How can we explain a stronger pro-Russian and weaker pro-European sentiment in Georgia’s peripheral regions compared to the national average? This brief essay combines quantitative data from public opinion polls with my qualitative research in the villages along the de facto border/occupation line of South Ossetia to explain the geopolitical outlook of the peripheral region.
We must acknowledge that we do not have any statistically representative quantitative study confirming such geographical deviation in the geopolitical outlook. Trusted surveys conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC Georgia) and others do not usually provide such a detailed geographical breakdown. Their data are typically limited to urban/rural divisions and occasionally show results of specific big cities.
These studies show that, on average, the rural population is less enthusiastic about Georgia’s integration into the EU and NATO than the urban population, especially compared to Tbilisi residents. The difference between these groups varies between 10 and 20 percentage points. The rural population tends to show even less support for Georgia’s Western policies than senior citizens (aged 55 and above).
Similarly, a 2021 study by the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies found a significant difference in negative attitudes towards the Russian state between Tbilisi (59%) and rural Georgia (36%). A neutral attitude (40%) was a more common answer than a negative one among the rural respondents.
I approach the research question by distinguishing two levels of socialization that influence an individual’s geopolitical orientation: national and regional/local. At the national level, everyday institutional practices and media representations shape shared meanings about the nation, community, state, and adversaries. Citizens’ regular exposure to these nationwide discourses reinforces their national identity and political outlook.
At the local level, it is an individual’s immediate environment and community, such as neighborhood, village, city, and region that shape their day-to-day experiences. Within this small-scale setting, local social and economic practices foster a sense of community and differentiate one region or locality from another. Participation in and exposure to these local, regional practices also shapes an individual’s identity and social habitus. Consequently, the region, characterized by its unique socio-economic history and identity, represents an independent variable in determining an individual’s geopolitical attitudes.
This definition of the region also applies to a small strip of villages within Shida Kartli, which, for lack of a more precise term, may be referred to as a ‘boundary region’ to distinguish it from other areas in Shida Kartli that do not share a border with South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region. Territorially, these villages belong to the municipal district of Gori, but historically and geographically they are closer to Tskhinvali.
I conducted fieldwork in the villages neighboring the de facto boundary with South Ossetia twice: in September-October 2019 and in August-September 2022. The goal of the fieldwork, among others, was to identify, firstly, prevalent geopolitical ideas and arguments in the region, and subsequently, the region-specific logic, conditions, and factors behind the local residents’ geopolitical views.
In total, I conducted 30 in-depth semi-structured interviews, with most of them taking place in Nikozi, Ergneti, Ditsi, and Khurvaleti. The respondents are relatively equally distributed across gender categories, but in terms of age groups, the distribution skews towards seniors. This bias appears to better reflect the age distribution among the region’s residents. Furthermore, most respondents are ‘ordinary residents’ representing the low-income economic category, such as farmers, teachers, nurses, pensioners, or unemployed individuals. However, about a third of the sample also includes individuals who could be categorized as local political and intellectual elites, such as local and regional civil servants, school principals, and regional NGO representatives.
The research has shown that the local attitudes towards Russia are more complicated than the mainstream Georgian view, which states that Russia is the enemy. While many respondents do indeed view Russia as Georgia’s enemy and have experienced Russian military violence firsthand, they also see Russia as a potential solution to their daily economic problems. Put simply, they distinguish two meanings of Russia: the state and the trading market.
Quantitative sociological surveys generally show some of this ambivalence towards Russia in the wider population too, especially among rural residents. According to a 2023 study by the International Republican Institute, 73% of the population fully supports Georgia’s EU integration, but this amount decreases to 55% if joining the EU leads to cutting trade relations with Russia. In the case of the rural population, the indicators are 69% and 51%, respectively. These figures show that Russia as a trade partner is a meaningful factor in shaping the Georgians’ geopolitical outlook.
Furthermore, my research also shows significant support for Georgia’s geopolitical neutrality but this view unsurprisingly varies by age groups. The older generation (above 55) remains cautious about Georgia’s Western integration and would welcome closer relations with Russia, particularly in the trade sector. On the other hand, the younger generation (under 35) expresses a strong preference for EU and NATO membership and a clear rejection of Russia. Although this pattern is characteristic of Georgia’s entire population, the generational divide has an additional reason in the ‘boundary region’.
While the 2008 war forever imprinted a sense of trauma among the residents and added a visceral dimension to their negative attitudes towards Russia, the periods before and after 2008 have also shaped their outlook. The younger generation grew up in an area best described as a dead-end due to the borderization process that escalated after the 2008 war. As a result, the ‘boundary region’ became a socio-spatial periphery, entirely dependent on economic aid from the central government in Tbilisi. On the other hand, the older generation has also experienced an earlier, pre-2008 period when the region was an economically vibrant in-between space and the trade relations with Russia sustained the local economy and supported people’s livelihoods.
The economic vitality of the region was largely due to the Ergneti market, situated on the de facto border between Tskhinvali to the northwest and Ergneti to the south. The informal market thrived due to its strategic location. Firstly, it was situated at the crossroads of disputed territories, enabling it to operate outside of state control. Secondly, it was positioned at the southern end of the Transkam highway, providing a fast and direct route to Russia. As a result, the Ergneti market became a hub for regional trade in the 1990s and fostered a self-sustaining economy that involved and benefited much of the local population as it provided employment and income for local Georgians and Ossetians.
The significance of Russia as an economic partner was greater in this region than in any other part of Georgia. This partnership had a significant impact on the daily lives and economic well-being of the people. Consequently, the residents of this region regardless of their ethnicity (Ossetian or Georgian) displayed a distinct positive attitude towards Russia, unlike the rest of Georgia, where Russia was considered a threat to national security and territorial integrity.
Since 2008, the once-invisible and almost non-existent boundary has become a real obstacle in local life due to a combination of Russian soldiers and physical barriers such as barbed wire. This process of territorial enclosure is known as borderization, creating a de facto border where there was none before. In Georgian discourse, borderization is viewed as Russia’s political tool and leverage over Georgia. Russia is seen as an aggressor and Georgia as a victim. However, this narrative fails to fully capture the experience of the residents.
In this regional, peripheral understanding of the geopolitical situation, the victim is not just Georgia as a sovereign state suffering from Russia’s territorial aggression (although this perspective is fully acknowledged). It also includes the local community, which was initially devastated by Russia’s war and territorial enclosure, and afterwards, further undermined by the lack of support from the Georgian state.
The problem lies in the state’s failure or unwillingness to mitigate various costs created for the locals by the borderization. Despite the state’s security presence in the villages and on the boundary line, and despite some social benefits that the residents get, the sense of abandonment and frustration has been a key theme of my conversations in the region. These negative feelings of insecurity are only partially related to the Russian threat; the rest is more inward-looking and revolves around unemployment, poverty, and daily survival.
This set of insecurities and anxieties have been contributing to out-mobility from the region. Some have moved to Tbilisi, while others have left the country altogether. The primary reason is not the fear of Russians but uncertainty about the present and the future. These negative experiences also shape geopolitical attitudes.
A video report about an incident of borderization in Gugutiantkari from 2020 by Gori-based journalist Goga Aptsiauri illustrates this point. A local elderly man reacted to the news by suggesting that “if the government cannot stop [borderization], let us unite with Russia again, the way we were before.” His neighbor, in a separate conversation with the journalist, repeated the same view: “We should not have separated from Russia. See what the independence brought to people?” The journalist dismissed these declarations as old people’s nostalgia for the Soviet Union. However, I think that more than longing for the past, these quotes illustrate the frustration with the present.
Frustration and uncertainty about the present and future also impact the feelings about Georgia’s geopolitical and geo-economic choice of Europe, which has not brought any perceived benefits to the region’s residents. Most do not possess the technology or resources to produce high-quality agricultural products that would sell on the EU market, but they do have the experience of earning a livelihood through exporting apples to Russia and importing cheap flour to feed the family. Several of my respondents remembered the actual price of a bag of flour sold at the Ergneti market in the early 2000s, which was several times cheaper than today. One respondent succinctly summarized the relationship between the economic condition and the geopolitical outlook: “When your child is hungry, and your family is hungry, [we] should not be surprised that they see the solution in Russia.”
In the current political climate, as Georgia’s government actively undermines the country’s European integration efforts, public opinion, which overwhelmingly favors a pro-Western foreign policy, remains crucial in preventing a shift towards Russia and the establishment of an authoritarian system in Georgia. However, a critical question that we cannot currently answer, and that quantitative studies struggle to properly capture, is the intensity of the pro-European sentiment. While about three-quarters of the population may support Georgia’s EU integration, far fewer would likely feel outraged or threatened if the government pursued a different policy. That is because Georgia’s EU integration process has so far largely bypassed the people’s daily lives in rural areas. They hear about the EU-Georgia free trade agreement and visa-free regime on TV, but these concepts do not bring them any real benefits because most Georgians cannot even afford to travel to Europe. The challenge lies in translating policy achievements into tangible effects.
This can be achieved through the existing instruments such as the EU4Business Initiative, which provides financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises in Georgia and other Eastern Partnership states. However, for this initiative to have a profound impact, it must expand its financial and geographic scope to include Georgia’s rural areas, including geopolitically sensitive ‘boundary regions’ in Shida Kartli and Samegrelo as priority areas.
Gela Merabishvili, Affiliated fellow at CSS