontière de l'État, la plupart des étrangères étaient originaires de Roumanie (55,7%), Ukraine (27,4%), Russie (8,0%), Bulgarie (1,7%), Italie (1,0%), Turquie, Israël, Allemagne et États-Unis (0,6%) , Pologne, Portugal et Bélarus (0,3%), Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et France (0,2%)⁹. Les données fournies par le Service de police des frontières reflètent les informations recueillies uniquement par les points de passage des frontières, qui se trouvent sous le contrôle des autorités officielles moldaves.

Conclusions

Le renforcement des relations de coopération transfrontalière entre la République de Moldova et la Roumanie est souvent compromis par un certain nombre de facteurs tels que: l'instabilité politique au niveau central qui tergiverse ou supprime les actions, les intentions des autorités locales ou régionales en matière de coopération transfrontalière; la mauvaise gestion de l'impact, de la visibilité, du mode de fonctionnement ou les recommandations utiles pour les actions ultérieures financées par des fonds européens ou d'autres financements extérieurs provenant de fonds nationaux de la Roumanie ou de la République de Moldova; différentes unités territoriales administratives comme type et taille; les mécanismes différenciés en termes de réglementation et/ou d'autorisation; mauvaise communication; ressources financières insuffisantes des budgets locaux pour financer des activités de coopération transfrontalière; le manque de

⁸ Ministerul Economiei și Infrastructurii al RM. Cooperare economică internațională, <http://www.mec.gov.md/ro/content/cooperare-economica-internationala>, consulté le 30.05.2017.

⁹ Biroul Național de Statistică. Numărul de traversări ale frontierei de stat de către cetățenii străini și cetățenii Republicii Moldova în ianuarie-iunie 2017, 10.08.2017, <http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=5713&parent=0>, consulté le 30.05.2017.

ressources humaines, ainsi que la mauvaise gestion des ressources logistiques, des technologies innovantes, etc.

L'auteur souligne la pertinence de la coopération transfrontalière de la République de Moldova avec la Roumanie comme facteur impératif de la politique de développement régional; ce qui ne peut être atteint qu'en définissant et en identifiant les opportunités et les défis politiques et économiques actuels et potentiels, pour la création d'un domaine de stabilité et de sécurité à la frontière orientale de l'Union européenne - une option décisive pour une éventuelle intégration européenne.

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Current Development of the EU-Central Asian Relations: Towards the Newest Strategy through Enhanced Public Diplomacy

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Abstract. The purpose of this article is to give a general overview of the current development of bilateral relations between the EU and the republics of Central Asia by examining the basic documents such as the EU Foreign Affairs Council's conclusions (2017), the EU Global Strategy (2016) etc. The relations between the EU and Central Asia have a peculiar history and development trends. Author pays a special attention to the current state and proposes to upgrade these relations through enhancement of public diplomacy tools. This article has been prepared in connection with the development of a the EU newest Strategy for Central Asia which is under elaboration process. Therefore, author, primarily, tries to re-assess the 26-year old history of the relationship between the EU and CA, to identify existing problems and areas of inefficiency, and help find solutions to the issues through the academic and scientific instruments.

Keywords: the European Union, Central Asian republics, Partnership, EU-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting, World politics, the EU Global strategy, EU strategy for Central Asia, implementation instruments, international legal liability, public diplomacy.

Central Asia has a centuries-old tradition of bringing Europe and Asia together as it lies at a strategically important intersection between the two continents. The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have undergone serious political and economic transformations since the beginning of their independence. When CA countries entered into the international scene as independent states 27 years ago, a number of European countries started establishing a permanent dialogue with them.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and emergence of new independent states in Central Asia (CA) in the 1990s led to significant geopolitical changes. The formation of the republics of Central Asia was taking place during a crucial moment in the history of international relations and encouraged to change the geopolitical situation on the Eurasian continent, adjusting the interests of world powers. With its rich natural resources, important geographical position and high human potential, the Central Asian region is within the partnership and collaborative interests of the European Union. Particularly, the EU Commission makes a special emphasis on the EU has strategic interests in Central Asia in its "Communication with the newly independent states of Central Asia"¹. However, along with this, US, Russian, Chinese and Iranian interests are also at stake. This means the region is also a place for fierce competition for the EU, which defines the place of Europe in the 21st Century World Politics.

The EU-CA relations have been instituted on the basis of recognition of mutual and equal interests. On December 31, 1991 the European Communities and the twelve member states recognized the state independence of the Central Asian new independent states in their "Joint Declaration of the Twelve"². Diplomatic relations were established by signing Memorandums of mutual understanding between the republics of Central Asia and the Commission of the European Communities on April 15, 1992. The process of mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations was carried out along with the recognition of regional states in an individual basis and setting up diplomatic contacts with them by the EU member states.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the time has come for a new partnership between the EU and Central Asia states in a globalized world. The common goal to achieve stability and prosperity by means of a peaceful inter-action made Europe and Central Asia relations for increased

¹ The relations of the European Union with new independent states of Central Asia/Communication/EU/European Commission. Document COM/95/0206.7.

² Bulletin CE, n 1-2/1992. 76.

cooperation. The strong EU commitment towards its Eastern neighbours within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy has also brought Europe and Central Asia closer to each other, both in terms of political cooperation and economic development.

Up to present days, these relations have significantly developed and revealed closeness of values, economic and security interests. The growing dynamics of bilateral relations between the EU Member States and the countries of Central Asia also confirmed that there is a significant potential for strategic cooperation between the EU and CA region.

However, EU-CA relationship has not reached its peak yet. Within the framework of current relationships there are many unutilized spaces, and these are the areas of opportunity. Prospects of the future cooperation will depend on the effective utilization of those missed opportunities. Particularly, many challenges facing the globalized world affect Europe and Central Asia alike, and warrant a common response. Security questions and regional economic development require close cooperation of the EU with each Central Asian state, taking into account their geographical location, in particular with respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. This applies to developments in the areas of border management, migration, the fight against organized crime and international terrorism, as well as human, drugs, and arms trafficking.

The dependency of the EU on external energy sources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. EU efforts to strengthen local energy markets will help to improve investment conditions, increase energy production and efficiency in Central Asia and diversify energy supply and distribution in the region.

At the time of the European Union's recognition in the international arena as a major economic and financial institute, the necessity of uplifting Central Asian political, economic, trade and cultural relations with this organization and its member states to a new stage requires elaboration of a thorough analysis of politico-legal and economic bases of these bilateral

relations. New prospects of partnership and cooperation relations have exposed the prerequisite necessity for broadening and consolidating treaty-legal foundations of bi- and multilateral relations. These types of situations determine the pressing need for examining all aspects and legal sources of the European Union – Central Asia interactions.

The necessity of raising the relations between the European Union and Central Asia to a new level is felt by the leaders of the two sides, and the EU's new initiatives are evident.

The Council of the European Union, in its document entitled “The European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”, adopted 23 June 2007, made the European Union’s strategic interests in the region even clearer³. EU-Central Asia relations have been developed under this strategy of the EU. The EU Strategy for Central Asia which has been implemented for more than 10 years foresees that progress made on implementing the Strategy be reviewed in 2008 and every two years thereafter. Four implementation progress reports have been prepared in 2008, 2010 and 2012, 2015 (13 January) respectively. The conclusions adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 June 2012 approved the latest progress report and confirmed that all priority areas of the Strategy remained important⁴.

In the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, entitled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”, announced and elaborated by the High Representative Federica Mogherini in 2016, has been emphasized that “The EU internal and external security are ever more intertwined: its security at home depends on peace beyond European borders. ...It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa. ...In Central and South Asia, we will deepen

³ The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a new partnership - <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010113%202007%20INIT>

⁴ Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia - http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/20120628_progress_report_en.pdf

cooperation on counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking and migration, as well as enhance transport, trade and energy connectivity”⁵. In the EU Global Strategy, the High Representative Federica Mogherini paid a specific attention to EU-Central Asia relations and defines the priority of the inter-regional cooperation such as fight on counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking and migration, as well as enhance transport, trade and energy connectivity.

As a next step, the EU Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions on the EU newest strategy for the region on June 19, 2017. The Council therefore asked the High Representative and the Commission to come forward with a proposal for a new Strategy by the end of 2019 in accordance with the EU Global Strategy. According to Council’s statement, alongside high level political dialogue support to education, intercultural dialogues, cooperation between civil society entities, people-to-people contacts between the EU and Central Asia should be emphasized in the new strategy. The Council also underlines the importance of support to education. Education programmes provided by the EU and individual Member States should play a key role in helping Central Asian institutions to build capacity to offer modern and inclusive curricula that respond to the needs of the labour market and contribute to the promotion of the values of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and intercultural dialogue, by making full use of the existing Education Initiative and its Platform. On the tenth anniversary of the original Central Asia strategy the Council believes that it is time to review and renew our relationship, taking into account new geopolitical realities and the evolving needs and capacities of the Central Asian partners⁶.

On November 10-11, 2017, HR/VP Federica Mogherini paid a visit Uzbekistan for the first time to participate in EU-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting “EU and Central Asia: Working for a Safer and More Prosperous Future Together” during which she officially called CA partners

⁵ <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/shared-vision-common-action-stronger-europe>

⁶ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/conclusions-central-asia/>

for a partnership for change, for development and for security. According to the HR/VP Federica Mogherini “The European Union and Central Asia are partners for change... But this isn't just about business, as it wasn't just about the trade route. Diversity and pluralism are written in this region's history, and there is no reason to fear them, be it on Central Asian territory, in Europe or elsewhere. On the contrary, diversity and pluralism can only make our States and our societies stronger. With independent media, an open space for civil society, human rights for all, institutions are more credible, States more resilient in times of crisis – and you know that we are crossing times of crisis - and economies are more solid and attractive. This is another interest we share. A partnership for change is a partnership for innovation, for research and for human growth”⁷. At this meeting she announced the call by the EU Foreign Affairs Council for a new EU Central Asia Strategy by the end of 2019, which should be based on mutual interests, common approaches and values of the EU and countries of the region.

In its turn, the high officials of the Central Asian countries focused on the potential for enhanced economic relations between the EU and the Central Asian countries. Strengthening the nexus between security, migration, climate change and economic sustainable development could contribute to stronger economies. Transparent rules and regulations, as well as increased use of e-governance solutions, are important for a favourable investment climate and private sector development in the countries of Central Asia, which will promote the region's further sustainable economic development⁸.

⁷ Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the opening ceremony of the International Conference on Security and Sustainable Development under the auspices of the United Nations: "Central Asia: Shared past and common future, cooperation for sustainable development and mutual prosperity", Samarkand, Uzbekistan, 10/11/2017: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35422/speech-hrvp-federica-mogherini-opening-ceremony-international-conference-security-and_en

⁸ Joint Communiqué: European Union - Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting “EU and Central Asia: Working for a Safer and More Prosperous Future Together”, Samarkand, 10/11/2017: <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35423/joint->

Hence, present conditions themselves require a more constructive and comprehensive discourse on the history, current status and future prospects of the EU-CA relationships. Indeed, in order to effectively solve the issues at hand and set a right path for the future development of cooperation, we need to look back to the history and carefully re-assess it. Past twenty-seven years have been the period of test in the relationship between the EU and CA countries. Thus, at this stage, it is very essential to review and evaluate the results, and to establish an agenda for further strengthening the relations.

However, EU-CA relations have not been linear throughout the past years. It is even difficult to say that the relationship between the two sides will be smooth in upcoming years. There are many internal and external factors that might impact on the course of bilateral and multilateral relations. But it is also to acknowledge that past years have seen a wide range of positive developments in EU-CA relations. So, problems and successes usually come side by side. Therefore, we should work on these problems in order to find a constructive solutions to them in the future. The followings could be the areas to start:

First, although the official level relations (i.e. diplomatic and intergovernmental) have been developing steadily, unofficial relations i.e. public diplomacy (relations between nongovernmental structures, civil society institutions) remain underdeveloped and need to be given serious attention;

Second, EU-CA relations have not been noticed (or, unpopular) in “lower” levels of society. Ordinary public is not well informed about the contributions of such relationships in their lives. Recent developments in EU’s internal and external policies, Brexit and other events have increased a necessity for reliable and unbiased information about the EU and its’ consequences in other regions like CA;

Third, academic and scientific exchanges are also insufficiently developed. Scientific publications and scholarly works on the European Union remain underdeveloped in Central Asia. EU-CA academic networks, scientific communities, joint projects and grants well below their actual potential. Fostering relations between academic communities may contribute to the further development of other areas like cultural and scientific cooperations, mutual understanding between peoples, business-touristic cooperation in, etc. Therefore, it is very important to convene non-officials, civil societies and academic representatives around the table through the joint workshops and seminars, and to increase the amount and quality of publications (both public and scientific) in order to provide policy makers as well as general public with reliable and necessary information.

Therefore, it is high time to re-assess the 27-year old history of the relationship between the EU and CA, to identify existing problems and areas of inefficiency, and help find solutions to the issues through the academic and scientific instruments. In doing so, the EU newest strategy on Central Asia should concentrate on two interconnected factors: fostering the dialogue between the academic world, policy-makers, public servants, and civil society institutions, on the one hand, and disseminating information among the general public at large, on the second hand.

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Georgian Dilemma: Concerns for National Identity and Quests for Europeanness

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Abstract. This article discusses Georgians' online discourses of national identity in the context of Europeanisation focusing on two periods perceived by Georgians as the most important steps towards EU integration: Georgia's initialling of the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 and signing of it in June 2014. It investigates the ambivalence encountered by Georgians: their strong aspiration to integrate with the EU is combined with their perception of Europeanisation as a threat to their national identity. However, national sentiment is expressed differently while performed for the domestic and international audiences, as well as in the two periods: before Georgia signed the association agreement with the EU, the domestic discourses revolved around the threats to the national identity, while this concern seemed to fade and Georgians passionately asserted their Europeanness in front of the international audience. After signing the association agreement, the discourses intended for the international community have penetrated into the domestic backstage and Georgians' concerns have shifted from the declining national identity to their fragile or even questionable Europeanness.

Keywords: EU-Georgia Association Agreement, Europeanisation, national identity, online discourse, domestic backstage, international front stage.

Introduction

In November 2013 Georgia initialled an Association Agreement with the EU, which was signed in June 2014.¹ Georgians consider this event as a crucial step towards ensuring the country's security and its 'European' identity (MacFarlane 2012; German 2015). The political elite's pro-European

¹ The details of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement are provided at the EEAS website: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:261:FULL&from=EN> (accessed 1 May 2018).

attitudes, which resulted in declaring EU integration as Georgia's main foreign policy priority,² have been manifest since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Kakachia and Minesashvili 2015). Likewise, popular support for EU integration has constantly been high, as illustrated by the representative public opinion polls by CRRC-Georgia.³ However, a look behind the official discourses and a critical review of the available statistics disclose a rather complicated picture: Georgians mix their strong support for the EU with a significant concern about what impact such an integration might have on their national identity. For instance, despite the political elite's excessive hopes attached to EU integration, their narratives reveal the identity concerns attributed to the EU's neglect of the country's security threats that result from its pro-European aspirations (Rinnert 2011). Furthermore, despite predominantly Euroenthusiastic public attitudes, the abovementioned CRRC-Georgia surveys also reveal that around a third of respondents think that the EU threatens Georgian traditions.⁴

In this article, I analyse Georgians' popular discourses of national identity in the context of Europeanisation to reveal 'how national sentiment is experienced' (Woods and Tsang, 2014: 2) and expressed. I explore such discourses in the online space, especially in social media, which has become an increasingly popular venue for discussions of EU-related issues. I show that Georgians often express their national sentiment ironically, which serves similar function as that described by Maria Louw in her paper 'Being Muslim the Ironic Way: Secularism, Religion and Irony in Post-Soviet

² Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy 2006-2009, available at: http://usa.mfa.gov.ge/files/-Documents/strategy2006_2009.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018); Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy 2015-2018, available at: <http://mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/ForeignPolicyStrategy.aspx> (accessed 1 May 2018).

³ Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017. Although the 2015 wave shows some decline in popular support for EU integration, the 2017 wave shows an upward trend again, available at: www.crrc.ge (accessed 1 May 2018).

⁴ The portion of those seeing the EU as a threat to the national traditions has been showing a tendency towards increase since 2009. *Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia: Trends and Variations 2009-2015*, available at: <http://www.epfound.ge/english/current-programs-activities/european-integration/public-opinion-polls/public-opinion-polls-.html> (accessed 1 May 2018).

Kyrgyzstan'. As Louw argues, irony 'allows people to be religious and not religious' (2012: 157-158), that it is 'a reflexive way of relating to and exploring their Muslimness' (2012: 155). In line with Louw, I would argue that irony allows Georgians to be nationalist and not nationalist, and that it is 'a reflexive way of relating to' their Georgianness and exploring it in the context of Europeanisation.

To set the scene, I start from the past and show how national sentiment was expressed by one of the most prominent founders of the Georgian nationalist movement in the 19th century – Ilia Chavchavadze. While developing a project of 'Georgia's national rebirth' under the Russian Empire, Ilia Chavchavadze wrote his poem 'Happy Nation' that caused lots of confusion among his compatriots. The first line: 'Is there any other nation as happy as we are?' and the first verse portraying Georgians as grateful, industrious, honest, and brave, was immediately followed by the description of the nation as 'unable to identify an enemy, condemning a friend; cowardly outside and brave inside; possessing nothing and knowing nothing, careless and hungry'.⁵ The irony implied in the first verse becomes obvious straightaway.

How can irony be viewed in the context of nationalism? Guhin argues that irony is a discourse and 'a trope that could [...] strengthen the romantic story of the nation' (2013: 23). Others think that irony might play an essential role in both the construction of nationalism (Lee, 2004) and the promotion of more nuanced forms of nationalism (Rothenburger, 2010).⁶ No doubt, irony is a way of reflecting on those aspects of national identity and nationalism that evoke special embarrassment. This seems to represent a true dilemma for contemporary Georgians who both proudly articulate their Georgianness and attempt to integrate in the EU often referred to as a post-nationalist formation (Delanty, 2003). To add to the complexity of the

⁵ Because the English translation of the poem is not available, this fragment has been translated by me.

⁶ On irony in political discourses see: Boyer D and Yurchak A (2010) *American Stioch: Or, What Late-Socialist Aesthetics of Parody Reveal about Contemporary Political Culture in the West*.

matter, the evidence shows that traditional national identities within the EU still take precedence over any pan-European identity.⁷ Hence, people tend to 'support the membership of the EU on practical grounds, but their emotional loyalty (feelings of national pride, etc.) continues to be directed towards their country of origin' (Miller, 1995: 160). This argument is supported by the analysis of the Eurobarometer series regarding national attachment and national pride since 1991, which shows that one can hardly find any quantitative evidence for the decline of national identities even in Western Europe (Antonsich, 2009: 288). Although Georgian scholar Ghia Nodia ironically notes that 'it would be naive for Georgians to be embarrassed about their not-yet-postmodern-enough nationalism and try getting rid of it in favor of recycled European multiculturalist dreams that are losing credit in their multiple homelands' (2009: 97), Georgians' embarrassment is still apparent. But is this irony meant to contribute to weakening of national embarrassment by showing that it is useless to give up one's 'not-yet-postmodern-enough nationalism' in favour of a failed post-nationalist project that Europeans themselves do not believe in?

Herein Michael Herzfeld's (2005) concept of 'cultural intimacy', implying those aspects of national identity that represent a source of both pride and embarrassment, is especially relevant. Based on the argument that '(n)ational embarrassment can become the ironic basis of intimacy and affection within the private spaces of the national culture' (2005: 29), we might expect to find that national embarrassment and the irony it provokes serve as an essential unifying force for any national culture.

That for contemporary Georgians their national identity is a source of both pride and embarrassment is evident from the nationwide representative surveys. In the ISSP 2013 Georgia survey on National

⁷ See International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) modules on National Identity 1995, 2003 and 2013, available at: <http://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/national-identity/> (accessed 1 May 2018).

Identity,⁸ 88.8% of the respondents report they are proud of being Georgian (71.7% stating that they are very proud, whereas only 0.2% are not proud at all). The investigation into what makes Georgians feel proud of being Georgian leaves a confused picture. 65.8% of the respondents are, for instance, not very proud or not proud at all of the way democracy works in the country, 64.7% are not proud of the country's political influence in the world, 60% express dissatisfaction with the social security system, and 71.7% have a negative view on the country's economic achievements. Lacking pride in their country's socioeconomic and political developments would naturally cause Georgians' embarrassment if their 'civilizational inferiority' was not counterbalanced by a feeling of cultural or 'spiritual superiority' (Morawska, 2003: 172). That such a cultural or spiritual superiority exists is indicated by the fact that 74.6% of the respondents feel proud or very proud of their country's achievements in arts and literature. Likewise, 74.2% of the respondents report pride in Georgia's sporting achievements and 73% give kudos to the armed forces. Finally, Georgia's history constitutes a special source of pride with 90% of the respondents reporting that they are proud or very proud of it. The items from the latter list, especially history, seem to be of particular importance in raising national sentiments. Indeed, as Anthony Smith notes, it is the use of poetic spaces and history that is key in constructing the cognitive maps of nations (1991: 78). Apparently, the reference to cultural and not 'civilizational' achievements is decisive in the confrontation between pride and embarrassment, reflected in the 88.8% of Georgians who are proud of their national identity.

An interesting question that emerges in this context is the interrelation between national pride and EU integration. As Carey (2002) illustrates, the higher the level of national pride, the more European integration is perceived as a threat to national identity. Apparently, this is

⁸ International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2013 module on National Identity, Georgia, available at: <http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-profiles/national-identity/2013/> (accessed 1 May 2018).

one of the main reasons for the ambivalence experienced by Georgians: their strong aspiration to integrate with the EU is combined with their perception of Europeanisation as a certain threat to the Georgian identity. The evidence shows that such ambivalence is not unique to Georgians but was characteristic of Central and Eastern Europeans both prior to and following their EU accession (Kuus, 2007; Krzyzanowski, 2009; Kavalski, 2010; Fox and Vermeersch, 2010; Risse, 2010; Tsuladze, 2013). A similar ambivalence is characteristic of other Eastern Partnership countries, particularly Moldova that initialled and signed the association agreement with the EU on the same day as Georgia.⁹ It should be underlined that although the studies demonstrate that those exhibiting exclusive national identity, fears for its loss, and feelings of cultural threat reveal the resistance to EU enlargement (Toshkov et al., 2014: 22), the Georgian case shows that while possessing these characteristics Georgians are still highly supportive of it (Dimitrov, Haralampiev and Stoychev, 2015).

Methodology

Although representing a reliable source of information, a public opinion poll can hardly provide a 'thick description' (Geertz, 2000: 3) needed to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues related to national identity and nationalism, which are considered to be discursive constructs (Billig, 1995; Brubaker, 1996; Calhoun, 1997; Bruner, 2005; Tzanelli, 2008; Lapeyronnie, 2009). It is argued that in order to understand nationalism, we have to understand the ways it structures perception and organises discourse (Brubaker, 1996: 7). Furthermore, we can assume that alongside being continuously produced by spoken and written discourses (Lapeyronnie, 2009: 206), nations are continuously reinvented and rebranded via respective narratives. No doubt, such narratives are produced for both domestic and international purposes. Thus, to use Tzanelli's words,

⁹ A research summary on Moldovans' ambivalent attitudes to the EU is available at: <http://www.cepolicy.org/news/moldovans-attracted-eu-not-sure-about-membership> (accessed 15 January 2014).

nations look both 'inwards' and 'outwards' (2008: 3), inventing their identity for domestic use and performing/staging their identity for international audiences, respectively. Indeed, an essential aspect of national identities seems to be their performance (Hobsbawm, 1983; Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002; Herzfeld, 2005; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008; Hogan, 2009) implying that nations choose not only how to present or perform their national identities, but also what not to perform, and to keep behind the scenes. Thus, national identities are part of the phenomenon called 'contextual nationalism' that is 'actors' selective use of national narratives' (Suszycki, 2010: 185), hence performing them differently in different contexts and for different audiences.

These very considerations have provided the framework for my analysis of Georgians' online discourses of national identity in the context of Europeanisation. In order to understand how the discourse of national identity is organised and performed in Georgian online media, I have targeted two main sources: one represents the discussions held on the most popular amateur forum in Georgia – forum.ge, where population of various sociodemographic backgrounds¹⁰ discuss significant ongoing sociopolitical events and topics. The discussions are organised into a number of discussion groups, which are open on a daily basis. The main limitation, however, is that the forum participants predominantly represent the urban population with Internet access, especially from the capital. The forum's largest thematic section entitled 'Politics', among other topics, includes the discussions on Georgians' attitudes towards the EU, EU policy towards Georgia, the country's history and traditions, aspects of Georgian nationalism and the impact of recent political developments on the latter. In the studied period, the section consisted of more than 150,000 themes

¹⁰ One can find here different segments of population, whose age, educational background, and occupation considerably vary. Although their background variables are anonymous, their gender and approximate age are easy to identify from the texts. Not infrequently their narratives also provide the information about their education and employment status: the latter varies from recent graduates to housewives, from public servants to NGO employees.

making it most popular among the forum's participants.¹¹ Because of the discussants' immediate reflections on ongoing events, I was following relevant discussions on a daily basis from November 2013, when Georgia initialled the association agreement with the EU.

Another source of the data is a Facebook discussion group entitled 'National Identity and Europeanisation in Georgia' created by me. The group had 47 members: 18-25-year-old males and females, mainly BA, MA and PhD students of Social Sciences and Humanities at Tbilisi State University.¹² I started the Facebook group on November 3, 2013, familiarising the young people with my research objectives, getting their consent to participate in the research, and asking them to reflect on Georgia's westward aspirations and their implications for national identity. While being a passive observer of the discussions held on the forum.ge, I was posting questions and moderating discussions in the Facebook group. The two sources allow for a comparison of the discourses of national identity as affected by Europeanisation in the two periods (the initialling and signing of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement), as well as by the two groups: a large anonymous group of the forum participants and a closed Facebook group of the younger generation with higher education. The latter represents a category that, according to the abovementioned CRRC-Georgia surveys, is the most pro-EU segment of the population.

The gathered data were subjected to discourse analysis. The special feature of online discourses is that by introducing new 'participant frameworks' (Goffman 1981) the online media enhances a sense of co-presence and brings its language closer to spoken than written discourse; hence, the discussions among the forum and Facebook participants were closer to group conversations. This conversation mode and its accompanying sense of co-presence had an impact on the way the

¹¹ The forum discussions are available at: www.forum.ge (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹² Teaching at Tbilisi State University myself, I could easily involve in this group my students and their friends interested in EU-related issues. The Facebook discussion group is available at: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1423036884580622/> (accessed 1 May 2018).

sentiments were simultaneously experienced and expressed (especially since a number of discussions were taking place in the course of actual events, say, while signing the EU-Georgia association agreement). Therefore, it was essential to analyse not only how the participants attempted to negotiate problematic questions, but also to look at the organisation of discussions turn by turn and the participants' use of language and metaphor, as well as to disclose their underlying motivations and ideological perceptions. Thus, the online discussions have been analysed 'both in a literal sense of what goes into its making and at an ideological level' (O'Keeffe, 2011: 441).

Ironical expressions of national sentiment

'What do we, Georgians, possess?'¹³ This question posted on the forum.ge a month prior to the initialling of the EU-Georgia association agreement, immediately got responses such as 'the future that is to come, our potential' (Ignited, male) and 'only history' (BERU, male). There is a sad irony implied in both phrases, which becomes obvious when following the issuing discussion: We possess... 'people running on the highways and cars parked on the pavements'; 'more churches than factories'; 'the institution of virginity'; 'Stalin and his heritage'; 'Georgian hubbub'; 'wine and women'¹⁴... These are just a few items from a long list, which perhaps are not easy to comprehend without the intimate knowledge of Georgian reality. They obviously represent the aspects of cultural intimacy that are considered embarrassing though are often proudly presented to outsiders as the most fabulous features of Georgian culture. For instance, the first sights Georgians would most likely take their guests to are old monasteries and churches, and visitors would certainly think that their hosts are proud rather than embarrassed by their abundance. Likewise, the first thing the guests

¹³ The discussion is available at: <http://forum.ge/?f=29&showtopic=34584426> (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹⁴ 'Wine and women' is a shortened version of 'wine, duduk, women' (the Georgian equivalent of 'wine, women, and song') that is often attributed to Georgian men.

would taste is probably Georgian wine, which would hardly have a negative connotation while hosting them; the first encounter with the food would certainly be a Georgian feast (hardly anyone would dare call it a hubbub then), which marks one of the most spectacular aspects of Georgian hospitality.

It seems that self-irony is used as a self-defence strategy whereby 'others' are blamed for one's current situation. The most natural way to do so is to find such 'others' in recent history, the memory of which is still present. In this case, the most relevant referent is Russia with its cultural expansionism believed to be the main reason why Georgian traditions were distorted and turned into a spectacle devoid of authenticity:

I think the century-old Georgian traditions ceased to exist as a result of Russian cultural expansion. In this very period Georgian table traditions were distorted, the institution of hospitality turned into a means of swindling and showing off, and Georgian idleness became prominent, making many of us think that it has been our inborn feature since remote ages. (Nirvana, male)

This outbreak of little nationalism plays an important role: it can be argued that referring to 'the century-old Georgian traditions' that 'most likely never existed ... [encourages] the legitimation of discourses of *re-nationalism*' (Kavalski, 2010: 213), illustrated by the next discussant who, using Billig's words, ardently plays the patriotic card (1995: 99). He states that there is no need of either self-irony or self-excuses as:

We possess more or less the same as other nations do. What we lack though is rationality, as our excessive emotionality constitutes a real problem. We need more education as we lack critical thinking and cognition. We give up too quickly and easily, and we are not patriots. However, if we improve these deficiencies, we will become the best state and nation in the world. We are still

better in many respects than the Russians and many Europeans.
(Isaac Clarke, male)

It is obvious that this narrative echoes Ilia Chavchavadze's words. As in his poem, the lack of rationality, education, and courage is emphasised. There is, however, one crucial difference: if the cited discussant had used the same irony, he would have hardly been able to conclude that Georgians are better in many respects than the Russians and many Europeans. In fact, his narrative representing an evident case of the discourse of re-nationalism attempts to persuade other discussants that despite possessing certain embarrassing features, Georgians still have significant potential and should be proud of being Georgian. The comparison with Russia and Europe certainly makes sense, as Georgians have to justify their decision to integrate with the EU rather than the Eurasian Customs Union led by Russia.¹⁵ Being in a position of asymmetrical dependence on the EU, hence facing the asymmetry of attraction, Georgians need to prove that they are 'still better in many respects' than not only the Russians whose union they have refused to join but also many Europeans whose union they so eagerly attempt to join. However, while attempting to integrate with the EU, Georgians encounter an important dilemma: How to adjust their national identity to the post-nationalist project implied by Europeanisation?

The questions directly linked to this dilemma and causing Georgians' confusion are identical to the ones faced by the Greeks, as illustrated by Michael Herzfeld (2005). While focusing on the Greek case, he notes that these questions point to rather general issues of interaction between international politics and everyday life that address the following identity concerns: 'Are we "European" or "Third World"? When do we claim which identity? In what context do these discriminations matter, and what larger

¹⁵ Such justification is an inseparable feature of the domestic discourses despite the fact that Georgians' judgments are quite close to those of Ukrainians as described by Narvselius: 'In Ukrainian society and politics a vision of "civilisational" choice between "Europe" and "Eurasia" is patterned in many ways in the same manner as a moral choice between "Good" and "Evil"' (2007: 40).

geopolitical realities do they index?’ (Herzfeld, 2005: 37). I will adopt Herzfeld’s framework contextualising the abovementioned questions in the Georgian reality and showing why they matter so much for Georgians’ discourses of national identity.

Three confusing questions

Whether Georgians are ‘Europeans’ or ‘Third World’ is one of their main identity concerns. It has gained a special importance as current debates about EU enlargement are constructed ‘along the lines of tolerable national and cultural differences between... “Europeans” and “non-Europeans”’ (Nanz, 2000: 289). As the evidence shows, even Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europeans from the EU member states reveal ‘some uncertainty about being European’ (Ichijo, 2011: 6). No wonder thus that questioning one’s Europeanness is common to Georgians, who – despite their strong desire to integrate in the EU – represent a small, in-between country with its uncertain location between Europe and Asia, and in particular, its continuous transition to democracy.

According to the official rhetoric, Georgia most certainly belongs to Europe with the EU flags proudly decorating the facades of all the state buildings. A famous phrase by the then Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania ‘I am Georgian, and therefore I am European’ seems to have remained unquestioned for almost two decades on the both political and public levels, which is also confirmed by the representative public opinion polls: according to the Knowledge of and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia, 2017 survey, 58% of Georgians readily agree with Zhvania’s statement.¹⁶ However, when asked how close they feel to Europe, it seems very few Georgians consider themselves European, in particular, only 18.4% of Georgians feel close or very close to Europe, while 77.3% feel not very close or not close at all.¹⁷

¹⁶ The data are available at: <http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/eu2017ge/EUROPEAN/> (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹⁷ ISSP 2013 survey on National Identity, Georgia, available at: <http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-profiles/national-identity/2013/> (accessed 1 May 2018).

One might in this way get an impression that ‘I am Georgian, and therefore I am European’ is a purely rhetorical tool to declare one’s Europeanness to others and maybe even to persuade oneself that one is European. It seems it has hardly been internalised at the level of national sentiments necessary to evoke the feeling of collective belonging. Furthermore, the responses to the question ‘How European are we?’¹⁸ that often appears in Georgians’ online discourses on Europeanisation sound rather pessimistic, sometimes obviously ironic. An illustration of this point is a comment from the Facebook discussion group, in which the discussant, a male MA student, lists the qualities Georgians associate with Europe, such as industriousness, order, economic stability, self-orientation, security, and equality, and argues that Georgians understand these concepts their own, Georgian way. He notes that, for instance, Georgians would agree that everyone should be equal but if they met a gay person they might not throw stones at him, but would abuse him verbally. Hence he concludes that the concept of equality remains a mere metaphoric device in Georgia.

The Georgian concept of freedom (‘tavisupleba’) seems to function the same way. One of the discussants from the same discussion group puts emphasis on the importance of the concept of freedom at the both political and personal levels in Europe, sadly concluding that Georgians can only boast of their ‘as-if-freedom’ in both respects (Mariam, female, BA student). This idea is further developed by the next discussant:

For me Europe is a plurality of ideas within a single space; it is cohabitation through having different forms and common goals, and not the other way around... Europe is not an order but a possibility of free choice, which ultimately brings an order. Concerning Georgians, we do not respect others’ views, we are not tolerant to

¹⁸ The evidence from Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe shows that this question remains central to not only those who aspire to integrate with the EU (say, the Turks), but also those who already represent the member states, particularly the Bulgarians, Croatians, Hungarians and Greeks (Ichijo, 2011).

diversity, and we have our own, specific vision of freedom, which is literally understood. 'Tavisupali' (free) – 'tavis upali' that word in word means 'one's own God' is understood as being able to do whatever one wants to do. This is our distorted perception of freedom. (Salome, female, BA student)

According to this narrative, the main distinction between the European and Georgian concepts of freedom is that the former results in order and the latter results in unrestraint. The Georgian 'as-if-freedom' reverses in this way the democratic concept of freedom. Consequently, the discussants point out that there is still a long way to go before European values are internalised by Georgians. At present the Georgian way of enacting them produces a self-viewed distorted version, which only qualifies as 'as-if' equality, 'as-if' freedom, etc. What makes the latter the 'as-if' phenomena is the fact that instead of being embedded in practice they remain on a declarative level. In this respect, Georgia is self-perceived as being quite distinct from Europe, rather belonging to the third world. It seems declaring that Georgians are Europeans, while in fact they do not feel this way, represents the same 'as-if' phenomenon. However, Georgians' online discourses reveal that they are aware that openly acknowledging this fact would hardly support the country's integration in the EU.

This awareness has become more obvious after Georgia signed the association agreement with the EU in June 2014, which once again invoked the need to justify the country's European choice to the domestic audience. Forum.ge hosted a number of discussion groups related to this theme such as 'A few hours are left until the signing of the association agreement',¹⁹ 'We choose Europe: how about you?',²⁰ 'Congratulations on the signing of

¹⁹ The discussion is available at: <http://forum.ge/?f=29&showtopic=34665179> (accessed 1 May 2018).

²⁰ The discussion is available at: <http://forum.ge/?f=29&showtopic=34657318&st=0> (accessed 1 May 2018).

the association agreement',²¹ 'Georgian products on the European market',²² etc. As the domestic view on Europeanisation foresaw certain threats to the national identity, a counter-narrative has been produced representing EU integration as a means of reviving the Georgian identity. Such a narrative can hardly be encountered in Georgians' online discourses on Europeanisation before the association agreement was signed:

Europe is the only way if Georgia is to survive. Most importantly, Georgia will regain its culture and creativity within Europe that was lost for 70 years. During those years Georgians suffered from an inferiority complex being constantly told that they were unable to do anything but sing and dance, while all the crucial questions were to be solved by the centre – Moscow. In that very period our true Georgianness was lost. In contrast, Georgia will be free and creative within Europe, not facing any impositions. Long live European Georgia! (Experto, male)

As illustrated by this passage, the signing of the EU-Georgia association agreement is seen as a means of regaining the 'true Georgianness' lost during Soviet times. Furthermore, it seems to naturally add an important attribute to the country: the 'European Georgia' has not been previously mentioned by the forum's discussants. Celebrating this new bond, some participants state that the country has never been so close to Europe and that the population will gradually feel the positive outcomes of this process.²³

However, this passion would seem rather unusual to Georgians not used to performing such narratives on the domestic backstage, hence

²¹ The discussion is available at: <http://forum.ge/?f=29&showtopic=34665352> (accessed 1 May 2018).

²² The discussion is available at: <http://forum.ge/?f=29&showtopic=34665009> (accessed 1 May 2018).

²³ Moes describes quite similar sentiments expressed by young Poles after the EU accession that was perceived straightaway as becoming "more European" (2009: 445).

meeting them with certain suspicion and even irony. As one of the discussants ironically notes: 'Congratulations! Indeed, the signing of the association agreement is beneficial in economic terms though we are exactly the same distance from Europe we were yesterday' (picpic, female). Furthermore, reflecting on the country's European choice some discussants conclude that their decision hardly makes any difference as it is up to the hegemonic players with a 'superior bargaining power', to express their views using Schimmelfenig and Sedelmeier's words (2005: 3), to decide where Georgia belongs with the risk that the country might end up in a permanent position of being not-good-enough. The discussants fear that Georgia might remain 'an evergreen university entrant being unable to get enough credits because we are not well prepared or the judges are partial' (Mepar, male). Considering such perspectives we might ask whether the creation of 'European Georgia' is possible at all. Despite certain doubts, the discussants share the stance that asserting the European identity is necessary for further EU integration.

This leads Georgians to the next confusing question: 'When do we claim which identity?' As illustrated above, the discourse of 'I am Georgian, and therefore I am European' can be seen as what Goffman (1959) calls a frontstage performance, which is used as a way of ensuring one's eligibility for EU integration; while on the backstage Georgians more or less openly voice their concerns about Europeanisation being a threat to their national identity. It is argued that perceiving Europeanisation as a threat to national identity was also common to Central and Eastern Europeans prior to their EU accession. Consequently, although they viewed Western Europe as a model of political, economic and societal progress, they also viewed it as 'a model to defend oneself from' in order to protect one's national identity and traditions (Spohn and Triandafyllidou, 2003: 9-10).²⁴ The above

²⁴ The evidence from different Central and Eastern European countries at that time can be summarised using Moes's words that in their domestic public debate the EU is often represented as threatening their national sovereignty and identity, as '[b]ecoming more "European" is held to be synonymous with becoming less "national"' (2009: 429).

observation accurately describes the Georgian reality too, especially prior to the signing of the EU-Georgia association agreement. However, after signing the document, the frontstage discourse has penetrated into the backstage and Georgians' quests for Europeanness have overshadowed their concerns for national identity. As a result, some attempts have been made to revise the concept of national identity by viewing it from a non-traditional perspective rather uncommon to Georgians. For instance, Ketik, a female BA student from the Facebook discussion group, believes that in contrast to the traditional view that opening doors to others threatens one's national identity, it is time for Georgians to understand that national identity has to do with a conscious choice and not just name, blood, and heritage. Thus, viewing national identity as a matter of choice, the discussant sheds a different light on the impact of Europeanisation on the Georgian identity challenging her compatriots' identity concerns. Furthermore, in some cases Europeanisation is even seen as an opportunity to question whether the Georgian identity in its current form – with the residues of the Soviet past – should be preserved at all.

Reflecting on the possible positive and negative effects of EU integration following Georgia's signing of the association agreement, a discussant in the forum discussion group 'Do we want the EU at all?'²⁵ expresses his fear that 'Georgian identity will lose its essence and completely degrade' (Iverieli, male). Seeing Georgia's future within the EU in the same light as its past under the Russian rule, he concludes that this permanent dependence on others has deprived Georgians of the capacity to produce anything, and that 'the degradation of Georgian human and intellectual resources will continue further.' This statement is met with irony by other discussants, who – while sharing the view that Georgians are dependent on others, unable to produce anything new and valuable themselves – believe there is not much to be preserved from the current national identity. Making a sharp division between Georgia's past within the

²⁵ The discussion is available at: <http://forum.ge/?f=29&showtopic=34605494> (accessed 1 May 2018).

Soviet Union and its possible future with the EU, they view EU integration as a means of reviving the Georgian identity. As EU integration is seen as 'the most authentic form of modernization' (Melegh, 2006: 118), the embrace of respective innovations from the EU context is considered vital for the renewal of Georgian identity. However, the discussants underline the necessity of adapting EU perspectives to the local reality and not just adopting them without critical examination in order to maintain 'the right balance between Europeanisation and nationalism' (Ilona, female, PhD student, the Facebook discussion group). This might lead to 'Eurolocalisation' (Morawska, 2003: 182) or a 'domestic adaptation with national colors' (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 1). Thus, the domestic adaptation or 'doing things the Georgian way' gains a double connotation: although it is perceived as the main reason for the distortion of European values by transforming them into their 'as-if' phantoms, it is also considered as the only means of preserving the national identity. The question is what 'doing things the Georgian way' might imply in 'European Georgia'? Furthermore, how to resolve the dilemma stemming from the dual image of Europeanisation viewed in the light of both threatening and reviving the Georgian identity?

It seems Georgians have found a solution in the selective use of national narratives. After signing the association agreement with the EU, Georgians' main concern has shifted from being preoccupied by declining national identity to the question of how to avoid the fact that the status of being not-good-enough leads to national embarrassment. The backstage discourse has thus changed its focus from the threatened Georgian identity to Georgians' questionable Europeanness, transforming the popular frontstage expression: 'I am Georgian, and therefore I am European' into the ironic backstage one: 'I am Georgian, and therefore I am an associationally agreed European' (Irakli, male).²⁶ The latter expression points to the fragility of Georgians' Europeanness. It is a matter of agreed recognition, which is

²⁶ The discussion is available at: <http://forum.ge/?f=29&showtopic=34665352> (accessed 1 May 2018).

perceived as dependent on not only Georgia's progress on the Europeanisation scale but also the interests of those assessing this progress.

Still another confusing question adds to all this confusion: in what context does the Georgian/European dichotomy matter? As illustrated above, these discriminations become prominent in two different settings – the international and the domestic – that encourage divergent performances.

It is argued that domestic 'interpretive cultural performances dramatize national myths, experiences, and values' (Hogan, 2009: 98). Even if they are performed the ironic way to further dramatise the distinction between glorious past and inglorious present, they aim to raise national sentiments and inspire a wave of re-nationalism. What seems striking is that both ironic and proud discourses of national identity might point to the same reality. As Herzfeld argues, national pride can be a mark of political dependence (2002: 906). Whether it relates to Russia with its imposed dependence or the EU where the dependence is non-imposed but asymmetrical, it likewise hurts Georgians' national sentiments. However, when these interpretive cultural performances are staged for the international audience, no traces of irony are noticeable and Georgians proudly assert their Europeanness alongside their strong aspiration to integrate in the EU.

Here again we encounter the power of contextual nationalism though we distinguish two phases: before signing the association agreement with the EU, Georgians seemed to carelessly forget their Europeanness in the domestic backstage, while being readily reminded of it on the international front stage. In the same vein, their concerns about the declining national identity were activated in the domestic backstage, while they were concealed and even forgotten on the international front stage. After signing the association agreement with the EU, the frontstage discourses have remained largely the same, while the backstage ones seem to be undergoing changes: Georgians feel the need to stress their Europeanness even on the domestic backstage in order to justify their

choice and persuade themselves of their eligibility for EU integration. At the same time, their backstage concerns have shifted from the declining national identity to their fragile or even questionable Europeanness.

What larger geopolitical reality does this signify? Apparently, it points to Georgia's rather uncertain position and vague perspectives on the Europeanisation scale. Nevertheless, the country strives to integrate with the EU and its progress towards this aim will likely encourage specific responses to the three confusing questions.

Conclusion

Looking through Georgians' discourses of national identity in the context of Europeanisation, it is evident that the ironic expressions of national sentiment provide Georgians with the opportunity to step back and reflect on what they consider the embarrassing features of their national identity. Consequently, the Georgian identity is staged differently for the international and local audiences.

Yet, comparing the initialling and signing periods of the EU-Georgia association agreement, it is obvious that the divergence between the discourses meant for the international and local audiences has diminished. Before signing the association agreement, the domestic discourses revolved around the threats to national identity, while this concern seemed to fade and Georgians passionately asserted their Europeanness in front of the international audience. However, after signing the association agreement, the discourses meant for the international community have penetrated into the domestic backstage and Georgians' concerns have shifted from their declining national identity to securing a place within the European Family. Despite the abovementioned shift, Georgians still face a dilemma: their quests for Europeanness go hand in hand with their concerns for national identity raising certain ambivalence towards Europeanisation.

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Integration Problems of the Azerbaijani Migrants in the World

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Abstract. The article examines the problems of integration, which are manifested during migration processes of Azerbaijanis abroad. The paper defines the concept and identifies differences in the problems of integration of Azerbaijanis. These differences are that Azerbaijani migrants in other countries are highly dependent on their native country. Working and living in Russia and CIS countries, often for many years, they do not lose touch with their homeland and carefully follow the social and political developments taking place there, hoping for a return in case of positive changes. In the overwhelming majority they were not completely assimilated into the socio-cultural reality of the Russian or other post-Soviet association, including the linguistic and local standards of the host. In many respects this was connected with the previous Soviet life. The situation of Azerbaijani migrants in European countries is rather complicated: there is a language barrier, a visa regime, strict immigration rules, and the labor market is sufficiently saturated with migrants from other countries. For those who are not adapted to life in the diaspora, away from home, this is a serious problem. Therefore, they prefer the post-Soviet space, for temporary stay there. Those who choose European countries, as a rule, are more confident in themselves, possess special knowledge, including the language of the host country, and therefore have to integrate in the host country.

Keywords: integration, migration, migrants, “migratory map”, migratory balance.

The disintegration that took place in the USSR changed not only the world territorially, changing its map, but strongly influenced many political, economic and socio-cultural processes. The collapse of the socialist republics is connected with international conflicts, which led to the immense migration movements of many peoples. The Azerbaijani Republic

not only could not get around these problems, but also by the will of circumstances became the biggest topic for discussions in modern Azerbaijani society. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become one of the main causes of migration processes. After the beginning of this conflict in February 1988, Azerbaijan and Armenia were overwhelmed by waves of refugees, who escaped violence and riots, hurriedly left their native places. Then Meskhetian Turks started to arrive in Azerbaijan, who became victims of unrest in Uzbekistan in 1989. On February 1, 1990, the State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan officially registered in the republic 207.5 thousand refugees, who were sent from Armenia to Azerbaijan, as well as about 48 thousand Meskhetian Turks. Subsequently, some refugees left Armenia and Uzbekistan for Russia, but the number of Armenian and Uzbek refugees in Azerbaijan Republic has always ranged from 210 to 230 thousand people¹.

After the collapse of the USSR and gaining of independence by Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1991, the Karabakh conflict has entered into international confrontation stage between the two states. Armed actions began, as a result of which a significant part of Karabakh and the adjacent regions found themselves in the zone of Armenian occupation, caused a mass flow of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons. In May 1994, the shooting was stopped².

This conflict remains, has not been solved yet, and for over 25 years the international community has been trying to find a solution to this problem.

But at the same time, migration movements affect other processes. One such process is "integration". The question of integration, which affects migration flows, is rather complex and not monosemantic. In certain cases, this depends on the similarity of the cultures, religions and languages of

¹ Article "Migratory trends and the tendency in post-Soviet Azerbaijan" of Arif Yunusov – of k.i.n., the leader of the department of konfliktologii and migration of the institute of peace and democracy. Baku.

² Ibidem.


migrants and their hosting country, even from the general situation in the country that involves migrants.

Integration in the broadest sense is a process combining multiple individual objects into one. The Latin root "integro" means "whole, unified". The same word underlies the mathematical concept of the integral. That is, integration points to the process of mixing cultural standards and values that originally functioned in the homeland of migrants are separate and possibly contradictory.

At this time we can identify several popular destinations that the residents of Azerbaijan have chosen for temporary or permanent residence.

In Fig. 1 it shows the main directions of migration of Azerbaijanis, where it is clearly visible that preferences are given to the countries of the former socialist republics, and, first of all, to Russia. Today, the number of Azerbaijanis residing in Russia ranges from 600-800 thousand people and according to official statistics of the Russian consulate for 2015-2016, 14% of the population living in Moscow are ethnic Azerbaijanis. The second block of countries includes such western countries as Germany, Holland, France and the USA, the number of Azerbaijanis in these countries reaches 120-140 thousand people. And the last third group of countries - the Middle East countries, among which the "lion's share" of migrants settles in Turkey, out of 150,000 Azerbaijanis who migrated to eastern countries, at least 100,000 migrants left for Turkey. Each region where Azerbaijanis migrated has its own culture, language, religion; therefore, Azerbaijani migrants should first of all consider these nuances.

Fig. 1: “The migration of Azerbaijanians into other countries 2015-2016”.



* <https://ru.sputnik.az/pressclub/20160219/403834123.html>

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant number of Azerbaijani migrants live and work in the territory of the Russian Federation. The question of integrating migrants into the Russian association for twenty years has always been relevant, but today it is becoming the most acute.

And if we divide the migrants into several categories, we can identify the following groups:

1. Born in Russia and considered itself native Russians.
2. Arrived in Russia in the post-Soviet period and oriented to integration and obtaining of Russian citizenship.
3. Arrived for work and ready at the first opportunity to return to Azerbaijan or go to another country.

Thus, the first category of migrants includes those Azerbaijanis who were born in Russia (usually the second generation of migrant children) and who consider themselves to be Russians. Obviously, in this case there is such a strong integration into Russian society that these migrants often very poorly know their native language or do not know it at all. They are completely lost for Azerbaijan. We can consider Azerbaijanis living in the city of Derbent an exception. Dagestani Azerbaijanis settle in the coastal and foothill parts of Southern Dagestan, essentially in the city of Derbent and

adjacent areas. Azerbaijanis living in the Republic of Dagestan, make up 131 thousand (2011, census), which is 4.5% of the region's population, or 2.1% of all Azerbaijanis of the Russian Federation³. They could retain their uniqueness and ethnicity.

However, the views and positions of representatives of the second and third groups cause concern. For many years, their visible minority has been focused on integration. As a rule, in the 90s of the 20th century were, in fact, the so-called "Russian-speaking" Azerbaijanis, which are associated with the collapse of the USSR and the Karabakh conflict, turbulent social and political events of the late 80's and early 90's of the 20th century. They caused a feeling of discomfort and a desire to leave the republic. Although many surviving links with the homeland, however, they were originally focused on the need to stay in Russia, which they received as their new homeland⁴.

Why do Azerbaijani migrants have problems with integration in Russia? The answer to this question must first of all be sought in the reasons for the departure of migrants and their way of life. Usually, from Azerbaijan, mostly men aged 20-35 go to work in Russia. Those who are 36-50 or 16-19 years are much less likely to leave. This is natural, since the life of a labor migrant is very difficult and is connected with many uncertainties, so they can be overcome by physically strong people who are not burdened with family ties⁵.

Only in the first half of this year more than five thousand Azerbaijanis, according to the State Statistics Committee of Russia, received Russian citizenship. Over the past decade, the number of people entering Russia from Azerbaijan exceeds annually the number of people leaving Russia to Azerbaijan by at least 10,000 people.

³ <https://www.turkishnews.com/ru/content/>


⁴ Article "The factor of integration in the migratory processes in Azerbaijan of Arif Yunusov year 2013 T 12.

⁵ Article "The factor of integration in the migratory processes in Azerbaijan of Arif Yunusov year 2013 T 16.

Diagram 2 shows that in the period from 2005 to 2016, more migrants from Azerbaijan arrived in Russia than in the opposite direction for the same period of time, as a result of which there is a negative balance of the migration process for the Azerbaijani state.

Negative migration balance is an acute problem of official Baku. In addition, Azerbaijanis are concentrated mainly in Moscow, which causes discontent among the local population. That is why with the advent of complications in the relations with Azerbaijan, the Russian authorities intend to develop a "migratory map". In the late 1990s, when Azerbaijan did not sign an agreement on the collective security of the CIS, and moreover, declared its desire to join NATO and, in fact, began this process, and then, in opposition to Russia's influence in the CIS, the political association GUAM was established, Azerbaijani migrants in Russia felt the deterioration of the relations in the host country.

Fig 2. "Migration between Russia and Azerbaijan 2005-2016"



*<http://www.bbc.com/russian/features-41692992>

All this caused great irritation in Russia. By the fall of 1999, the Azerbaijani-Russian relations deteriorated sharply, both sides sent notes of protest to each other on this or that occasion. And then in November 1999 the authorities of Russia stiffened the regime of the stay in Russia of Azerbaijan migrants. The mass round-ups of law-enforcement agencies were developed against them on the Russian labor markets, in the media anti-Azerbaijan campaign was fanned.

By December 1999 only from Moscow 12 thousand Azerbaijanis were deported for "violation of the certified regime". The situation has become similar, and in other regions of Russia, there is no doubt that migrant workers from Azerbaijan who now live in Russia will not try to return home, which will involuntarily force them to reconsider their attitude to stay in this country. These migrants, in fact already Russian citizens, acquired real estate, significantly expanded their business in Russia in various fields of activity and not necessarily in trade.

A completely different picture can be observed in Western countries, where migrants from the Republic of Azerbaijan wend their way. In this case, there are the following problems:

- Lingual barrier.
- Visa regime.
- Rigid immigration regulations.
- Saturated labor market, most frequently by migrants from other countries.

Absence of "points of contact", as migrants from Azerbaijan residing in Russia and CIS countries are connected with "the common Soviet past". They do not have such a common history with the West. Namely, this primarily prevents their penetration into Western countries. In Western countries, one cannot come only for temporary earnings; therefore, having decided to move to the West, the Azeris need to leave their homeland almost forever and integrate into the host society. Therefore, only those who have a certain qualification, including language, and who are self-confident, are to be moved.

It is for this reason that in the first ten years of independence most of them were sent to the Western countries by more well-formed, mainly Russian-speaking young people of the Azerbaijani capital, as well as representatives of opposition parties and organizations that had a chance to obtain the status of political emigrants or seek asylum.

Later, political emigrants and young people joined other groups of migrants from Azerbaijan. Some of them were businessmen who earned money in Russia and other CIS countries and who did not want or were afraid to invest in their country. But there are few such among Azerbaijani migrants. There were more people who in recent years have worsened living conditions in Russia, which forced them to seek work in other regions of the world, including European countries. And among them there were many residents of the provinces⁶.

Today, there are, practically, no serious problems with integration in the West among young people, first of all these are students, who come to Europe through educational programs.

As a rule, young people adapt more easily to the new environment, know languages and are ready to build a career. The most popular destinations are Germany, England, and France.

And the worst is for those who come from rural regions of Azerbaijan, because they do not know the language of the destination country, do not have contacts and support from the host country, and they do not have the finance to start their own business. These are labor migrants who, in different ways, often illegal, found themselves in Western countries. Their main problem is employment.

There is the following entry mechanism, so:

For a certain fee, Azerbaijanis or Turks who are living in European countries, send an invitation to Azerbaijan, on the basis of which the future migrant will receive a tourist visa for a legal short-term (1-3 months) stay in the Schengen countries. Of course, such a visa did not allow the migrant

⁶ Scientific research report "The factor of integration in the migratory processes in Azerbaijan" of Arif Yunusov 2013.

officially get a job. But this problem is solving simply: Azerbaijanis were illegally hired to work for Turks or compatriots, avoiding the attention of police and contacts with local residents⁷. This is especially true for those who have arrived illegally or are connected with criminal structures and therefore are forced to avoid contacts not only with local law enforcement bodies, but also local residents. Most of the illegal migrants from Azerbaijan in European countries now live in Germany and Holland, as well as France and Sweden.

Azerbaijanis have their own integration problems that chose the countries of the Middle East for migration. Here, most often, Azerbaijanis give their preference to Turkey and Israel. The reason for this choice is the similarity of religion and language, in cases with Turkey. And in the case of Israel - the widespread use of the Russian language.

Table 1.

Number of Azerbaijanians in the countries of the Near East 2016

Country	Number of Azerbaijan migrants (thousand)
Turkey	3 000 000 (ml)
Iraq	800000
Israel	77000
Syria	45000

* <https://skomaren.blogspot.com/2016/03/azerbaydzhancy.html>

This table gives an opportunity to see the number of Azerbaijanis in the countries of the east, it is worth noting that some of the Azerbaijanis living in these countries are not always migrants, due to the similarity of cultures and the ability to quickly integrate into society, many of the visitors receive the citizenship of the host country. If in the Western countries, the CIS countries and Russia go mostly men, the superiority of women among

⁷ Ibidem.

migrants is clearly visible in the countries of the Middle East. Unfortunately, this does not mean that women are better integrated in the eastern countries and find work more quickly. The predominance of women among migrants, speaks of the existence of such a global problem as trafficking in human beings. This problem has become topical since 1997, when more and more reports began to appear from Muslim countries about Azerbaijani women who illegally engaged in prostitution in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Syria and Iran, and occasionally in Pakistan. Undoubtedly, such a large-scale flow could not remain outside the field of view of the law enforcement agencies of the respective countries. So, in 1999 it became known that the Turkish authorities registered 6 thousand Azerbaijani women engaged in prostitution, and in the UAE, there were 2 thousand⁸. Since that time the situation has not changed, but also has a tendency to increase. In the media, reports of the deportation of Azerbaijani women from Eastern countries were constantly appearing. The geography has expanded greatly. But it was quite clear that the majority of Azerbaijani women were trafficked to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, India, Jordan, Egypt and Indonesia for sexual exploitation. It was from these countries that there were reports of arrests and deportations of Azerbaijani women. In fact, the problem of trafficking has become a national one. There was a problem of integration of women on their return to their society, which rejected them. This problem was so acute, that caused such heated discussions in the society that the authorities could not ignore this problem. In 2004, President Aliyev signed the National Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings. According to the plan of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs, a special Anti-Trafficking Office was established, a national coordinator to combat trafficking was appointed, a rehabilitation center for victims of trafficking was put into operation. And in 2005, the Azerbaijani parliament passed the Law on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

⁸ Yunusov, Arif. Migration Processes in Azerbaijan. Baku, 2009. 4.

So, after studying the peculiarities of integration of Azerbaijani migrants in different countries, the following recommendations can be made:

1. Given the strong nostalgia and fear of Azerbaijani migrants to lose their identity, Azerbaijan should adopt a law on dual citizenship based on interstate treaties;
2. Azerbaijan's signing of the readmission agreement;
3. To improve the integration of forced Azerbaijani immigrants and refugees in other countries, first of all it is necessary to provide them with housing and work.

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Intellectual Leaders Preparation: Synergetic Approach and European Experience

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Abstract. The models of university education development are under study in the paper. The conceptual basics for the development of the Institute for Research Staff Preparation in the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus regarded as a higher educational establishment of a university type (academic university) within a synergetic model framework are put forward in terms of efficient educational program management aimed at the forming of intellectual leadership competence with regard to a synergetic parameter.

Keywords: university education, competence, concept, intellectual leadership, synergetic model.

Presentation of the Problem

The analysis of modern higher education development exhibits some typical features which can be easily traced in most national systems of higher education at present. A critical change in external environment, the emergence of global challenges inevitably either entail the stagnation of a university organization or enable its evolvement with advance in new management models. However, in our opinion, management innovations¹ do not result in the destruction of all existing management schemes irrevocably, conversely, they imply an introduction of new management subsystems and links, traditional management mechanism optimization, the

¹ V. Gusakov, Kak obespechit innovatsionnoe razvitie ekonomiki [How to provide innovation economic development]. Nauka i innovatsii [Science and Innovations], 2016, vol. 3, No. 157, 4-9. [in Russian]

development of human capital and pedagogical technologies on the basis of a new tool base. Meanwhile the development of a modern university management model remains topical so that it should be both receptive to the advantages of integration processes in the sphere of higher education and science, and resilient to the negative consequences of inevitable globalization strengthening as well as solid in regard to the competition on the educational services market to ensure the innovative and sustainable development of a modern national state².

Methods

The key method applied in our research is modelling. We will dwell upon the existing historical higher education models and those which enjoy high popularity and serve as the basic models for developing new ones at present. Thus, the objectives of research are as follows: the study on various approaches to university management and the advances in conceptual bases for the development of the Institute for Academic Staff Training within the synergistic principles framework of openness, nonlinear management, distributed topology and landscape / educational environment creativity³, which helps both promote the dynamic development of higher education on the basis of advantages accumulation of traditions relating to the national higher school and modern integration processes (access to international resources, a synergy of scientific and educational potential, improving curricula and programs, effective advanced training, bench marketing, etc.), and reduce the negative consequences of current challenges in education.

The present university model appears to be a long-term evolution result. From the historical standpoint, a university has never stood out as an

² I.I. Hancharonak, Knyazev S.N., Upravlenie innovatsiyami i innovatsii v upravlenii [Management of innovations and innovations in management]. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 21 [Herald of the Moscow State University, Issue 21], 2007, no. 4, 27-32. [in Russian]

³ E.N. Knyazeva, Kurdyumov S.P., Nelineinost vremeni i landshfty koevolutsii [Time nonlinearity and co-evolution landscape]. Moscow, Komkniga, 2007. [in Russian]

autonomous institution of education. The sovereignty of this organization has always implied close interaction with three public institutions: power, market and church, with which a university has been in opposition or in a state of compromise, dependence or autonomy.

Organizational conservatism and the so-called closed continuum were typical of medieval universities that appeared in Western Europe in the 11th-13th centuries. Subsequently, the medieval university model with its typical "aristocratic" (scholastic) and church-oriented approach to scientific research (looking over hands-on experience) was called the "English university".

The Enlightenment gave birth to a new organizational type of university. This period was marked by the weakening of church and the strengthening of secular bodies influence on the university, which made attempts to subordinate a university's activity in accordance with religious utilitarian and pragmatic interests. Thus, the model was called the "French University". Founded by Napoleon the "Imperial University" served as a university model aimed at meeting public needs as it supervised and coordinated the activities of all the French universities of that time. The French model of a university made a focus on teaching only while scientific activity was delegated to the Academy. It was the model of the "French University" which Peter I, the Russian Tsar, borrowed and adjusted to the existing Russian higher education.

The non-efficiency of the two university models, both ecclesiastical and aristocratic, overlooking the needs of society, solely information delivering-oriented education resulted in public concerns about the university model at the end of the 18th century and triggered a wave of university reforms and shifts.

The German university model, known as the "Humboldt University", was developed at the beginning of the 19th century and gained more popularity than any other model. The author of the idea is Wilhelm von Humboldt. The fundamental principles of the new university organization were academic freedom and the unity of research and teaching. Thanks to

the ideas of freedom and the responsibility for the state and society, the focus on solving practical educational problems and developing different sciences, the model of the Humboldt University became influential. Most modern universities have adopted this particular approach based upon characteristic hierarchical departmentalization. It is possible to distinguish an educational subsystem (a set of departments consisting of departments), a scientific subsystem (university research structures), and an additional subsystem (departments performing educational, administrative and economic functions). The classical structure of a traditional university is not static; it is constantly being modernized, since horizontal links are inevitably being formed due to the participation of academic staff in various fields of educational and scientific activity. The features and the tell-tale signs of bureaucratic professional organization precisely described by M. Weber are spotted in most modern universities. However, some authors suggest that "now the organizational design of a university as a professional institution no longer agrees with reality"⁴. A rapidly and continuously changing external environment happens to be the main challenge to this type of organization functioning. Growing competition slows down achieving success if the scale of organization is taken into consideration purely. A rapid development of technologies leads to a change of suppliers of novelties that is why success is possible if innovative, creative ideas and approaches are elaborated and put forward, which implies the creativity and individual initiative competences dominance.

Based on attracting significant public investments in higher education this way to problem solving faced by most universities in terms of the so-called academic capitalism, is formulated in the article by J.I. Alferov and V.A. Sadovnichiy⁵. The authors suggest using financial stimulating of educators as well as the creation of a public-state educational management

⁴ A.O. Grudzinskii, Proektno-orientirovannyi universitet [Project oriented university]. N. Novgorod, N. Novgorod State University, 2004. [in Russian]

⁵ Zh. I. Alferov, Sadovnichii V. A., Obrazovanie dlya Rossii XXI veka [Education in Russia in the XXI century//Obrazovanie, kotoroe my mozhem poteryat [Education that we can lose]. Moscow, Moscow State University, 2002, 12-23. [in Russian]

system consisting of federal university districts, educational and methodological bodies, biased panels, an increase in the number of departments, faculties, specializations and the expansion of international partnerships.

By the beginning of the 21st century, new tendencies in the development of the world educational system have come forward. In most countries of the world, including the post-Soviet countries (except some republics and elite universities that enjoy priority support from their states) the bulk of higher educational establishments are directly or indirectly involved in market-oriented activities relying upon competition for resources. The purpose of this competition is meeting the state requirements on the training of specialists, raising funds for conducting research and advancement in science, and providing paid educational services. Some universities that have production associations or laboratories in their structure are involved in the market struggle for the promotion of their technological products on the same footing with production enterprises. In general, there has been spotted globalization in educational and scientific market as a result of the world integration, a tendency to encourage the market-oriented strategy of state universities by governments in many European countries. The Bologna process and scientific and technological development programs stand out as the examples of the world tendencies. Thus, the requirements of the external environment predetermined the vector of the university structure transformations with the shift from classical vocational organization to professional entrepreneurial organization, with a significant emphasis on business culture formation, intellectual activity outcomes commercialization, and, consequently, intellectual product value added enhancement. Therefore, the approach was named University 3.0. In our opinion, it is synergistic formalism, or rather phenomenological synergetics (in spite of the difficulties of applying synergetics to social systems⁶), that

⁶ E.N. Knyazeva, Kurdyumov S.P., *Nelineinost vremeni i landshfty koevolutsii* [Time nonlinearity and co-evolution landscape]. Moscow, Komkniga, 2007. [in Russian]

allows to single out the conditions required for remarkable qualitative transformations of universities as complex hierarchical organizations.

At present the problem of university management is topical as university management plays a crucial role in reforming higher education. It is the universities that take responsibilities for the training of specialists who are able to act as leaders in the increasingly complex and "complicated world"⁷. Hence, the need for the formation and development of psychology and leadership pedagogy arises, including the perfection of educational management, educational environment, team building and intellectual leadership⁸, ensuring the effectiveness of management in a complex system of making up a modern educational program for academic staff training. The concept of the Graduate School of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus (hereinafter referred to as the Institute) is designed within the framework of a synergetic model that enables to outline the key directions of effective scientific, educational and innovation resources integration both on a national scale and within the framework of intergovernmental integration processes with Belarusian partnership.

In accordance with these provisions / strategic goal, the Institute proclaims itself as a steadily developing unique national and leading European center for academic staff training meeting the needs of innovative economy. The Mission of the School lies in the development of human resources potential of the intellectual elite ready to perform for the purpose of the dynamic and sustainable development of Belarus.

The basic principles of the Institute development include:

- Effective interaction with scientific organizations, scientific and practical centers and public organizations of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, universities and other educational institutions, ministries and departments, providing integration of education and science and innovative activities for the dynamic and sustainable socio-economic

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ B. Macfarlane, *Intellectual Leadership in Higher Education*. London and New York: Routledge, 2012.

and cultural changes in the Republic of Belarus and integration associations with Belarusian partnership

- Outpacing quality of services
- Active dissemination of the outcomes of any activity in a professional community and the life of Belarusian society
- Personnel development management based on biased investments
- Intensive infrastructure development
- Information and innovative technologies transparency
- Active and efficient corporate image-making activity
- Searching for and providing the gifted youth from the Republic of Belarus with a broad access to elite education and scientific research
- Cooperation with leading international scientific and educational and other organizations in the sphere of scientific personnel training and managing of scientific and innovative activities

The Institute positions itself as the leading educational and scientific-pedagogical center of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. Its goal is providing well-rounded training of employees of higher scientific qualifications in accordance with the economic needs of the technological structures relating to types V and VI, socio-economic and humanitarian priorities for the development of the Belarusian state. The Institute provides additional education functions for the purpose of effective implementation of its mission and tasks set by the leadership of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, including the formation of innovative receptivity among the chairpersons of the scientific organizations.

The School's development model is tailored from that of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), created on analogy with Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2008. The activities of the EIT are aimed at promoting sustainable economic growth and competitiveness of the united Europe by strengthening the innovative potential of the states through the integration of the most promising areas of innovation, research and education by means of organizing novel international master's and postgraduate programs.

It should be noted that the EIT is regarded as a new model of interaction and synergy of science, education and business, and is promoted as a symbol of the formation of the scientific and innovation-educational Pan European space and a catalyst for the development of scientific, educational and innovation centers in the EU. In some countries like China (1978), Sudan (2004), Vietnam (2014) and others, there have been founded higher educational establishments of a university type (the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with 1800 masters and 1500 postgraduate students) whose activities do not cover undergraduate education. This approach which is especially acute, in our opinion, in smaller countries provides a broader range of highly motivated and scientifically aware young people (university graduates from all over the country).

It is also useful to analyze the Russian experience of creating academic educational systems. In the early 1990s in accordance with the testament of M. Lomonosov, "The academic regulations are supposed ... so that the Academy should not only be content with learned people, but it should also propagate and distribute them throughout the state ..." there emerged an idea of creating a separate university with the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) which might partially make up humanitarian knowledge lack in modern Russian society. In 1992 the Russian Center for Humanitarian Education (RCHE) embodied the above-mentioned concept.

It is important to note that there was no any preliminary plan for founding an ultimately humanitarian university. The primary idea assumed the creation of a university covering all the aspects of scientific knowledge in the Academy of Sciences, thus, the founders of the RCHE intended to introduce the faculties of exact sciences in the structure of the university. The original name was changed to the University of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The theoretical ideas of the university model were not put into practice because of the failure to cope with a variety of difficulties encountered.

No more than two years later (February 24, 1994) the RCHE received the status of a state educational institution of higher vocational education

(University). It became the starting point of a new Russian higher educational institution active development. New faculties are annually opened, mainly on the initiative of the chairs of academic institutes which host the faculties. On August 21, 1998, the Center was reorganized into the State University for the Humanities (SUH), and 10 years later the university obtained its academic status, and, thus, it was renamed the "State Academic University for the Humanities".

Specialist training in the field of natural science was implemented on the basis of the Academic University of Physics and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences established in 2002. In 2009 St. Petersburg Academic University as the scientific and educational center for nanotechnologies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (the Academic University) was founded as a result of joining together the Lyceum "School of Physics and Technology" of the Russian Academy of Sciences and St. Petersburg Scientific and Educational Center for Physics and Technological Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2011 the Academic University received the status of the National Research University.

Educational programs of universities of a new type presuppose the creation of new implementation mechanisms. Figure 1 shows the synergistic coordinates of the design of a master's educational program. Effective realization of the synergistic principle of openness is ensured through the purposeful cooperation of the Institute with leading scientific and educational and other organizations in the field of training academic staff and managing the scientific and innovative activities of the CIS and the Union State, and above all with the aforementioned RAS universities.




Fig. 1 - Synergistic model of an educational program

The principle of nonlinearity is realized through the development of skills of innovative receptivity among management personnel of scientific and educational institutions, as well as interaction with innovation-oriented business structures. Dynamic mobility in the elaborated synergetic model is provided through the network mechanism of interaction between partners including primarily academic scientific organizations. The competence of intellectual leadership is highlighted as one of the parameters of managing a master's program. Scientific management of a master's program is performed by an academician or corresponding member of the NAS of Belarus.

The graduate level of education is of fundamental importance in academic staff training. Along with the improvement of domestic approaches, it is useful to analyze the Bologna model of training highly

qualified scientists to ensure effective international cooperation with the countries of the European Union. This problem is acute and often under discussion at academic, economic and political forums and is directly linked to the strategic goal of the European community - the building up of the European Society of Knowledge. Moreover, as a fundamental provision, the role of research and the training of scientific personnel for the providing and the improving of higher education quality in general, and the competitiveness of the European system of higher education in particular, is grounded. It is in this context, along with the originally designated educational cycles for baccalaureate and postgraduate programs, that the European Ministers of Education have included doctoral level (postgraduate study) as the third stage of the Bologna process in addition to the two main levels of higher education.

The Bologna model for PhD students training manifests itself in "10 principles".

Principle one. The key component of postgraduate education should be the acquisition of new knowledge by means of original research. It should be noted that scientific personnel training must meet the requirements of labor market, which should not be restricted solely to academic activities in educational and scientific institutions. And this trend should be of progressive character.

Principle two. The institutions of vocational higher scientific qualification staff training will carry the responsibility for the topicality of research developed by postgraduate students / doctoral students, which can provide them with opportunities for career advancement and self-development.

Principle three. The importance of diversity is beyond any discussion. The Bologna spectrum of doctoral programs in Europe (including joint doctoral programs offered, for example, by two universities from different countries) is an advantageously stimulating factor that should be maintained by quality and practical implementation.

Principle four. Graduate students should be perceived as beginner researchers in academic environment who are able to contribute to the generation of new knowledge.

Principle five. The defining role of scientific management and attestation is vital on all the stages. It is necessary to create a transparent contractual framework that ensures mutual responsibility of postgraduate students, managers, institutions (and, probably, other partners) that provide higher qualification training of scientific personnel. Figure 2 presents the formalized model for postgraduate students training on analogy with the principles of a laser, which ensures high quality of the generated "product" through the implementation of internal feedback, planning, monitoring in the evolving system of a scientific school.




Fig. 2. Model of academic staff training management

Principle six. Achieving a "critical mass" ensures innovation in European universities. Together with that the variability of decision-making in different contexts is emphasized while taking into account various

differences in European countries. This circumstance should promote the development of international, national and regional cooperation between higher education institutions.

Principle seven. It touches upon the duration of training. Doctoral programs should have an adequate duration, as a rule, of 3 or 4 years. In this connection it is necessary to present the concluding provisions of the Declaration adopted at the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 350th anniversary of the French Academy of Sciences: "In different times great achievements of humanity were associated with changes in communication between people ... In the present digital age of the fast-delivering of information and long-distance sound, video messages and texts people often make confusion and understate, sometimes we need to stop, take a pause for reflection. Therefore, it is important to learn how to use this new communication tool in a proper way so that people would also have time for reflection, which is necessary for the production of knowledge."

Principle eight. Promotion of innovative structures is a principle aimed at providing interdisciplinary training and the development of relevant skills.

Principle nine. It dwells upon the increase in mobility. Doctoral programs should provide both geographic and interdisciplinary mobility and international cooperation in the framework of interuniversity cooperation and other partnerships. It is fixed that within the EU, the correlation of mobility in the first, second and third cycles are as follows: 35%, 25% and 20% respectively.

Principle ten. Ensuring adequate funding comes part and parcel while introducing innovations in any educational environment. The development of qualitative staff training and ensuring the successful defense of dissertations on time calls for proper and sustainable financing.

Thus, it should be noted that there is significant coherence in the strategies for reforming the system of higher qualifications staff training in the Republic of Belarus and the European Community. Moreover, the analysis shows that similar transformations are taking place in the North

American region, they are traditionally reproduced to the fullest in the countries of South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa, where the American model of higher education is cultivated. However, it should be accepted that new ideas are just under discussion at various levels of managerial bureaucracy. The current state of affairs calls for their prompt realization into the practice of concrete state / intergovernmental management decisions, which should ensure the rapid creation of the "critical mass" for building up innovative economy. On the other hand, the "critical mass" requires scientific and responsible management, which in combination with the third European principle (diversity) underlines the need for diversification of a master's programs (Fig. 3).



Fig. 3. An example of an innovative master's program implementation in the European Institute of Technology

Let's pay attention to the relevance of the so-called professional / practice-oriented academic degrees that correspond to the following

disciplines: management, pedagogy and public services as well. This is a new growing tendency in graduate training abroad.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Thus, the analysis of models and trends in the development of university management allows us to set forth the conceptual foundations for the formation of the Academic University in the paradigm "University 3.0" on the basis of the Institute for the Graduate School of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, within the framework of the synergistic formalism built up on managing educational programs on the training of intellectual leadership among scientific personnel. Non-linearity of management is realized through the formation of the competence of the receptivity to innovations on the basis of the implementation of an effective system of additional education and practice-oriented Master's programs in the School. Internationalization of education and effective academic mobility in partnership with leading partner universities will ensure a significant export of educational services and dynamic development of the Graduate School - Academic University of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus for the development of intellectual potential of a modern state.

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Reformation of the Educational System in the Republic of Moldova. Evolution and Priorities

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Abstract. The educational system in the Republic of Moldova has undergone substantial changes in its effort to respect european principles and values. At the same time, the analyzes carried out show several deficiencies that do not allow for proper adoption in european models. These deficiencies concern the imitative nature of reforms. One thing can be said with certainty, reformation of the educational system at both national and global level is an irreversible and unavoidable process, and if the process is experiencing massive resistance, if we refer to the state and the imitative way the reforms that it offers, then we will see a phenomenon that actually, today is happening, that is the devaluation of diplomas, the lack of trust in educational institutions and the search for other educational platforms, or practicing other skills acquisition methods, such as self-education. There is a need for the Republic of Moldova to focus its efforts on solving these problems by supporting education and research, on the basis of which a civilized, democratic, generating ideas, technologies and solutions for the future can be built.

Keywords: traditional education system, educational policies, key competences, informational era, creative school.

Introduction

Education has an essential role in sustainable economic and social development in the long run. The importance of education is demonstrated at all times and in any field of social and personal life. Thus, the destiny of each individual, group, and each society as a whole depends on the quality of education. It is obvious that, given the rapid evolution of society and implicitly of education and knowledge, many of today's knowledge and practices will be obsolete tomorrow. It is expected that in a period marked by so many technological changes and the emergence of new forms of organization of education and work, specific competencies will also become

rapidly overcome. The need for updating, education and lifelong learning will be on the rise. But what is most important is that the needs of knowledge and action of society and its members will be other than what has been so far. This necessitates the best reflection of the educational phenomenon of the changes or anticipated changes in the socio-economic sphere and the undertaking of rigorous researches on the possibilities of optimization of the traditional educational systems. The importance of education for social and economic development has also been recognized in the Republic of Moldova, which has led to the labeling of education as a national priority and the main factor of the sustainable development of society, based on knowledge. Thus, we can find this position in various normative and legal acts.

Although the reforms in education were initiated immediately after independence in 1991, the state's official vision of the future of the education system was only exposed at the end of 1994 with the adoption by the Parliament of the "Concept of Education Development in the Republic of Moldova and the formation of the Coordinating Council for conducting the reform of education". According to the Concept, education in our country was declared a national priority, based on the principles of democratization, humanization, humanitarianization, accessibility and adaptability, unity and diversity, developmental education, secular character of education in state institutions.¹ Based on the Concept, in 1995, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Law on Education, which established the principles and objectives of education, the structure of the education system and the way of organizing the education.² According to the study "Education and Human Development: Current and Prospective Challenges", the authors assess the normative-legal framework of the educational system of the Republic of Moldova as unstable and incoherent. In the process of

¹ Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 337-XIII din 15.12.94, cu privire la Concepția dezvoltării învățământului în Republica Moldova și la formarea Consiliului coordonator pentru desfășurarea reformei învățământului, Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova nr.17-18/172 din 24.03.1995.

² Legea învățământului Nr. 547-XIII din 21 iulie 1995.

implementing the law it was found that some of its stipulations were inaccurate and no longer correspond to the needs of a modern, market-based society. For these reasons, during the period 1997-2009, the Education Law was modified 32 times, in 2003 there was a record number of six changes. Many of the fundamental provisions of the Concept and Law of Education have not been transposed into life, the main ones being the elaboration and implementation in full volume of the state educational standards, ensuring the autonomy of the educational institutions, and the legal status of the teaching staff.³ The elaboration of the normative and legal framework that would have contributed to the modernization of the education was hampered by the intervention of the political factors, the financial constraints, as well as the lack of a clear vision of the functioning of the educational system under the conditions of a democratic regime. Under these conditions, although the Law on Education, adopted in 1995, foresaw the elaboration of the State Educational Development Program, this program was adopted much later in 1999. In 2005, a new program for the modernization of the educational system was adopted, the deadline for which it expired in 2008. The evaluation of the implementation of this Program has not been done, the political instability placing other issues at the forefront of the public agenda. In the context of 2005, the Republic of Moldova joined the Bologna Process, restructuring the higher education system into a new model of higher and postgraduate studies. Also this year, the Ministry of Education and Youth has drafted the project of the Code of Educational Laws and proposed for public discussion, but this project has not been examined by the Government. After several delays, in the absence of a new Concept for modernization of the educational system in the Republic of Moldova, another Education Code was developed, which, although approved by the Parliament in 2008, was not promulgated by the President of the Republic of Moldova then, and later, he was withdrawn. Only in 2014 the Parliament approved the Education Code in its final

³ Thomas Otter, Arcadie Barbăroșie și Anatol Gremalschi, *Educația și dezvoltarea umană: provocări curente și de perspectivă*, PNUD Moldova, Chișinău, 2010.

reading. This code proposes a new approach to the education process meant to modernize the education system in the context of the European integration process of the Republic of Moldova, in accordance with the Bologna Process. The Education Code adopted by Law no. 152 of 17.07.2014 establishes the legal framework of the reports on the design, organization, operation and development of the education system in the Republic of Moldova. It is a profound and real reform of education at all levels, it facilitates the integration of the education system of the Republic of Moldova outside the European education area, academic mobility, recognition of qualifications and access to the labor market for educated and trained citizens.⁴

The poor demographic and economic situation of the Republic of Moldova led to the beginning of the school optimization reform, started in 2007. This process has triggered major changes in terms of quantity at all levels of the education system. Demographers find that: in the last 15 years, the depopulation process is taking place in Moldova, with no visible signs of restoration. The optimization process was necessary because the spending in education is very high, International experts say that a country with a more developed economy can afford to maintain schools with few children, but our economy - no. Thus, the existing problems have led to the adoption of a number of national decisions, strategies and programs in the field of education:

- Consolidated Strategy and Action Plan in the Education Sector (2011-2015), elaborated with the purpose of implementing the policy documents in the field of education development, 2010;
- Consolidated Development Strategy for Education for 2011-2015;
- Education Development Strategy 2014-2020 "Education 2020";
- The National Youth Development Strategy 2020 and the Action Plan on its implementation;
- The National Development Strategy "Moldova 2030".

⁴ Codul Educației al Republicii Moldova nr. 152 din 17.07.2014, publicat: 24.10.2014 în Monitorul Oficial nr. 319-324, art. Nr. 634, intrat în vigoare la 23.11.2014.

An important step taken by the Republic of Moldova in linking the higher educational system to European values, principles and practices, represents Moldova's accession to the Bologna Process. In the process of European integration of the Moldovan educational system, there have been both progress and a number of obstacles which have not yet been eliminated. As progress, we can list:

- *Adoption of a comparable diploma system and enforcing the administrative annex to the diploma. (Diploma Supplement).* In 2002, the Ministry of Education introduced the administrative annex to the diploma- Diploma Supplement, which is issued at the request of the graduate. By the decision of the College of the Ministry of Education, starting with 2010, the bachelor's degree certificates were drafted and issued in English, with 14 degrees of protection.
- *Creating a common architecture of higher education focused on 2 university cycles.* In this context, amendments and additions were made to the Education Law of 1995, which foresee the passage of higher education to two cycles of study. Cycle I has a duration of 3-4 years and ends with obtaining a degree equivalent to the qualification of bachelors in the European space. Cycle II has a duration of 1-2 years and will be completed with the master's degree.
- *Implementation of a transferable study credit system - ECTS.* The mode of implementation of study credits is carried out in accordance with the 2005 Guidelines issued by the Directorate-General for Education and Culture (ECTS) of the European Commission and the supervision of the Ministry of Education with the aim of adjusting and monitoring the application of the study credit system in the university institutions in Moldova. At present, universities in the Republic of Moldova are implementing the European Credit Transfer System, 60 credits - the study year and 30 credits - one semester of study.

- Another important aspect of integrating European standards and adhering to the Bologna Process is the reform of the *university curriculum*, which is one of the priorities of education policy at national level. According to the Ministry of Education and Research, the following factors require renovation of the curriculum:

- The need to establish optimal continuity between pre-university and postgraduate education university;
- Adjustment of the university curriculum to the initial professional training standards;
- Adherence to the Bologna Process and orientation to curricular development trends both on national and international level.

- *Promoting the mobility of students and teachers.* Academic mobility is carried out in international programs, bilateral agreements, cross-border exchanges of teaching staff and students. A program for academic mobility is considered to be the Erasmus+ program which proposes simplified participation and funding conditions than previous programs.

- *Ensuring the quality of higher education.* With the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the Bologna Process, quality within the education system has become a priority, and in this case the accreditation and licensing process becomes the instrument of state management and control in the field of the quality of education. An important decision in this direction is the approval of a new methodology for the accreditation of technical, higher education and in-service training institutions. Thus, all VET institutions, as well as their study programs, will be evaluated externally by the evaluation experts enrolled in the national Agency for Quality Assurance in Education and Research, or in the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR).⁵

⁵ Daniela Secrieru, "Integrarea sistemului educațional din Republica Moldova în spațiul european", UTM, Chișinău, 2007.

In the attitude towards higher education there is also a certain resistance and reserves to change both from the administrative structures and from the higher education institutions. Thus, regarding the reform of higher education, two extreme trends are emerging:

1) The state advocates centralized management where important decisions are taken centrally and universities have a role to play in applying them;

2) Universities are acting for a decentralized management based on unlimited academic autonomy.

None of these positions has reached that credibility threshold to show their priority. Although for the Republic of Moldova adherence to the Bologna Process was an exceptional phenomenon, we find some resistance to the reforms this Declaration expects. In this context, we are not the only skeptical, in some university centers in Spain, Germany, France and Italy the rectors of the most famous universities refer to the Bologna Process very carefully and with a certain amount of suspicion, insisting on the national and institutional priorities in higher education. We also find that national authorities are ignoring the most important principles, autonomy of universities and student participation in higher education governance. That is why, in our case, I think that it is necessary to implement the model of the national education system at the level of state thinking by adopting a code of laws in the field of education, which will promote the national concept able to be integrated into the European system.

An attempt in this direction is the main education policy document, which is the strategy for education 2014-2020 "Education-2020." Strategic vision 2020 has set ambitious targets, primarily aiming at linking the education system to labor market requirements to increase labor productivity and increase employment in the economy This can be achieved through the modernization of the vocational training system and the improvement of the continuous training mechanisms of the labor force The partnership between the educational system and the labor market will lead to the advent of an educational offer that corresponds to the quantitative,

qualitative and structural demand for labor, which in turn will contribute to the reduction of the unemployment rate and the flow of citizens leaving abroad as well as of the population at risk of racial or social exclusion. This strategy was built on three pillars: access, relevance and quality. Since the quality of life and the economic competitiveness of the country depend on the accessibility, quality and relevance of education, among the objectives of the strategy we can highlight the following:

- Increasing the efficiency of spending public money invested in education, so that the redundant resources are redirected for a better salary of the education staff and the increase of the quality of the educational infrastructure;

- Increasing the efficiency of the educational system, expanding and diversifying the educational services by capitalizing on the opportunities offered by the information and communication technology;

- Ensuring the sustainable development of the educational system in order to form an integral, active, social and creative personality - the main factors of the human development and of the socio-economic progress of the country;

- The structural and qualitative compatibility of national education with the European educational area of education.

In this context, besides the established objectives, the "Education 2020" strategy offers a diagnosis of the current status of the education system in the Republic of Moldova, identifying the main problems of the system:

- Imbalance between supply and demand in the labor market and skills shortage;

- Curriculum theorization and the low applicability of curricular content at all levels of learning;

- Non-implementation of the system for monitoring, evaluation and assuring the quality of the results to the rigors of the international evaluation programs;

- The lack of professional competences of teachers to the changes of the educational system.

Analyzing these problems in all their complexity, we can see that, although the curricular development in the Republic of Moldova has largely followed the evolution of the curriculum in countries with a similar historical path: from simple curriculums with content ranges - to the curriculum centered on objectives, and from them - to the competence-based curriculum, the current curriculum has a number of shortcomings. According to the Education 2020 Strategy, these shortcomings are:

- The excessive theorization of the curriculum;
- The low degree of relevance and practical applicability of curricular content to all levels of lifelong learning and subsequent assertion of learners on a personal, social and professional basis;
- Excessive focus of formative and summative assessment of learning on knowledge and content reproduction, to the detriment of competence assessment;
- Insufficient training of entrepreneurial skills and life skills, communication skills in state language and foreign languages, problem-solving, cooperation and teamwork, design and management of their own learning process, use information technologies and resources.⁶

It is obvious that the curriculum is imperfect, it is inflexible and overloaded. Students do not have the opportunity to get deeper into the areas they are interested in. At the basis of the non-implementation of the curriculum there are many reasons, including: lack of effective teaching and management staff, lack of adequate technical and material basis, insufficient funding, etc. But one thing we can certainly recognize is that the current curriculum is a failed one, does not serve as a basis for creating and operating an effective school and professional guidance system, and their competencies are largely below the expectations of higher education.

⁶ Strategia de dezvoltare a educației pentru anii 2014-2020 “Educație- 2020”, http://particip.gov.md/public/documente/137/ro_1112_STRATEGIA-EDUCATIA-2020.pdf

Another difficulty is the deficiency and fluctuation of the teachers, the woes related to pay and working conditions, the low social status of the teaching staff. The main problem in this field is that the teacher profession is not an attraction for young people. The need for staff with professional competence and pedagogical vocation is insufficiently covered and is not linked to changes in the educational system. The number of teaching staff in general education diminished continuously. The causes of this data can be multiple, the fact that the teacher profession is unattractive and does not enjoy a good image in society, the low level of motivation for training, the low level of pay and the migration phenomenon that is currently facing the Republic of Moldova. This situation is aggravated by the low quality of the young teachers entering the system: the pedagogical specialties are among the lowest admissions, and the average grade for the graduation of higher education institutions and pedagogical education is of 7,80. Another problem is the initial training system and the continuous training system that does not provide the necessary quality of training of the teachers for the professional activity, connected with the requirements of the educational system and the society. Without cadres with at least above average education in the fundamental subjects: mathematics, romanian, foreign languages, history, the intellectual horizon of the admission candidate will not be able to be modeled either at a rigorous level of thinking or at the level of communication capacities.

Meanwhile, states in Europe consider education to be a priority area, allocating between 4% and 7% of GDP in the sector. In the Republic of Moldova, expenditure on education as a share of GDP has been assessed as follows:

In 2004 - 10.2% of GDP;

In 2005 - 11.5% of GDP;

In 2006 - 11.7% of GDP;

In 2007 - 12.8% of GDP;

In 2008 - 13.0% of GDP;

In 2009 - 13, 1% of GDP;

In 2010 - 13.5% of GDP.⁷

Beginning with 2015, spending on education has dropped considerably, with the Ministry of Education allocating 14 million lei in 2016, and in 2017 only 10 million lei. In 2018, spending on education constitute 6.5% of GDP.⁸

Thus, in the context of the mentioned problems of the educational system in the Republic of Moldova, the strategy targets the following priority actions:

- The educational process focused on the educational needs of students and a relevant curriculum, linked to the demand of the labor market;
- A fair evaluation system, focused on measuring competencies relevant to the individual's life and the labor market;
- Teachers reward in terms of professional performance, able to design learning activities focused on the individual educational needs of the beneficiaries;
- Professional managerial staff able to manage education and education institutions effectively;
- A network of educational institutions efficiently dimensioned, in line with demographic and social trends and in line with current quality standards;
- Infrastructure and a learning environment friendly to the learner;
- A modern, flexible and functional institutional framework to help ensure the quality of education.⁹

However, in the case of the Republic of Moldova, it is difficult to say that the modernization of the educational system is still a priority for the development of the Republic of Molodva. Although the changes mentioned

⁷ Hotărârea Guvernului Nr. 756 cu privire la Cadrul de Cheltuieli pe Termen Mediu (2008-2010).

⁸ Bugetul pentru cetățeni 2018, <http://mf.gov.md/sites/default/files/Buget%20Cetateni%202018.pdf>.

⁹ Strategia de dezvoltare a educației pentru anii 2014-2020 "Educație - 2020", http://particip.gov.md/public/documente/137/ro_1112_STRATEGIA-EDUCATIA-2020.pdf

in the field have occurred, they have been poorly felt by the subjects of the educational field. We can not deny improving certain aspects of the education system, but the recently adopted strategies and action plans have had a modest implementation level. Changes have been largely technical and administrative, and yet few changes have been made to target children, young people and the teaching staff. The only document that demonstrates that volume of objectives is the Government's Action Plan for 2016-2018, which states that a new payroll system for teachers has been implemented, the curriculum to ensure the relevance of studies and integration at the socio-professional level, new study programs implemented on the basis of new teaching methodologies (problem-based learning), question-based and simulation-based learning) were introduced in six universities and modernization of innovation-oriented infrastructure, innovation, relevance, efficiency education and fair access to education. Up to now, curricula have been reviewed on all levels of education, and in more institutions, information technologies have been introduced in the education process. There are many achievements in this action plan, but most of them only concern the legislative framework and some technical aspects, and the impact of these actions was not a substantial one on the overall picture of the education system, on the contrary, in this direction little have evolved. If we are to ask why, then we come to two conclusions:

1. Reforms in education encounter resistance from teachers because of the existing mentality system.

2. The bodies responsible for the implementation of those objectives do not have the necessary competences to carry out these actions.

The solution to a decisive step towards modernizing the education system is concealed in these two conclusions, we need a change of mentality to allow a new approach to the process of study and competent stuff for a more efficient and more voluminous implementation.

The current and future state of the world economy and of each state depends directly on how well the level of literacy among young people will be defined. Here we are talking about the 21st century literacy, which

includes some highly developed academic skills in terms of thinking, understanding, teamwork, and the use of new technologies. In order to make progress in the digital economy, pupils and students will need some knowledge based on the digital age. It is important for the education system to make the necessary changes in order to be able to accomplish this mission, namely to prepare students for the world outside the classroom. Therefore, the education system must understand and accept the following competencies of the 21st century within academic standards and programs. Students must first acquire computer literacy and digital literacy. This involves analyzing, addressing, managing, integrating, evaluating and creating information in different environments. Students must also be able to consider reserve plans, they must anticipate changes and understand the mutual link between the elements within the system. Given the circumstances, adaptability and flexibility are essential.¹⁰

From the employee of the future, the ability to adapt to a changing environment is expected. For such continuous learning, curiosity about the surrounding world and the way it works is needed. Researchers have discovered that intellectual concerns lead to a change in the brain's structure - there is a direct link between the amount of experience in a complex environment and the amount of structural change in the brain. Curiosity provides lifelong learning, contributing to a better quality of life and the intellectual capital of a state. Equally important is the assumption of risk, without which there would have been many of the discoveries, inventions and knowledge that we know today.

An important part of innovation and inventions is creativity, this important component is important in professions such as business, economics, architecture, industrial design, science and engineering. In fact, many already think that we are gradually moving from the informational era to the innovative age where the ability to solve problems in novel and efficient ways such as greening energy consumption or inventing new

¹⁰ Bernie Trilling & Charles Fadel, "21st century skills. Learning for a life in our times". <https://yasamboyuogrenme.wikispaces.com/file/view/21st+CENTURY+SKILLS.pdf>

technologies (bio and nanotechnologies) or creating versions better technologies already in place (affordable electric cars and solar panels), all of which will be highly appreciated. But unfortunately, as Kenneth Robinson mentioned in the book, "A World Out of Mind. Creative Revolution of Education": "We are not growing in a creative environment, but rather educate us outside of this environment." This is due to traditional education, based on assimilation of facts and data, memorization and passage of standardized tests that have not proved to be effective in developing creative and innovative potential.¹¹

Benjamin Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives, which serves to develop intellectual abilities, such as knowledge, understanding, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation, has essentially proved not to be the most effective learning path.

The revised version of the taxonomy uses the updated terms of memory, understanding, application, analysis, evaluation and creation, provides conclusive proof that, as the authors point out, "these processes can be learned at the same time or in reverse order. The research has shown that the combination of many of these thinking skills improves the learning outcomes. Creation, application, memory, analysis, understanding, and evaluation can all be used together in learning activities and projects to improve the effectiveness and longevity of learning outcomes."¹²

All of these elements contribute to 21st century education, but two key tools that are not on this list could be the most powerful tools ever invented:

- Questions and the process of discovering their answers;
- Problems and invention of possible solutions.

Problems have always been a driving force and motivator in the production of certain tools, inventions, religion, law, science, engineering

¹¹ Kenneth Robinson, "O lume ieșită din minți. Revoluția creativă a educației", Editura Publica, București, 2011

¹² Taxonomia lui Benjamin Bloom. Ierarhizarea tradițională a proceselor cognitive. <https://iteach.ro/pagina/1111/>

and the practical evolution of information technologies and social institutions. Questions and problems are also natural motivations for learning: Why? is a favorite question for curious children, and persistence in asking why? Even in maturity this simple question can lead to in-depth knowledge and additional questions that will inspire you throughout your life in search of answers to mysteries still unresolved. Disturbing issues that demand fresh ideas in search of new and better solutions can lead to creative results and even remarkable discoveries.¹³

Schooling students in 21st century requires collective efforts in several spheres of education. The knowledge skills of the basic disciplines on which the principles of the 21st century education are based are the following subjects: English, literature, foreign languages, creative disciplines, mathematics, economics, real disciplines, geography, history, natural sciences and law. The school institution will be fully involved in the training and learning process of the pupil, collateral will be implemented in this program also interdisciplinary themes, contextualized with the requirements of the 21st century:

- entrepreneurial qualities, skills in finance, and economics;
- civic involvement;
- skills in the field of health protection;
- ecology and sustainability skills;
- critical thinking and problem management;
- IT skills.

The current demands for life and work are determined not only by the factors of critical thinking and basic knowledge, but also by accommodation capabilities to the ever more complex conditions of our lives. Thus, a student must be familiar with contextualized skills for life and work:

- power of decision and self-determination;
- productivity and responsibility;

¹³ Bernie Trilling & Charles Fadel, "21st century skills. Learning for a life in our times". <https://yasamboyuogrenme.wikispaces.com/file/view/21st+CENTURY+SKILLS.pdf>

- managerial qualities.

The list of competences required in the 21st century is the result of numerous scientific papers, reports, current research and opinions of representatives of education, business and industry. In order to be adequately trained, students need to acquire knowledge and skills within the context of contemporary situational context. Transmitting these skills to the digital age and correctly assessing skills already acquired by students and students will determine whether today's children will be prepared to live, learn, work and serve society in the digital environment. Taking into consideration that some countries already have this set of competences in their study programs and most states still maintain the positions of a traditional educational system, the implementation of this set in a massive scale at the moment is difficult to imagine, from various reasons, keeping the status quo or ineffective educational policies. The state and the academic environment encounter the greatest resistance to the reformation of the system, while young people are increasingly aware of the need to modernize education and show a fierce discontent with the existing system. The creative spirit is something absolutely natural to the human being, and the problem-solutions components are those elements of creation, respectively, we must use the passions of young people to solve the local versions of global issues, this defines the quality of our lives and can be one of the best ways of full engagement in the study process.

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The Correlation between Corporate Social Responsibility and the Economy of Happiness

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Abstract. In the last period there have appeared many studies on a new direction of economic research and namely economy of happiness. We define the economy of happiness as an economy based on sustainable development, and respect for the global ecological balance. Another approach to this concept is based on the interdependence between the level of economic growth of the country and the level of happiness of the citizens. By analysing the various opinions on this subject, also by watching documentary films revealing these ideas, we wanted to complete this research with some additions to the economy of happiness, which in our view seem quite reasonable and argued. As research methods, it has been used deduction, induction, comparison, and factual approach.

Keywords: social responsibility, gross domestic product, sustainable development, economy of happiness.

We started researching the hypothesis that there are many countries, in which there is a higher level of economic growth over the years, and at the same time the number of socially responsible companies is growing too, the fact which is correlated with the increase in the degree of happiness of the citizens of the respective countries. In the World Happiness Report as criteria are included: GDP growth, Social support, Healthy lifestyle, Freedom of choice, Generosity, Perception of corruption. In our view, these criteria are quite relevant indicators that determine the level of perception of happiness. We have tried to demonstrate how large corporations can contribute to the happiness of the states that are active, and whether there is a correlation between corporate social responsibility, the level of development of the economy, and the happiness of the people.

In the documentary film *The Economy of Happiness* (2011, directed by Helena Norberg-Hodge, Steven Gorelick and John Page), the relationship between global economic growth – a concept introduced by capitalism – and the idea of happiness – express an ideal of any society, regardless of their degree of development. In large metropolises, local gastronomy moves determine another economic model. Is this the beginning of a fair world? How is the transition from the global to the local and what is being done to our everyday life? The film describes a world that moves simultaneously in two opposite directions. On one hand, the corrupt alliance between governments and large corporations continues to promote globalization and the strengthening of corporate power.

On the other one is the population who opposes these policies, demanding the revision of the commercial and financial regulations and, far from the plans of the old institutions of power, trying to shape a different future. Communities are uniting to build a more human, scale of values, ecological economies based on a new paradigm – a localization economy.

The happiest countries in the world are in northern Europe, while Romania ranking 90th, ahead of Hungary and Bulgaria, but behind Greece or Libya, shows the World Happiness Report 2013, published by Earth Institute at Columbia University. Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden are the happiest countries in the world, according to the report. Nevertheless, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Republic, Benin, and Togo – all located in sub-Saharan Africa – are on the last places in the ranking, CNN reports. The United States is 17th, behind Canada (6th), Australia (10th), Israeli (11), United Arab Emirates (14) and Mexico (16), according to Earth Institute. The report ranks the UK 22nd among the happiest nations in the world, France on 25th, Germany on 26th place, Japan on 43rd, Russia on 68th and China on 93th position.

Romania is ranked 90th, with an average of 5,033 score, behind the Czech Republic (39th place), Poland (51st), Republic of Moldova (53rd place), Croatia (58th place), Albania (62th place), Belarus (66th place), Greece (70th) and even Libya (78), Pakistan (81) and Kosovo (83rd place).

Behind Romania is Serbia (106th), overtaken by Iraq (105th), Bosnia Herzegovina (107th) and Hungary (110th). Egypt, which crosses a political and security crisis after the Islamic President Mohamed Morsi was deposed by the army on July 3, is on 130th position, while Afghanistan, devastated for nearly 12 years, is ranked 143th, followed by Bulgaria. The 2015 data show that Switzerland, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, Israel and Austria are among the top places. The biggest paradox appears analysing Luxembourg and the US indexes, countries with the highest GDP per head remain behind other countries with lower indicators.

The situation in 2013-2015 has not changed much, if we group them, the top countries in most cases are the Nordic countries practicing a socially oriented market economy, and a management based on femininity, following Hofstede's model. In this context, we wanted to see how much Corporate Social Responsibility would contribute to increasing happiness. While "the world has become a happier and more generous place over the past five years," political and economic changes have led to a reduction in welfare in some nations, the report said. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have dropped dramatically in the list due to the impact of the eurozone crisis, while Egypt and Myanmar Saudi Arabia have fallen due to recent political and civilian problems. Egypt had the biggest decline in happiness. On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the highest level of happiness, Egypt gets an average of 4.3 in 2012, compared with 5.4 in 2007. Angola, Zimbabwe and Albania are showing the highest increases among the countries.

Governments that want to increase the degree of happiness of the population should allocate a higher percentage of the budget to combat mental diseases, which is the most important "unfortunate factor" in the evaluated countries, says the authors of the study conducted in 2010, 2012, "People can be Unfortunate for various reasons - from poverty and lack of a job to family problems and physical affections, "the report said. "In all societies, chronic mental disorders are a cause that greatly affects

misfortune." "If we want a happier world, we need a completely different approach to mental health," the report concludes.

However, we consider that the process of economic life evolution, the kind of economic growth could influence the level of perception of happiness. Economic growth is all the more qualitative the more comprehensive it is from a social and geographical point of view. A qualitative economic growth ensures a high degree of human inclusion in economic processes, reduces income inequality and the incidence of poverty by increasing the income of poor populations, and contributes to improving education and the health of the population. At the same time, a qualitative economic growth is environmentally sustainable. Growth should also be sustainable from an economic point of view. For this, it is necessary for some of the income to be reinvested in maintaining or expanding the basis for future economic growth. From the perspective of this definition, the economic growth in the Republic of Moldova in 2000-2006 was of low quality, therefore it had a relatively modest impact on human development in our country.

Corporate social responsibility is one of the essential elements of sustainable country development and is therefore included in the global policy agenda. A number of international organizations and institutions are busy studying this concept, promoting it amongst companies, and enhancing the benefits that both companies and society in general can have, such organizations are: United Nations Global Compact, OECD, CSR Europe, Business for Social Responsibility, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, etc. However, we wanted in this article to see the effect of social responsibility on the citizens of the country, the real contribution to sustainable development, or it is nothing more than a simple return of perceived taxes levied on customers in the case of lack of competition or a return to society of profits once unjustified. To track the effects of RS on the economy as a whole, we wanted to develop the subject of the analysis of the concept of corporate social responsibility. This term came as a result of the shift from the predominant business model that focused mainly on

production, the exploitation of resources, major oriented individual interests coupled with a minor government interest, and a general business view as a closed system at a broader and more complex model of socio-economic business, which is focused mainly on the overall quality of life, conservation of resources, interests of society and a vision of business as an open system.

The concept of social responsibility of the business organization involves a form of self-control, more than a constraint of some types of behaviour from external sources. The concept is set to serve the private interests of the corporation sensitive to social needs. In one sense, social responsibility is one of the other alternative forms of control, such as the market, government regulations, trade union activities, and lobbying pressures.

Social responsibility is the notion or concept by which companies' obligations towards groups formed in society, other than shareholders, and also those prescribed by law and trade unions are taken into account. Social responsibility is the notion or concept through which it is connoted the firms' obligations towards the social groups of interests, other than shareholders and also those prescribed by law and trade unions. The two sides of this definition are: first, the obligation must be voluntarily accepted. Secondly, the obligation is somewhat broader, ie it extends beyond the traditional obligation to shareholders to other groups in society, such as consumers, employees, suppliers and neighbouring communities. So the essential feature of social responsibility is that it must be voluntary and involve the managers' direction to act in one way or another. So, corporate social responsibility is the responsibility of managers to act in ways that serve both their own interests and those of many external stakeholders (individuals or groups that are affected in one way or another by the behaviour of the firm).

Broadly speaking, corporate social responsibility is the ethical behaviour of a company towards society. In a narrow sense, this means that management must act responsibly in its relationships with various societal

stakeholders who are affected in one way or another by the behaviour of firms - not just shareholders. Social responsibility is largely promoted by a large number of great companies and multinational firms, yet it is relevant for all types of savings and all sectors of activity, from small to medium enterprises to multinational companies. Thus, promoting and applying social responsibility among small and medium-sized enterprises is of great importance, as they contribute greatly to the economy and employment of the workforce.

"Corporate social responsibility involves conducting a business in such a way as to be economically profitable, to comply with legislation, to support society ethically and socially. Being socially responsible is understood that profitability and law enforcement are the main conditions when talking about the ethics of the firm and the extent to which it supports the society in which it exists through contributions of money, time and talent."- Archie Carroll (1983)

Models of corporate social responsibility have also been developed.

Sethi has developed since 1975 a model to classify corporate behaviour, which he called "corporate social performance." In his opinion, the three levels of corporate behaviour are:

- social obligation (adaptation to legal and market conditions);
- social responsibility (addressing societal norms, values and expectations of performance);
- social sensitivity (anticipated and preventive adaptation to social needs) – companies need to develop their competence to take effective engagement with social groups and take pro-active measures regarding their problems and concerns.

Based on Sethi's model, Archie Carroll developed the so-called "Quadripartite Model of Corporate Social Responsibility" in 1979, then it was refined in a recent paper, conducted in collaboration with A.K.Buchholtz (Carroll & Buchholtz 2000). This model is shown in the figure below.

Figure 1. Quadripartite model of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1991)



Source: Carroll, A. B. and A. K. Buchholtz (2000), *Business & Society, Ethics and Stakeholder Management*, South-Western Publishing, Cinn., Ohio

Economic responsibility – "Be profitable". Companies have shareholders who claim good earnings for their investments, have employees who want secure and well-paid jobs, have customers asking for good quality products at affordable prices, etc. This is by definition the reason for being different business in society. Thus the first responsibility of a business is to be a functional economic unit and to remain on the market. The first layer of social responsibility is the basis of other types of responsibilities, which it supports and makes possible. This is why the satisfaction of economic responsibility is claimed (imperative) by all corporations.

Legal responsibility – "law-abiding". It requires businesses to comply with laws and comply with the "rules of the game". As with economic responsibilities, Carroll believes that satisfying legal responsibilities is an imperative requirement of society towards any corporation.

Ethical responsibility – "Do what is fair and fair and avoid damages." Ethical responsibilities oblige corporations to do what is fair, just and fair,

even if they are not forced to do so by the existing legal framework. Carroll therefore claims that ethical responsibilities are what society expects from corporations, beyond economic and legal requirements.

Philanthropic responsibility – "Be a good corporate citizen". At the top of the pyramid, the fourth level of corporate social responsibility includes philanthropic actions. According to Carroll, philanthropic responsibilities are only what society wants, without being claimed or expected by corporations, which makes them "less important than the other three categories."

The merit of the quadripartite model proposed by Carroll and Buchholtz is that it structures the different social responsibilities of the firm on distinct dimensions without ignoring the primordial fact that firms have an obligation to be, above all, profitable within the limits of the law.

Corporate Social Responsibility refers to transparent business practices that are based on ethical values, fulfilment of legal requirements and respect for people, communities and the environment. In addition to generating profits, companies are responsible for their impact on humans and the planet.

Corporate Social Responsibility refers to how business aligns its values and behaviour with the expectations and needs of diverse groups not just consumers and investors but also employees, suppliers, communities, special interest groups, and society in general. The most important components of social responsibility include governance, environmental management, commitment to stakeholders, working standards, employee and community relationships, social equity, responsible sourcing and human rights.

Beyond academic debates, most definitions converge towards a common view, namely: *Corporate social responsibility is a business culture that takes into account the impact that business has on society and which tends to maximize positive externalities and minimize negative ones.*

According to the Fortune and Forbes magazines, the most responsible companies in 2015 are: Apple, Amazon, Google, Qualcomm,

Royal Dutch Shell, Whole Foods Market, Nike, Starbucks, Facebook, Starwood Hotels and Resort. Most of them are large corporations present at international level, who already communicate the practice of a long-term performing organizational culture.

Table N1. Social Responsible Companies and Their Rankings in the 2015 Happiness Report

SR firms	Country	Country position in the rank of happiness
1. Apple	USA	17
2. Amazon	USA	17
3. Google	USA	17
4. Qualcomm	USA	17
5. Royal Dutch Shell	Great Britain, the Netherlands	22
6. Whole Foods Market	USA	17
7. Nike	USA	17
8. Starbucks	USA	17
9. Facebook	USA	17
10. Starwood Hotel and Resort	USA	17

Source: Designed by the author based on **Forbes and Fortune reports**

From the table we observe the following: most socially responsible companies are from the US which are active in most countries of the world. Also, it is necessary to remark that we have no company from countries with the highest index of happiness. It is questionable if there is a direct link between the country's economic level and the level of happiness of citizens and of human development.

Table N2. The position of the happiest countries by GDP per capita, and HDI

Top the happiest countries	Position after GDP per capita / human development index
1. Switzerland	2/ 3
2. Iceland	7/16
3. Denmark	9/4
4. Norway	6/1
5. Canada	19/9
6. Finland	16/24
7. Netherlands	14/5
8. Sweden	11/14
9. New Zealand	23/9
10. Australia	2/2
52. Republic of Moldova	143/107
86. Romania	67/52

Source: developed by the author based on HDI report 2016 and statistic times 2016

From the data presented, we can deduce that the top 10 countries in the ranking of the happiest countries are at the same time countries with a high GDP and HDI. The biggest paradox is in the case of the Republic of Moldova, where we are ranked 52th by the happiness index, and the other indicators being 143th and 107th. Here are the explanations, we can guess that the statistical data are erroneous, especially on the population and hence GDP per capita is poorly presented, or there is another explanation for the happiness deriving from the Orthodox Christian religion, which instills people humility, obedience and patience and it is indifferent that we are an oligarchic state, poor and outdated. Or perception of happiness needs other aspects to be researched for instance psychological or even physical ones.

Conclusions

The degree of development of the economy is directly related to the perception of people's happiness. Nevertheless, the level of happiness is much more determined by the social equity and the policy of state to ensure it. Out of the total number of countries, the happiest people are those in the Nordic states practicing a socially oriented market economy. But the perception of happiness is not only affected by economic values but also by the cultural ones, the religion and the degree of knowledge that the people possess. The confirmation of this conclusion is presented by the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, where the level of economic and social development is quite low, because of the high level of corruption and oligarchic dominance, the perception of happiness is increasing and exceeds the level of many more developed and more socially protected countries.

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The Model of Evolutional Integration of Ukraine to the European Union

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Abstract. This paper offers the approach to glance at the Ukrainian integration in the EU from the position of the sustainable development model of Ukraine that is based on a human-centred approach and presents new trajectory of economic growth in Ukraine by 2030. It is considered in compliance with global megatrends and the goals of the millennium that are expected to affect the global economy in the coming decades. It defines the set of actions (mechanisms) needed to achieve the horizons of effective use and the identification of Ukraine's existing economic strengths and capabilities, to create new strategic capacities by strengthening the existing potential of the EU from the stable and forecasted neighbour – Ukraine.

Keywords: EU, model, integration, Ukraine.

Introduction

Ukraine had signed the association with the EU, but there is still the shortage of the researches on the consequences of this act to the EU. As Ukraine as the country with less resources, lower economic development performance can absorb volumes of European resources that weaken the EU. That is the threat and looks more impacting after the Brexit. Simultaneously, Ukraine has the internal triggers (like low level of anticipation of changes) and psychologically quite resistant population. ESFJ-type of personality is in the majority that differs from ESTJ-European

population style. Ukrainians could be not so quickly integrated to the sober-minded and strictly regulated European space. As shows, the practice of Balkan states and some western partners of Ukraine only the continuous evolutionary cointegration can have positive results for all stakeholders. Thus, the goal of this paper to highlight the necessity of prognostic cointegration on the base of forecasted model of the sustainable development of Ukraine.

Literature review

The urgency of the creation of the model of Ukraine's integration into the EU is due to the absence of a coherent policy document in Ukraine, in which strategic goals and priorities of socio-economic development of the state would be determined. There is no single document in the Ukraine that takes into account, on the one hand, national interests and existing potential, on the other – global challenges and trends of world development. The responses to such challenges can be found by developing and synthesizing existing methodological rating tools developed by UN experts, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum in Davos, and also based on the scenario of Foresight Ukraine 2016.¹

Modern theoretical developments in the field of strategic planning at the state level take their origins in the theory of strategic planning in the field of corporate management, the founder of which is considered a mathematical scientist and economist Ansoff.² This theory has been

¹ Future State 2030. Report KPMG. Available at: <https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2015/03/future-state-2030.html>; Scenarios for Ukraine. Reforming institutions, strengthening the economy after the crisis. World Scenario Series (April 2014). WEF. Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ScenariosSeries_Ukraine_Report_2014.pdf; The Transformation of Our World: An Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030: UN Program. Available at: <http://www.un.org.ua/ua/tsili-rozvytkutysiacholittia/tsili-staloho-rozvytku>; Foresight «Ukraine 2016». Foresight of Ukrainian Economy: mid-term (2015–2020) and long-term (2020–2030) time horizons (Revised Edition). World Data Centre for Geoinformatics and Sustainable Development. Available at: <http://ied.kpi.ua/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Foresight-2015.pdf>

² Ansoff I. H. (1986), Corporate Strategy, Sidgwick & Jackson.

developed and supplemented by other scholars such as Ackoff R., Hatten K., Higgins J., Pearce J., Robinson R., Schendel D.³ and many others. However, the strategic planning horizon in Ukraine is rather small – most of the state strategic documents are limited to 2020, for example, the Ukraine-2020 Sustainable Development Strategy.⁴ At the same time, developed countries have developed development strategies for 2030-2050 years.

In the European Union itself, which suffers from migrants, Brexit's expectations and budgetary imbalances in individual member countries, there is a mixed opinion about its expansion. European integration processes are studied in terms of policies, in the integration period, management practices, investment processes, and the burden on the labor market.⁵ The discourse is about the social and financial burden of the enlargement of the European Union. Will it be able to withstand it? In this case, the benefits of market expansion, increasing the scale of the economy are almost not taken into account.

At the same time, the European Union states in its policy documents that "strong neighbors are strong partnerships".⁶ Based on this, priorities

³ Ackoff R. L. (1981) *Creating the Corporate Future: Plan Or be Planned For*, Wiley; Higgins J. M. (1983) *Organizational Policy and Strategic Management: Text and Cases*. 2nd ed., Homewood: Richard D. Irwin; Pearce J. A., Robinson R. B. (1985) *Strategic Management*. 2nd ed., Homewood: Richard D. Irwin; Schendel D. E., Hatten K. J. (1972) *Business Policy or Strategic Management: A Broader View for an Emerging*, Academy of Management Proceedings.

⁴ Стратегія сталого розвитку "Україна – 2020": Указ Президента України від 12 січня 2015 року № 5/2015. Режим доступу: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5/2015>

⁵ Eberlein, B. and Kerwer, D. 2004. New governance in the EU. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(1): 121-41; Egan, M. 2009. Governance and learning in the post-Maastricht era? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16(8): 1244-53; Bauer, M., Knill, C. And Pitschel, D. 2007. Differential Europeanization in Eastern Europe: the impact of diverse EU regulatory governance patterns. *Journal of European Integration*, 29(4): 405-23. https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/3991/Differential_Europeanization_in.pdf?sequence=1; Iammarino S., Santagelo G. Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Attractiveness in the EU Integration Process (2000) *European Urban and Regional Studies* 1 <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096977640000700101>.

⁶ JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Brussels, 18.11.2015 JOIN(2015) 50 final)

are set for building cooperation with neighboring countries, including Ukraine. In developing the model of Ukraine's evolutionary integration into the EU, the priorities and basic theses of the European Neighborhood Policy,⁷ as well as the harmonious (without shocks) integration of the Ukrainian economy, society, business into the European Union system were taken into account.

Model

Ukraine 2030 provides a solid analytic foundation to support the efforts of Ukrainian politicians to develop – and western policymakers to support – a policy framework to modernize Ukraine's economy and governance.

Ukraine 2030 proposes a specific strategy to foster development that will lead to a more prosperous Ukraine by 2030. Ukraine has enormous potential. It can follow the path to prosperity that many central European countries have taken since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The wealth and potential of Ukraine lies in its human capital. Investing in people – in science, culture, education, and health – will result in a high-tech national economy that grows more inclusively and efficiently.

However, Ukraine has systematic problems that constrain this potential. Based on research from key experts at Ukraine's leading universities, Ukraine 2030 describes problems that inhibit the development of Ukraine and proposes specific steps to address these problems.

pa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf

⁷ Ibidem.




Fig. 1. Tasks for Ukraine in the context of deployment of global megatrends and goals of sustainable development

Source: authors'

In addition to the critical problem of the war in the East of Ukraine and occupation of Crimea, which has caused thousands of deaths and has cost Ukraine 25% of its GDP, the problems addressed through this strategy include:

1. The closely related issues of corruption and the shadow economy, consisting of black market transactions and undeclared work. The shadow economy officially consists of at least 35% of Ukraine's GDP. Expert assessment put this figure closer to 50%. Ukraine can reduce the shadow economy to the EU average by 2030 if the government introduces e-governance, improves rule of law, and promotes the effective and equitable distribution of wealth. **Corruption** costs Ukraine 14% of its GDP. Ukraine can reduce this cost to 4% of GDP by 2030 by separating government and business activities to remove influence from oligarchs, through open transparent public tenders, and through reforms in the prosecutor's office.

2. **The inadequate, outdated pension system** costs 13% of GDP. Pension reform can reduce the state budget burden to less than 5% of GDP, including by confirming that payments actually go to retirees, eliminating multiple taxation of pensions, and adopting legislation to reduce unreasonably high pensions.

3. **High public debt.** Public debt costs the country annually 9 billion USD (almost 10% of GDP) and puts destructive pressure on the national economy. Ukraine does not need an IMF loan, but rather needs to provide an attractive investment climate to increase domestic economic activity and the tax base.

4. **Extremely high energy-intensity.** Ukraine's is among the world's least energy efficient countries. Energy use per unit of production is three to five times the level of developed countries. Implementing structural reforms and fostering high-tech innovation can improve efficiency almost three-fold while also improving economic competitiveness.

To address these problems, Ukraine 2030 proposes that the national government of Ukraine lead an anti-crisis program, and that supportive countries and international financial institutions assist in this endeavour. This program includes specific steps in three related areas:

1. Improve governance, transparency, and rule of law
2. Improve health care and education
3. Stimulate the domestic economy



Fig.2. Schematization of a sustainable development model of Ukraine-2030

Source: authors'

Governance, Transparency, and Rule of Law

To combat corruption, reduce the power of oligarchs and the monopolies they control, and increase transparency and participatory governance, Ukraine should:

1. Separate government and business activities to remove influence from oligarchs.
2. Implement transparent public tenders for government contracts that have clear qualifications requirements for participating companies.
3. Reform the prosecutor's office.
4. Create a system to return assets from abroad that derived from money laundering.
5. Create an automatic information exchange system to links border checkpoints with the foreign customs services to combat laundering.
6. Implement good governance, including by ensuring stakeholder participation in policymaking processes.

Health Care and Education

An essential prerequisite for advancement is sustained investments in human capital, in particular in health care and education.

Improving the health care system will require:

1. Reducing high health care costs by eliminating unnecessary procedures that health care practitioners perform.
2. Providing a mechanism for health care practitioners to receive formalized payments for the work they currently conduct in the shadow economy.
3. Reducing the duplication of medical services supported by the government.
4. Introducing insurance that covers both preventative and urgent health care.
5. Assisting health care practitioners to receive continuing medical education abroad.

6. Implement e-Health, a system of electronic patient records and registries, and creating an open e-Health market.

The national education system should prepare the citizens of Ukraine to respond to the challenges of the future by:

1. Tailoring university curricula to the projected demand for future specialists and future skills in the labor market, and stimulating the development of training programs in close cooperation with science centers and employers.

2. Providing a state order for training specialists that are critical for the national economy (at all educational levels, including the training of scientific and teaching staff). Ensure that students who commit to work in Ukraine following graduation get priority access to free collegiate education versus those who leave the country.

3. Ensuring free access to citizens from all economic backgrounds to primary, secondary, and collegiate education.

Stimulate the Domestic Economy

Ukraine's economy has contracted significantly in the last decade. However, this trend is beginning to reverse. The steps below can stimulate domestic economic activity and create sustained growth and inclusive prosperity throughout the decade to come. In addition taking to the good governance measures described above, Ukraine needs to:

1. Reform the National Bank of Ukraine to be more transparent, to reduce the number of state-owned banks and separate commercial from specialized banking functions, and to accelerate the adoption of European standards.

2. Reform the tax system, including by reducing the number of taxes, reducing tax rates to increase compliance, reducing taxes on profit that is reinvested in the development of high-tech industries, and creating incentives to return to Ukraine assets that were taken out of the country.

3. Promote small and medium-sized business and entrepreneurship, including by providing tax holidays, creating a Ukrainian Development Bank

to lend to SMEs, and jointly creating and managing special funds for entrepreneurs with international development institutions.

4. Fundamentally redesign the moribund domestic stock market.

5. Privatize state-owned enterprises that do not provide infrastructure or other security functions.

6. Shift away from extractive and heavy industries by encouraging the development of economic clusters in key innovative and creative sectors that add substantial value.

7. Improve the climate for foreign direct investment by removing restrictions on investments and profits and by providing state guarantees for infrastructure and similar investment projects.

Implementing these changes will of course be enormously challenging. It will require increased awareness of the problems and the solutions by a broader spectrum of society, and Ukrainian citizens' active engagement in the policymaking process. Implementation will also benefit from the continued advice and support of policymakers and financial institutions in supportive countries.

Conclusions and Discussion

The fulfilment of the indicated algorithms will allow Ukraine to achieve the following desired social and economic outcomes:

- social and territorial cohesion,
- an annual growth rate above 10%,
- entry into the top 30 competitive countries in 2030,
- reduction of poverty and exclusion from the circle of "failed" countries,
- a GDP of around 710-750 billion USD.

One of the fundamental challenges of our times is the future structure of the economy. The projected mechanisms and the scenario approach of the Doctrine 2030 for Ukraine provide a starting point for a flexible and rapid response to the continuous dynamic change in the global economic landscape. Analysing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development and comparing the current strengths and weaknesses of the national economy, the Doctrine determines that human capital is the main wealth and the potential of Ukraine. Investment in people, i.e. in science, culture, education and health, will give the anticipated result – a high-tech national economy with sustainable, stable and comprehensive growth. Achieving the above objectives is a major challenge for contemporary public policy. The implementation of the mechanisms will allow harmonization with society, an increase in public awareness and transparency in policymaking of Ukraine. That will insure it stable and efficient step-wise integration in the EU on the content but not on the frame only.

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The Role of European Organizations in Central Asia (Cross-Country Review)

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Abstract. The following article provides a cross-country analysis of the activities of European organizations in the countries of the Central Asia (CA). It was revealed that for the last years immense amounts of the technical and financial assistance was rendered to the enterprises in the region including private and public. A new study identifies challenges and opportunities to help CA countries to diversify their economy and boost their infrastructural capabilities. As a sample the activities of the EU, EBRD, GIZ, ACTED are reassessed.

Keywords: Development, promotion, strategy, legal, human, climate, environment, assistance, project, dialogue, cooperation, sustainable, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

Introduction

Central Asia has a centuries-old tradition of bringing Europe and Asia together. It lies at the crossroads between the two continents and the states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have renewed this role for the region. Important European organizations are conducting cooperation with the countries of the region: most important of them being the EU, EBRD, GIZ, ACTED. Following European organizations are also conducting partnership in Central Asia: Aga Khan Foundation, Aide aux enfants démunis, Association Kareen Mane, Creative Learning, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, EuropeAid, Famille Villard, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, GIZ, Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, The Christensen Fund. The EU's engagement with the region has significantly

expanded since the early 1990s. Both regions share a common goal of achieving stability and prosperity through peaceful means.

The EU-Central Asia enhanced Regional Cooperation on Environment, Climate Change and Water project, launched by the EU in 2016. 2018 is a crucial year for boosting activities in Central Asia (CA), taking stock of the past experience to deliver a contribution to implementing the European Union-Central Asia Strategy. Discussing policy developments at regional and national level in CA, representatives of Central Asian countries, the EU, International Financial Institutions, international organizations, NGOs gathered in Brussels, on 6-7 February 2018 for the 7th meeting of the EU-CA Working Group on Environment and Climate Change (WGECC). Promoting sustainable solutions to water, energy, waste management and climate change related issues is top national development agenda CA. Following the decision of the 6th meeting of the WGECC in July 2017 in Astana, the EU-funded project WECOOP2 presented the Investor Guide and the web-based Regional Knowledge Centre. The Platform for Environment and Water Cooperation was established at the EU-CA High Level Conference in Rome in 2009 as the framework for the EU-CA cooperation in water and environment based on the EU Strategy for Central Asia. The EU-CA Working Group on Environment and Climate Change, chaired by The Italian Ministry of Environment, Land and Sea, assists in the identification of regional cooperation and supports the Platform at the regional level between EU and CA¹. In June 2017, the EU Council announced a review of the EU Strategy for Central Asia for 2019. Member States, the Ministerial Conference confirmed EU's engagement in CA and enhanced dialogue, exchange of experience. The results of the discussions will contribute to the drafting of a new EU strategy for the region by 2019².

¹ *Understanding the Investor: EU-Central Asia Discuss Green and Climate Financing.* https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39773/understanding-investor-eu-central-asia-discuss-green-and-climate-financing_en. 13/02/2018 - 07:49

² *Fifth EU-Central Asia Ministerial Conference on Rule of Law.* https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37278/fifth-eu%E2%80%9393central-asia-ministerial-conference-rule-law_en. 13/12/2017 - 08:20

The EPCA between the EU and Kazakhstan was signed on 21 December 2015 in Astana. Since 1 May 2016, the provisional implementation of the main articles of the Agreement has been launched. The EPCA provides boost to economic and political ties between the EU and Kazakhstan and enhances cooperation in 29 key policy areas, including in the sectors of economic cooperation, energy, transport, environment and climate change, employment and social affairs, culture, education and research. During 1991-2014, to support Kazakhstan, the EU funded more than 350 projects for the total amount of EUR 180 million, which have been allocated to policy assistance to various bodies of the Kazakhstan³.

Following the recent developments in Uzbekistan the EBRD has welcomed the opportunity to reengage in the country with new projects. The Bank opened a new office in Tashkent in 2017⁴. First Vice President Bennett signed three projects for a total value of US\$ 120 million with local companies in November 2017. In Kazakhstan, EBRD focuses on balancing the role of market and sustainable energy. Recently EBRD signed a comprehensive Partnership Agreement with Kazakhstan under which bank will co-invest in the economy. In the following table the data related with the countries of the region is shown.

³ 25 Years of European Union-Central Asia Relations: From the Past to the Future https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/40314/25-years-european-union-central-asia-relations-past-future_en. 23/02/2018-13:45

⁴ EBRD underlines commitment to Uzbekistan. Speech by First Vice President Bennett praises "enormous potential". <http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395266477689&d=Mobile&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FContentLayout> Anton Usov 09 Nov 2017

Table 1⁵.

Country	Number of projects	Cumulative EBRD investment (million)	Private sector share of portfolio	Current portfolio of projects (million)
Kazakhstan	239	€7,216	39%	€2,589
Kyrgyzstan	164	€662	59%	€254
Tajikistan	119	€588	26%	€343
Turkmenistan	66	€252	100%	€52
Uzbekistan	60	€875	98%	€74

The table shows that the Kazakhstan benefitted the most. In Uzbekistan EBRD focuses on identifying potential new projects in areas set out in a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the authorities in March 2017⁶. In Tajikistan EBRD focuses on stabilising and rebuilding trust in the banking sector, developing private enterprises and agribusiness, improving the availability, reliability and quality of municipal services and improving the quality of energy supply, regulation and energy efficiency. In the Kyrgyz Republic it focuses on fostering sustainable growth; promoting the sustainability of public utilities; and supporting critical infrastructure. A landmark renewable energy project in Kazakhstan was co-financed by the EBRD and the Clean Technology Fund with loans of well over €80 million⁷. EBRD supports better water services in Aktobe, and lends €10 million to private water utility in Shymkent, which benefits water and wastewater

⁵ Kazakhstan data. *Country information and economic data about the project work of the EBRD in Kazakhstan*. <http://www.ebrd.com/kazakhstan-data.html>; Uzbekistan data. *Country information and economic data about the project work of the EBRD in Uzbekistan*. <http://www.ebrd.com/where-we-are/uzbekistan/data.html>

⁶ Uzbekistan. <http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1395236554941&d=Mobile&pagename=EBRD>; Turkmenistan. <http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1395236560589&d=Mobile&pagename=EBRD>; Tajikistan. <http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1395236559633&d=Mobile&pagename=EBRD>; Kyrgyz Republic. <http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1395236549380&d=Mobile&pagename=EBRD>

⁷ *First large-scale solar plant in Kazakhstan receives EBRD backing*. 03 June 2015. <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/first-largescale-solar-plant-in-kazakhstan-receives-ebrd-backing.html>

improvements with a combined financing package equivalent to €18 million⁸. EBRD is expanding its presence in the agribusiness sector in Kazakhstan with a local currency loan equivalent to US\$ 49.2 million to RG Brands. According to the Memorandum of Understanding, signed between the EBRD and the Ministry for Investment and Development of Kazakhstan, the Bank will support the national economic policy known as Nurly Zhol⁹.

The EBRD is setting up a fund to deal with the legacy of Soviet-era uranium mining in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan¹⁰. It is increasing the financing to private businesses in Uzbekistan with a \$5 million credit line to Hamkor Bank for on-lending to micro and small enterprises¹¹. It is reengaging in Uzbekistan with the provision of a financial package of up to US\$ 30 million to JSCB Hamkorkbank, the country's privately-owned bank¹². EBRD provided US\$ 100 million to Uzbekistan's leading bank NBU. Demonstrating the EBRD's return to active support in Uzbekistan, the Bank is providing a major boost to local small and medium-sized businesses in the country as of November 2017¹³. The EBRD is lending €1.4 million to Marwin Brands, a juice and nectar producer in Uzbekistan, to help the company diversify production and improve its regional distribution network¹⁴.

⁸ <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/ebrd-lends-10-million-to-private-water-utility-in-shymkent-kazakhstan.html>

⁹ <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/ebrd-government-agree-to-boost-investment-in-road-sector-in-kazakhstan.html>

¹⁰ *EBRD sets up new fund for Central Asia's uranium mining legacy*. 17 June 2015. <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/ebrd-sets-up-new-fund-for-central-asias-uranium-mining-legacy.html>

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¹³ *EBRD First Vice President Bennett to visit Uzbekistan*. 06 November 2017. <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/ebrd-first-vice-president-bennett-to-visit-uzbekistan.html>

¹⁴ *EBRD supports juice producer in Uzbekistan*. 07 December 2009. <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2009/ebrd-supports-juice-producer-in-uzbekistan.html>

In September, in his inaugural address to the UN General Assembly, Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev used the global stage to pledge to protect human rights – a promise that has been transformed into real actions. During 2017 the Uzbekistan has released and removed the scores of citizens from the security services' notorious "black list," and increased the accountability of government institutions to citizens. It has banned the forced mobilization of teachers, doctors, and college students to labour in fields for the annual cotton-picking season. These moves—coupled with currency reforms and a foreign policy focused on repairing relations with Uzbekistan's immediate neighbours have contributed to a hope in Uzbekistan sending positive messages. On the eve of the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution, Sh.Mirziyoyev signed a Decree on pardoning 2,700 convicts. It is important that Uzbekistan took to improve the business climate, the judicial system, labour conditions and the fight against corruption. Here, EU is considering two new projects within the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights¹⁵.

On February 20, Delegation of the EU in Uzbekistan met with representatives of the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Assistance to Privatized Enterprises and Development of Competition. During the meeting EU's involvement into the Multi-Partner Trust Fund to eliminate the consequences of the drying out of the Aral Sea and to prevent the catastrophe of the Aral region was discussed. Creation of the Fund is implemented within the State Program on the realization of the Action Strategy on 5 priority directions for 2017-2021¹⁶. Launched in 1996, the European Union's DipECHO (Disaster Preparedness Programme) is the core element of the European Commission's Disaster Risk Reduction global

¹⁵ *EU Ambassador delivered speech on the occasion of the Human Rights Day Celebration 25/12/2017 - 11:10* Speech by Ambassador Eduards Stiprais, Head of the EU Delegation to Uzbekistan, on the occasion of the 2017 Human Rights Day Celebration. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37888/eu-ambassador-delivered-speech-occasion-human-rights-day-celebration_en

¹⁶ *Possible cooperation within the Multi-Partner Trust Fund was reviewed* https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/40174/possible-cooperation-within-multi-partner-trust-fund-was-reviewed_en. 21/02/2018 - 12:13

efforts. DipECHO has invested €46 million in over 100 projects across the region, in preparing for and mitigating the consequences of natural disasters since 2003¹⁷. DipECHO encourages citizens, civil society groups, local, regional and national authorities to work more effectively together, and efforts into development aid in order to ensure sustainable policies.

The EPCA between the EU and Kazakhstan covers areas such as trade and customs, climate change, energy and green economy as well as rule of law and judicial cooperation. The Cooperation Council confirmed the mutual interest of the EU and Kazakhstan in consolidating the cooperation, in ensuring regional stability and development. Cooperation Council addresses the issues of good governance, human rights protection and civil society cooperation. The EU announced that a new EU Strategy for Central Asia should be adopted in 2019, taking into account the changing political and socio-economic regional environment. The EPCA between the EU and Kazakhstan was signed on 21 December 2015 in Astana. Since 1 May 2016 the implementation of the articles of the Agreement has been launched. The Agreement provides significant boost to economic and political ties between the EU and Kazakhstan, enhances cooperation in 29 key policy areas, including in the sectors of energy, transport, climate change, employment and social affairs, culture, education and research. During 1991-2014, to support Kazakhstan directly, the EU funded more than 350 projects for the total amount of EUR 180 million¹⁸. The Foreign Ministers of the CA countries, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, and the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development met on 10 November 2017 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, for the 13th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting. Meeting focused on security, economic issues, as well

¹⁷ *The European Union and its partners in Central Asia achieve positive results in disaster risk reduction*. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tajikistan/35463/european-union-and-its-partners-central-asia-achieve-positive-results-disaster-risk-reduction_en. 13/11/2017 - 07:13

¹⁸ *EU-Kazakhstan Cooperation Council held in Brussels*. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tajikistan/40436/eu-kazakhstan-cooperation-council-held-brussels_en. 27/02/2018 - 07:45

as the European Union's role in the region, and resulted in the adoption of a Joint Communiqué outlining the further cooperation¹⁹.

GIZ

The “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH” (German International Cooperation) was formed on 1 January 2011. GIZ has been implementing sustainable development projects, programmes in Kazakhstan. In 1996 GIZ opened its first office in Kazakhstan, and today have offices in both Astana and Almaty. GIZ is supporting the Kazakh Government in the fields of sustainable economic development, education and vocational training, good governance, the environment and climate, and health²⁰. The following projects are implemented in Kazakhstan: *Transboundary water management in Central Asia, Central Asia Drug Action Programme German biosecurity programme, Supporting the German minority Promotion of the rule of law in Central Asia, Reform of educational systems in Central Asia, Ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change in high mountainous regions of Central Asia Sustainable use of natural resources in Central Asia, Trade Facilitation in Kazakhstan, Intra-regional and local economic development in Central Asia Mineral resources for development Professional education and vocational training in Central Asia, Support of regional economic cooperation in Central Asia, Support for Vocational Education and Training.*

In Uzbekistan, the GIZ opened a country office in the capital Tashkent in 1992. In CA countries GIZ deals with the sustainable infrastructure (*Transboundary water management in Central Asia*), social development (*Central Asia Drug Action Programme, Advanced training for medical and technical professionals to work with modern high-technology equipment in Uzbekistan. System development in sexual and reproductive health and*

¹⁹ 13th European Union-Central Asia ministerial meeting https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/turkmenistan/36074/13th-european-union-central-asia-ministerial-meeting_en. 23/11/2017 - 08:58

²⁰ Kazakhstan. <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/350.html>

rights – Central Asia). “Your safety is in your clean hands” (completed). German biosecurity programme, security, reconstruction and peace, governance and democracy environment (*Supporting the German minority. Promotion of the rule of law in Central Asia*) and climate change (*Sustainable use of natural resources in Central Asia, economic development and employment (Trade Facilitation in Uzbekistan. Intra-regional and local economic development in Central Asia. Sustainable economic development in selected regions)*).

GIZ currently staff, working in areas such as health, economic development and protection of natural resources. Traditional trade links, production chains collapsed and new national borders cut across transport and trading routes, impeding access to energy and water resources which had previously been shared with other Central Asian states. GIZ is supporting reforms in the economy, health and the protection of natural resources. Key areas of activity in the health sector are capacity development and drug prevention programmes²¹.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is one of Germany’s partner countries in the context of its international cooperation. GIZ has been implementing projects in this country since the 1990s. GIZ has maintained an office in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek since 1992. GIZ is implementing projects in Central Asian countries on a regional, transnational basis. Besides political instability, various other factors have contributed to poverty in Kyrgyzstan: a corruption, barriers to foreign trade, the disruption of former economic and trade relations, and an increasingly dilapidated infrastructure. Economic stabilization, structural reforms, debt reduction are key objectives of Kyrgyzstan’s Country Development Strategy, which aims to reduce poverty nationwide. GIZ’s projects make a flanking contribution to sustainable economic development, supporting the abolition of trade barriers and providing advisory services for the microfinance and resource sectors. Cooperation in the health system

²¹ Uzbekistan. <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/364.html>

focuses on reproductive health and rights, the introduction of development partnerships with the private sector, and quality improvements in health services, particularly in the regions. GIZ's programmes support health system development and the fight against drug use and drug trafficking²².

GIZ's other areas of activity in Kyrgyzstan are: 1) improving primary and secondary education, reform of vocational training, training of managers, 2) legal and judicial reform, 3) transboundary dialogue on water resources management; support for sustainable natural resource management, 4) assisting the Ministry of Youth Affairs to improve the prospects for young people in disadvantaged and conflict-prone areas, 5) promoting civil society organisations through a fund for small-scale development projects 6) support for the German minority.

The following projects are undergoing: *Transboundary water management in Central Asia, Central Asia Drug Action Programme German biosecurity programme, Perinatal Health in Kyrgyzstan Reform of educational systems in Central Asia, Fund for development projects with civil society partners, especially in structurally disadvantaged regions, Supporting the German minority Promotion of the rule of law in Central Asia.*

1) *Ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change in high mountainous regions of Central Asia, Community-based management of walnut forests and pasture in Southern Kyrgyzstan, Strengthening of livelihoods through climate change adaptation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Sustainable use of natural resources in Central Asia.*

2) *Trade facilitation in Kyrgyzstan, Professional education and vocational training in Central Asia, Prospects for youth Mineral resources for development, Sustainable economic development, Vocational training and employment promotion, Support of regional economic cooperation in Central Asia.*

The Central Asian countries had diverged more and more in terms of their social and economic development. The fundamental problem at the root of the weak economic development is the insufficiently developed

²² <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/356.html>

frameworks, in particular the lack of transparency²³. The project in Kyrgyzstan supports legal and judicial reforms in the area of civil and commercial law, provides assistance to the institutions monitoring government activities, including parliamentary committees, ombudspersons' offices and chambers of auditors. In Kyrgyzstan the frameworks within civil and commercial law are also being improved. In Kazakhstan the Supreme Court receives assistance in ensuring that lower-level courts are aware of and understand its rulings. In Kyrgyzstan the project carries out consulting and training measures to improve the application of civil and commercial legislation. In Tajikistan the project assists both the administration and the judiciary in implementing the existing modern administrative procedures act.

As a federal enterprise, GIZ supports in achieving objectives in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development. GIZ is engaged in international education work around the globe. GIZ facilitates change, empowers people to take ownership sustainable development processes. GIZ supports its partners at local, regional, national and international level. GIZ operates in many fields: economic development and employment promotion; governance and democracy; security, reconstruction, peacebuilding and civil conflict transformation; food security, health and basic education; and environmental protection, resource conservation, tourism and climate change mitigation. GIZ supports its partners with management and logistical services, and acts as an intermediary, balancing diverse interests. In crises, GIZ carries out refugee and emergency aid programmes. GIZ promotes networking and dialogue among actors in international cooperation. Capacity development for partner-country experts is a major component of GIZ's services, and GIZ offers its programme participants diverse opportunities to benefit from the contacts they have made. GIZ gives young people a chance to gain professional experience around the world – exchange programmes for

²³ Promotion of the rule of law in Central Asia. <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14355.html>

young professionals lay the foundations for successful careers in national, international markets. GIZ operates on behalf of other German ministries, as well as German federal states and municipalities, and public and private sector clients in Germany and abroad. These include the governments of other countries, the European Commission, the UN and the World Bank. It works closely with the private sector and promotes synergies between the development and foreign trade sectors. It operates in more than 130 countries worldwide. GIZ places or finances around 1,110 development workers, 700 integrated experts, 455 returning experts, 820 volunteers. With a business volume of around EUR 1.85 billion, GIZ is well placed to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

ACTED launched EU-funded DIPECHO X promoting integrated Watershed Management between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. ACTED is continuing its 20-year long commitment to the Tajik society by addressing the country's main challenges, fostering opportunities for the sustainable and inclusive development of the country. ACTED has been especially active in building the capacity of rural communities to prevent natural disasters through the improved management of natural resources. By promoting local mechanisms for the efficient administration of water resources, ACTED contributes to improving water accessibility, livelihoods and food security. ACTED contributes to enhancing the potential of local communities, encouraging their innovativeness and creativity to engage in income generating activities through community-oriented, demand-driven interventions. ACTED continues to foster social cohesion, the self-confidence of Tajiks through its Cultural Centre Bactria, which promotes Tajik culture and arts. In line with the objectives of Tajikistan's Water Reform, ACTED has been paying particular attention to improving equity, reliability of water supply, as well as the hygiene and sanitation situation in rural communities. ACTED has been working to combat soil degradation, water erosion, the main causes of mudflows or landslides. ACTED has been working to strengthen the Tajik civil society and to address the lack of relations between community-based organisations and the government by involving

non-state actors in the country development process. With more than 900 rivers longer than 10 kilometers, Tajikistan is particularly exposed to water-related disasters. ACTED has been adopting a “watershed management” approach aiming to connect upstream-downstream communities and to encourage the use of soil and water conservation measures for stabilising the erosion, degradation process in the whole watershed. ACTED works to increase the preparedness of communities, governments to potential hazards, raise awareness on the impact of detrimental human activities, ultimately decreasing the overall vulnerability of the Tajik population by building resilient, environmentally sustainable communities. Culture plays a key role in the sustainable social and economic development of Tajikistan by promoting intercultural understanding and youth development. In 2018, the Bactria Cultural Centre, initiated and supported by ACTED, celebrated its 17th anniversary. ACTED has been facilitating the access to culture and information, encouraging the development of contemporary art in Tajikistan, while promoting employability skills vocational trainings²⁴. The following projects are in process in Tajikistan: *Learning and Supporting: Two EU Aid Volunteers working on sustainable development in Tajikistan, Alleviating energy poverty in Tajikistan, Supporting Pasture Users Unions to prevent pasture degradation in Tajikistan, Community-based anticipation strategies to save lives, Water in Tajikistan, abundant yet challenging*. ACTED in 2016 run 20 projects in total projects 20 having 70 509 direct beneficiaries.

Uzbekistan is a resource-rich, doubly-landlocked country, strategically located in the heart of Central Asia. 32 million (as recorded in the beginning of 2017) people live in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s population accounts for approximately 46% of Central Asia’s population of 72 million people. Among the main challenges Uzbekistan is facing, employment opportunities and disparity in living standards between rural and urban areas. Governance at central and local levels is needed to improve participatory decision-making, transparency, and the openness of

²⁴ <http://www.acted.org/en/tajikistan>

government bodies. Indeed, the Aral Sea disaster has had a negative impact on regional economics, the environment, and the health and livelihoods of local populations. More equitable income distribution and the creation of employment opportunities, especially for vulnerable groups in rural areas, have maintained social cohesion. Gender equality in primary and secondary education has been maintained. The number of women in the Parliament of Uzbekistan has increased from 6 % in 1994 to 16 % in 2015. Uzbekistan's maternal mortality rate has gradually decreased from 33.1 per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 20 in 2013. Reduced fertility rate, fewer unwanted pregnancies and abortion cases, and longer time periods between pregnancies have contributed to this accomplishment. After rapid increase in 2000-2009, number of people newly diagnosed with HIV has stabilized at the level of 4,000 people. Better environmental management, development, environmental protection strategies, natural resource use, biodiversity, agriculture, renewable energy, etc. has been recognized by the Uzbekistan as important.

ACTED has started developing its activities in Uzbekistan in 1999 and to date remains one of the few International NGOs active across the country, leveraging its long-lasting experience and expertise in the framework of a five-fold mandate: Public health (1), financial assistance (2), agricultural activity (3), environmental protection, preparedness and liquidation of emergency situations (4), water sanitation and hygiene are the main directions of the ACTED. ACTED's aims in Central Asia are to improve the health of the rural population and to mobilize the communities on improving health, decreasing the number of key infectious diseases, changing the practice and attitude of rural population to health and preventing delivery and spread of malaria in the neighboring areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; To support vulnerable families, families with disable people, mainly single mothers with many children; To increase the incomes of vulnerable rural population through improving their agricultural activity by providing high-quality fertilizers and seeds, including provision with livestock and various equipment for processing agricultural production;

To improve of management of natural resources, ensure the protection of the environment, promote the development of renewable energies and prepare of rural population to emergency situations as well as their capacity to react to natural disasters; Water sanitation and hygiene: To improve the access of vulnerable rural population to water through the development of social infrastructures and trainings of rural populations on hygiene.

The purpose of the Uzbekistan's Sustainable Development Strategy for 2017-2021 is raising the efficiency of reforms, creation of conditions to ensure comprehensive and accelerated development of the state and society, setting the priority vectors for the country's modernization and liberalization. The Strategy includes five priority areas. The first one envisages improvement of state and social construction, strengthening of the Uzbek parliament's role in modernizing the country, development of the institutional framework of the state administration, reduction of state regulation of the economy, and strengthening of CSOs and the media's role. The strategy also envisages reformation of the Uzbek judicial system. It proposes to strengthen (i) the genuine independence of the judicial power (ii) the guarantee of protection of the rights and freedoms of the country citizens (iii) the development and liberalization of the Uzbek economy and (iv) the development of the social sphere. Ensuring security, inter-ethnic harmony and religious tolerance, implementation of balanced, mutually beneficial and constructive foreign policy aimed at strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the state. Creation of a security belt around Uzbekistan, stability and good neighborly relations, promotion of a positive image of the country abroad is also the most important direction of the strategy. Since 1999, ACTED has been active in the fields of food security, livelihood, economic development, conflict mitigation, local governance, strengthening CSOs through capacity building, shelter and infrastructure, microfinance, health education, reproductive health care, water and sanitation, etc. The following ACTED-lead projects were accomplished in Uzbekistan: *2002-2003: Rural Development and Cross-Border Cooperation – Towards a peaceful and dynamic environment in the*

Ferghana valley; 2003: Social Development and Economic Support In Southern Uzbekistan: A Model For National Replication; 2003–2004: Regional dialogue and development in Ferghana valley; 2004: Development of Business Opportunities; 2004: Implementation of the Rehabilitation of Community Infrastructures in Kashkadarya; 2004-2007: Community-based Health Education in the Ferghana Valley; 2010-2011: Emergency assistance to vulnerable populations displaced by the recent violence outbreak in the Ferghana Valley; 2011-2013: Sustainable Community Based Health Care in Andijan and Surkhandarya provinces of Uzbekistan; 2017-ongoing: Uzbekistan CSO Empowerment & Promotion Project.

Through project “Sustainable Community Based Health Care in Andijan and Surkhandarya provinces of Uzbekistan” (2011), ACTED has improved the living standards of vulnerable groups in Andijan and Surkhandarya provinces in Uzbekistan by building local capacities to reduce, prevent water-borne illnesses and infectious diseases. Teachers in the provinces have integrated water-borne illness and infectious disease information into their health and education programs, community health workers have improved their capacity to educate women on water-borne illnesses and seasonal infectious diseases, and rural health centers have regained or rehabilitated their access to clean water systems. Recently, ACTED has started implementing its “Uzbekistan CSO Empowerment & Promotion Project” which aims at improving local governance in Uzbekistan by enhancing the capacity of CSOs to act as sustainable development actors. Civil society organizations in Uzbekistan are recognized as key actors in local governance. ACTED and its local partners will conduct a Grassroots Organizations Capacity Assessment of CSOs to identify the trainings required to address their needs in terms of institutional development. By creating a user-friendly online platform that facilitates information and knowledge sharing, ACTED will not only increase CSO’s visibility and their capacity to mobilize resources but also create the conditions for future collaborations between CSOs and development stakeholders. The project was completed by March 2018. ACTED continues to engage across the organisation’s three

core pillars: building population resilience in disaster-prone areas; increasing access to the legal system for the most marginalised communities; and leading inclusive and sustainable growth to reduce poverty in Kyrgyzstan. ACTED responded to the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake in Osh oblast by providing reconstruction materials and technical support in “Build Back Safer”. ACTED continues to build on its previous interventions and strengthen local community capacities to prepare for and withstand natural disasters. Beyond vulnerability to disasters, accessing the legal system in Kyrgyzstan can be restrictive and confusing for marginalised and remote rural populations. By engaging civil society organisations and media in holding duty bearers responsible for respecting the rule of law, ACTED improves access to justice for vulnerable populations, especially in rural communities. Sustainable growth continues to be the largest programming sector in Kyrgyzstan’s predominantly rural agricultural economy, through capacity building in innovative climate-smart agricultural methods, rehabilitation of local infrastructures and support to on-farm value chains.

ACTED promotes inclusive sustainable growth, supported by district development planning. ACTED continues to foster inclusive sustainable growth within the country, by establishing value-added programming to support economic development in the poorest areas of Jalalabad and Batken oblasts through long-term district development planning. To foster inclusive economic growth, ACTED is supporting community planning with community stakeholders to engage in local development platforms, which have created district development plans. It increases access to rule of law for the most marginalised populations. The legal system in Kyrgyzstan can seem inaccessible for marginalised populations, whether they are limited by gender, ethnicity, age, disability or geographical location. ACTED and its partners continue to increase access for these groups, by providing free legal services, online innovative legal tools and engaging legal practitioners to advocate for practical improvements to the legal system. In 2016, over 5,300 marginalised people benefited from legal aid consultations. Particularly of note has been the high response of women (77% of

beneficiaries accessing ACTED's free legal aid) to access these legal services for support. Partners in 2016 in these activities were Batken Rural Advisory Services, Embassy of Switzerland in the Kyrgyz Republic, EuropeAid.

ACTED's Approach in Kyrgyzstan ACTED strategy in Kyrgyzstan is based on three Global Program Pillars: 1) *To respond to emergencies and build disaster resilience*; 2) *To strengthen civil society, effective governance and social cohesion*; 3) *To promote inclusive and sustainable growth*. ACTED promotes that empowering communities and developing the capacity of both civil society organizations and local authorities. ACTED continuously strives to provide the assets, build the capacities, and support activities that allow people to meet their needs, recover from shocks, and increase their resilience. ACTED's Ongoing Flagship Projects Building population resilience in disaster-prone areas ACTED pursues its disaster risk management (DRM) actions within communities most at risk in two disaster-prone watersheds across the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. ACTED supports more than 30 community-based DRM and rapid response teams in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, creates early-warning systems and safe havens, realises small-scale mitigation works and simulation exercises, all targeted towards increasing the resilience to natural disasters. Since 2014, ACTED has been committed to enhancing access to justice for vulnerable populations in remote areas. ACTED is engaged in activities aiming at reducing poverty by stimulating community based sustainable development and growth. ACTED has launched a community-led initiative in the poverty-stricken districts of Ala-Buka and Leilek, aiming at improving socio-economic conditions of the population by rehabilitating local infrastructures, supporting on-farm value chains, promoting environmentally-conscious agriculture and promoting the development of off-farm income generating activities. ACTED's continuous commitment to disaster relief, conflict mitigation, peace building and the prevention of violent extremism. In the wake of the May 2016 earthquake which damaged nearly one thousand houses in Chong-Alay District of Kyrgyzstan, ACTED provided 545 households with in-kind donations and unconditional cash assistance. ACTED helped 65 extremely vulnerable

households repair or rebuild their houses. ACTED was one of the first aid agencies to respond to the crisis in June 2010. This intervention included the distribution of food and non-food items to over 533,000 people, and the provision of cash injections through temporary employment. ACTED together with its partners, helped rebuild 1,900 houses in Osh and Jalal-Abad. To minimise the risk of instability and mitigate the systemic sources of tension across the southern regions of the country, ACTED launched the REACH initiative (<http://reach-initiative.kg>) to support peace-building activities through the collection of primary data on conflicts affecting rural communities. In 2014 ACTED launched a programme to support in-country capacities to prevent conflict and contribute towards peace, with a focus on women. ACTED helped establish a network of 71 women's organisations across Kyrgyzstan to facilitate the enforcement of Kyrgyzstan's National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. In 2017, building on its unique community outreach and vast experience in peace building and social cohesion, ACTED developed a Comprehensive Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. ACTED's approach consists of empowering communities to detect early signs of radicalization while creating the conditions. In Kyrgyzstan in 2017 there were 214,222 beneficiaries of the project totaling a budget of \$ 1.4 million²⁵.

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in co-operation with the National Information-Analytical Center on Drug Control under the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan has been issuing the information bulletin on the Drug Situation in Central Asia on yearly basis since 2003. Data presented in publications are provided by the state drug control agencies of the CA and include official statistical, analytical and legislative information²⁶. Several large events were organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan supporting open doors event at General Prosecutor's Office for International

²⁵ ACTED continues to strengthen core programming in Kyrgyzstan. <http://www.acted.org/en/kyrgyzstan>

²⁶ http://www.acted.org/Documents%20and%20Settings/User/2017_acted_fact_sheet_-_kyrgyzstan.pdf

Anti-Corruption Day offering training courses for female managers, organizing regional seminar on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism in Tashkent²⁷. Even in Uzbek media and society OSCE is promoting social advertisement calling for the eradication of corruption with the help of the distribution of the brochures and posters, TV-ads.

The following projects are in process in Tajikistan: Learning and Supporting: Two EU Aid Volunteers working on sustainable development in Tajikistan, Alleviating energy poverty in Tajikistan, Supporting Pasture Users Unions to prevent pasture degradation in Tajikistan, Community-based anticipation strategies to save lives, Water in Tajikistan, abundant yet challenging. Recent developments indicate that Central Asian countries are all collaborating in all fields including electric grid, natural gas, agriculture. Once they had tensions in practically all fields they have no quarrels at present. Opening of check points, visa-free movement of people between the countries facilitate the harmonization of the relations among the Central Asia.

Conclusion

To sum up, the data analysed in the article shows that the European organizations are the most accepted organizations in Central Asia, besides to their North American and Russian counterparts indicating that these institutions play equidistant role vis-à-vis non-European establishments. As a counterbalance towards these institutions European organizations are doing themselves best to disseminate Western values which in its turn will support the enhancement of high degrees of human development.

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The Russian Propaganda in France: Fantasy or Reality?

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Abstract. The aim of this article is to examine Russian influence and propaganda in France. Recently, the Russia Today TV channel has received agreement for a network in France. This decision has provoked a scandal in France and fears about liberty and objectivity of the news. During the last French election, President Putin and the Russian media had started a propaganda campaign against candidate Macron. It is not a secret to say that Putin shared some of Marine Le Pen's ideas, including those about the greatness of France and the defense of its sovereignty. After 1917 revolution, the Russian immigration to France had raised. The idea of a European Russian was in the air. Charles De Gaulle's famous expression "The Europe from Brest until Vladivostok" underlined the potential connection between Russia and Europe. The idea of reconciliation and new partnership with Russia finds some support among the French. This paper consists of two main parts. It starts with a brief overview of the Russian media and lobbying and its audience within France. The second part of the paper explains why a part of France could be sensitive to the Russian media (like the French communist party, popular during the 50' and 60') and the last one takes a closer look at the relationship between Macron and Putin.

Keywords: propaganda, France, Russia.

Introduction

On December, 18th 2017 there was a big but discreet event in France. The French version of Russia Today TV channel show diffused its first news. The position of other French media (as France Television, TF1...), politicians and intellectuals were careful and suspicious about the broadcast authorization providing by the French CSA (Superior Council of audiovisual) and created a certain polemic in France. There are already five news networks in France (BFM, CNEWS, LCI, France info, France 24). So why authorize another one with a potential danger of propaganda?

Curiously, this decision was taken approximately six months after Emmanuel Macron was elected President. During the last presidential campaign, Macron was rumored about his pretending homosexuality. An interview at the pro-Russian internet site “Sputnik” detailed that “Macron is Media’s favorite and had some support from gay lobby as Pierre Berge, who was Yves Saint-Laurent lover. Moreover, Macron’s party “En Marche” was victim of a cyber-attack from Russia.

In general, France had been accused of having an independent policy of Charles De Gaulle in the past, or an atlantist and pro-American one of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande recently. The cancellation of the sale “Mistral ship” in consequence of Ukraine crisis had increased the tension between Russia and France. For Russia, France is not anymore the great France of Napoleon Bonaparte or Charles De Gaulle’s. Just a pure support of globalization, migration and the feeling that France has lost its identity with immigration and the only real French protector is Marine Le Pen.

The present paper will inquire about the new Russia Today channel and the initial presence and action of Russian lobbying inside France. It will also show the potential connection between French opinion and Russian ones and an overview of the relationships Macron-Putin.

The Russian Media Lobbying in France

“Russia Today” in France

We had seen previously that *Sputnik news* and *RT (Russia Today)* had tried to destabilize Macron’s campaign. These media are financed by the Russian Government. Fake news had been published without controls or filters on Facebook and Twitter. Despite this, France authorized RT to broadcast its French version¹.

When President Macron welcomed Vladimir Putin at Versailles on the 29 May 2017, the President of Russia Today France, Xenia Fedorova also took part in this visit. She asked President Macron why her journalists were

¹ Raphaëlle Bacqué, *Russia Today France: l’arme du «soft power» russe*, «Le Monde» 6 December 2017 (www.lemonde.fr access: 6 décembre 2017).

not allowed to access the “En Marche” headquarters. His answer was explicit: *“Russia Today and Sputnik didn’t have journalistic behavior but were an influence machine and untruthful propaganda in the last weeks (during presidential campaign).”* This episode took place at the press conference and Vladimir Putin looked unconcerned.

The suspicions about Russia Today are more than a caricature. French journalists often ask Mrs. Fedorova if she really was a spy for Russia. It proves the distrust from French Medias about RT objectivity and ambitions.

The project for the French version of RT was official in 2015 but the drop of ruble exchange rate, as a consequence of economic sanctions and oil prices falls postponed it. Now it’s active and is being monitored by the French audio-visual council. However, Mrs. Fedorova has probably underestimated the bad reputation of her network in France.

First, it is well-known that RT had 14 warnings in the United Kingdom from Ofcom regulators for errors or partial information about Ukraine and Syria.

Second, Mrs. Fedorova had tried for 10 months to recruit famous journalists like Natacha Polony from “the Figaro”; daily news from the right. This talented journalist is defending the French culture and the treat of demagoguery’s consequences within the French political class about globalization and immigration. All these ideas are absolutely acceptable for RT.

She and other famous journalists will come eventually to Russian Today. For Mrs. Fedorova, there is political pressure for who could collaborate with their channel. The famous writer Helene Carrere d’Encausse, specialist on Russian history and member of the “French Academy” also declined the proposition. However, the French sovereigntist economist Jacques Sapir, known for his pro-Russian views, accepted.

It was easier to employ a marginal or unemployed journalist.

100% of RT France budget (280 million EUR) is directly financed by Russia. The official or unofficial target is to deploy a very influential public

diplomacy and to fix the Russian soft power in France. The channel will be broadcast only on certain “boxes” and not on the official digital territorial broadcasting.

It is too early at this time to develop a feedback on Russia Today France. For the previous version in England or in America, “*the ideas develop more a negative response about occidental countries than a positive speech about Russia*” said Maxime Audinet, a researcher on Russian influence. The media is too much smart for passing it as the “Putin voice” but it will certainly cover international events such as Ukraine or Syria in favor of Russia. It is useful to remind that French people don’t have yet this habit to watch international media sources like in the Middle East or Eastern Europe².

Since 2018, nobody is talking about RT France in the media or in bars. We have not seen any advertisements from the channel in the streets or on the internet; only some articles or report about the preparation. So we can be currently septic about the audience and the potential influence of RT in France under these conditions.

Russia lobbying and propaganda in France

If RT France is an element of Russian lobbying, the Russian propaganda could be like pollution in the river: we don’t see it, we don’t feel it but it is reality. In 2008, the institute of democracy and cooperation was inaugurated as the Russian think tank. Its official logo is the “Alexandre III” bridge, the famous Parisian bridge. Its first stone had been put by Tsar Nicolas the second in 1896. This is a certain reference to the tsarist period and the “big Russia”³.

The idea of this institute would belong to a lawyer named Anatoli Koutcherena, who defended Edward Snowden. He is also the “human

² Audrey Kucinskas, *Russia Today se lance en France: “Ce n’est pas une propagande grossière”* «Sputnik/AFP» 17 December 2017 (https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/medias/russia-today-se-lance-en-france-ce-n-est-pas-une-propagande-grossiere_1968396.html).

³ Andrew-Sebastien Aschehoug, *Les poupées russes de la propagande de Poutine en France*, «Slate» 11 february 2015 (www.slate.fr/story/97835/IDC-russie-france-poutine).

rights” adviser to Putin. The target is to respond to Americans and European think tanks, and in particular the “Freedom House”, which has Russia assimilated to African countries about corruption and economical level in its annual ranking. Here again, the new Russian soft power is in action to give a positive image of Russia in France and Europe.

The problem of this think tank is the source of its financing. The details and information about it are not clear and opaque. Putin’s adviser declared that the financing is about 70 million EUR from Russia, which is enormously much for a think tank. But the option of complementary financing by private Russian companies is also available. If the Institute would be a foreign one in Russia, it would be required to register as a “foreign agent” and declare the origin of its resources, as Russian law requires.

Natalia Narotchnitskaia is the director of this institute. She was a member of Russian Duma. Her views are conservative part and she is close to Putin. Her ideas are mixed with orthodox values and conservatism. All of her writings are not concerned about democracy and the ambition to cooperate with Europe and United States but much more for a return to historical Russia. She promoted the unification of all Russian people including in the post-soviet countries. These ideas can be echoed in the Populist Party, like “Front National”. Even though Marine Le Pen has denied it, her party was financed by some Russian banks⁴.

According to Radio Free Europe, France may be the principal target of the new Russian soft power and this institute. This is like a kind of “seductive operation” on the French political debate. Regularly, the institute is inviting some sovereignists and people from the traditional catholic right. Former ministers from François Mitterrand term, like Roland Dumas or Jean-Pierre Chevenement often participated in meetings organized by the

⁴ Agathe Duparc, *Le prêt russe du FN récupéré par une société aéronautique active en Syrie*, «Mediapart» 9 august 2017 (<https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/dossier-largent-russe-du-front-national>).

institute. These former ministers are supporting a changing about relationships between France and Russia.

Are French sensitive about Russian propaganda?

The last French election in 2017 had underlined the permanent risk of nationalism. Before this event, the Front National was strong and confident about its results. The institute of democracy and cooperation has a friendly relationship with Marine Le Pen and her party. Sergueï Narychkine, current Head of Duma, initiated the good relationships between Russia and Le Pen. She officially declared her admiration for Putin, and her father, former President and creator of Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen assumed that the values defended by Putin are the same than its party.

Obviously, and as in the rest of Europe, Marine Le Pen is surfing with the fears of migration, crisis and eurosceptism. Moreover, she is charismatic and her speeches are simplifications of problems, their origins and causes. There are many common points between Putin and Le Pen, much more than with Macron. Between them, it's a "win-win" cooperation: Russian ideas can progress through Le Pen ideas and vice-versa.

Previous candidate from the traditional right, François Fillon, was pro-Russian and was supporter of a new policy toward Russia⁵. In 2016, several French MPs also took a business and political trip to Crimea. They considered Crimea officially as belonging to Russia and also protested economic sanctions against Russia. These actions were, however, condemned by the French Government and François Hollande.

Russian propaganda can be heard and accepted by some French politicians as well as elites. The French elites are often Russophile as a result of history and the Russian migration in the 19th and 20th centuries. The famous French lawyer who defended the abolition of the death sentence in

⁵ Isabelle Mandraud, *A Moscou, le succès de François Fillon à la primaire salué comme un «événement sensationnel»* «Le Monde» 21 november 2017 (http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/11/21/a-moscou-le-succes-de-francois-fillon-a-la-primaire-salue-comme-un-evenement-sensationnel_5035384_3210.html).

1981, Robert Badinter, has Russian origins from his father, who immigrated to France in the beginning of the 20th century, from Bessarabia, in the former Russian empire⁶. In their mind, Russia can't be ignoring or discrediting...

For the common people the Russian propaganda can be heard via Le Pen's own ideas. For some of them, Putin is the symbol of a strong man who is able to make decisions on his own and defend his country and is a real Russian symbol. It's the opposite of the current situation in France. According to Le Pen, France is lost within the European Union and is losing its identity with an uncontrolled immigration for the last fifty years. Concerning foreign policy, Putin is also a good alternative of the American hegemony with a pragmatism based on a real relationship without moral judgments. Putin is able to talk with Assad in order to defend him, analyze the problems and also show to the entire world that Russia is powerful. Some French people are sensitive about the idea to stop American hegemony and looking after another relation with Russia.

Despite this, we must remind ourselves of the American lobby in France which is also powerful and more visible. The Russian propaganda in France can play a role in opposing the United States but still have a bad cliché from the Soviet time with spies, lies and fears. It is not easy to change thinking.

The Relationships Macron-Putin

Macron represents a big hope for France and Europe for his dynamism and willingness to change. But what about the relationship with Putin? The previous polemic with cyber-attacks and propaganda should give a clear picture of tension and virile meeting up. But Macron is clever and pragmatic: no hard reactions. It was better to deal and considerate Putin as he would desire: with magnificence and respect. He met with him at the Chateau de Versailles to remind him that France is still or become again the big France, as it was during Napoleon or Charles De Gaulle's period. It also

⁶ https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Badinter

means that Macron has to consider Russia as an equivalent in the level of noblesse.

The chateau was symbolic 300 years after visit of “Pierre Le Grand” Tsar to Louis XV, who was seduced by this place. Macron adds that it is “the symbol of Russia that wants to open its arms to Europe and taking all its strength.

Previously, relationships with Hollande were both good and constructive. Negotiations over Ukraine with Merkel and Hollande gave France a positive look. But despite this, distrust was present and Macron’s ambition was to rebuild trust by giving a solid appearance of being firm. It is in this context that Macron invited Mr. Putin.

The interview was frank and direct. Macron had evoked the Russian media and its fake news. He also denounced respectively the Ukrainian conflict and Russia attitude in Syria. For Macron, *the diplomacy is not a question of personal chemistry but it consists to bring solutions to concrete problems*⁷.

After this visit, Russia media in general changed their opinion about Macron.

The Russian daily news *Moskovski Komsomolets*, note that the old Europe has now a new terrible “Infant”. It underlined that Putin was silent when Macron called Russian media as influence machines and instruments of propaganda. Macron is typical French as the three musketeers: for not being obliged to defend himself, he attacked⁸.

We can hope this first meeting would be the start of a new and real partnership. Macron flatters Putin’s ego with this kind of organization. But as a realistic and pragmatic President, he will follow and observe Putin

⁷ Isabelle Mandraud, Rencontre Macron-Poutine: «l’Infant terrible» de France surprend la presse russe, «Le Monde» 30 may 2017 (http://lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/05/30/rencontre-macron-poutine-dans-la-presse-russe-l-infant-terrible-de-france-surprend_5136053_3210.html).

⁸ Solenn de Royer, Ukraine, Syrie, droits de l’homme: à Versailles, Macron ne ménage pas son invité Poutine «Le Monde» 30 may 2017 (http://lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/05/30/ukraine-syrie-droits-de-l-homme-a-versailles-macron-ne-menage-pas-son-invite-poutine_5135765_3210.html).

ambitions toward Europe. As for United Kingdom with Brexit, Macron also wants to be the European voice as Merkel was before him. She is currently too weak to appear as a European leader after German elections of 2017. The message is “don’t try to divided us and let’s work together”.

Macron is young and likes challenges as a real ambitious person. His businessman behavior is in connection with his first job at Rothschild bank. Even Donald Trump did not be impressing by Macron. He can be estimated as the future more than Trump and Putin who symbolized more the past and an idea of fears against foreigner and the defense of a patria and ethnic.

Conclusion

The Russian propaganda in France is a reality. All tools such as institutes, money and ideas could have an audience inside France. The European economic crisis is very helpful to this. But this propaganda is not strong enough for being a real soft power force. The autocratic way of governance from Putin, his ambition to further destabilize Europe and especially Eastern Europe is not a new fact.

There’s a question to the European Union: how could they fight against this propaganda? With more collaboration and consideration toward Russia? Perhaps.

The future of the Russian propaganda in France will depend on factors such as Macron’s policy in France. It depends if he’s able to restore France from the inside and also improve the economic situation. He will also be challenged concerning the Francophone and his ability to appear as a real leader who is more charismatic than Angela Merkel. Whatever it takes, the relations France-Russia must be real and non-aligned on United-States. If we want a real protected Ukraine, France has to take the lead on the Minsk agreement to affirm that France is back and Russia would have to take account of this.

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